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This study reflects on Pakhtun sense of belonging and suggests a complex and dynamic 
process of identification that involves multiple aspects. The multilayered, contextual 
and contested identification process among Pakhtuns indicates segmentary ethnicity that 
has intra ethnic, inter ethnic and national aspects. It argues that the literature on Pakhtun 
identity  highlights the internal stratification and ecological variation amongst Pakhtuns 
but stop short of establishing any  relationship between this internal stratification and the 
process of identification. The literature also fails to see the significance of the 
continuous and progressive identification of Pakhtuns with Pakistan and Islam. 
Focusing on generative processes (internal and external identification) in time of flux 
this thesis remains contemporary in its approach to ethnicity and identity. It also 
contributes to the debate in Social Anthropology about  the relative emphasis on 
‘boundary’ or the ‘cultural stuff’. The research focuses on Malakand in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), which in its changing administrative status has hybridity of the 
‘autonomous’ Tribal Areas and ‘governed’ Settled Districts. Such transforming status 
has a greater significance to investigate identity processes in time of flux and in the 
context of Pakhtun ecological variation. I have argued in this study that Pakhtuns in 
Malakand categorize each other as Khanan and Ghariban in times of socio economic 
change. These categories in reciprocal opposition maintain categorical boundary 
through a meaning system that is informed by particular patterns of social conduct. The 
two categories are also involved in contextual contestation over the ethnic identity i.e 
who is Pakhtun? The contestation involves alternative emphasis on ascribed and 
performing aspects of Pakhtunness in local and non local contexts. Pakhtuns also reflect 
on their Pakistani and Muslim identities in a progressive way. Although Pakhtun 
identity  remains primary in relation to Pakistani identity, they do perceive themselves as 
belonging to a multi ethnic Pakistani identity. The non ideological and non sectarian 
Muslim identity remains significant to Pakhtuns. However, the current religious unrest 
in the region has generated a discourse that reconsiders the relationship between 
Pakhtun cultural code and Islam. The thesis thus concludes that dynamic identification 
processes among Pakhtuns of Pakistan indicate multilayered, contested and contextual 
Pakhtunness. This also alludes to the segmentary nature of ethnicity and the complexity 
of relationship between ethnicity and Islam in Pakistan.
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Introduction 
The tragic incidents of 11 September 2001, helped shaping an understanding that 
humanity and global peace is threatened by  ‘unprecedented terror’. This understanding 
caused enormous shift of interest towards the Muslim world where the source of such 
terror was perceived to be. Such interest was transmitted through the words and images 
of media and through the extended academic enquiries. Although the media presentation 
of Muslim societies was often predicated on the distorted interpretation that produced 
stereotypes, the intellectual endeavors were also deficient in exposing the realities and 
complexities of these societies. More than a particular mind set, it  was the difficulty in 
access to these societies that  caused such inadequacy. In the paucity  of fresh data from 
these societies, researchers relied on the earlier historical and anthropological accounts 
with some intake from media reports and related them to the broader theoretical 
phenomena such as modernity, development, nationalism, religious revivalism, etc. 
Consequently, the end product of such a process was a holistic, elementary and 
unequivocal account of the societies that were otherwise much more in their subtleties, 
intricacies, diversities and variability. 
 Pakistan being one of the most pivotal Muslim States has been at the center of 
the recent turbulence since 11 September 2001. Most specifically, Pakistan’s North 
Western part and its majority  Pakhtun population has been at the center of almost all 
commentaries, policy reports and analysis on the ‘war on terror’.1 Pakhtuns in Pakistan 
and in the neighboring Afghanistan are often conveniently associated with Islamic 
militancy in the region. They are also found the protagonists of the Islamic revivalist 
tendencies manifested in the proliferation of Deobandi influence, attainment of electoral 
power by the religious political parties, and the increasing strength of the militant 
1
1 Pakhtuns, Pukhtun, Pashtuns or Pathans are different names of the (more than 40 million) people spread 
across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. My informants in the field called themselves 
Pakhtun and therefore, I borrow the word Pakhtun from their usage and refer to them as Pakhtuns in this 
text (see also Ahmed, 1980; Edwards, 1996). 1998 Census of Pakistan reveals that, besides the majority 
of Punjabis (44.15%), Pakhtuns are the second most numerous ethnic group of Pakistan (15.42 %) 
followed by Sindhis (14.1%), Saraiki speaking (10.53 %), Mohajirs (7.57 %) and Baluchis (3.57 %). 
Pakhtun in Pakistan are mostly settled in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan and the 
Federally Administered Areas (FATA). The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is often identified with 
Pakhtuns and this is reflected through the recent change of its name from North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The province was created by the British in 1901 and its name was 
recently changed by the 18th constitutional amendment. The amendment was passed by the parliament 
through a consensus vote and was signed into law by the President of Pakistan on 19 April 2010 (The 
News, 20 April 2010).
organization such as Taliban and Al-Qaeda.2  These linkages than help construct the 
image of a Pakhtun in the image of Taliban or ‘Islamic terrorists’. These stereotypes are 
then disseminated through international and national media in Pakistan. They also 
engender question about Pakhtun identity and its relation with Islam. Most of the 
presentations of Pakhtun identity  are the rereading of the historical accounts of religious 
millenarian movements of 19th and 20th century in the region and some of the 
anthropological enquiries that report tribal conflict, factionalism and violence. Such 
understanding of Pakhtun identity construct a Pakhtun who is strict adherent of his 
primordial and static cultural code known as Pakhtunwali and Islamic Jihad. Therefore, 
a Pakhtun is seen as a ‘primitive’ and ‘fanatic Muslim’. 
 Pakhtuns around the world daily encounter these stereotypes not only  through 
the vibrant media but also through their interaction with wide range of people. The 
experience of such an encounter, often in form of an ordeal, channels into 
contemplation on their identity and the possible reaction to such stereotypes. Exceeding 
amount of anguish and contemplation expressed in various peace association, forums 
and blogs on the world wide web can be witnessed. This study  is part  of my own 
reflective and contemplative endeavor to comprehend Pakhtun identity and its related 
complexities. My Pakhtun credentials put me in a position that manifest concerns that I 
share with my Pakhtun friends and also the advantage of having access to a society  that 
is less accessible to others. Therefore, unlike many other academic endeavors, mine is 
both rooted in a concern I share with my Pakhtun friends and in the advantageous 
position I have to gain access and reach out to the people that are conveniently relegated 
to ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ and ‘militants’.
 My focus in this study is on Pakhtun identity as it is central to understanding the 
complexity of their society and existence. Moreover, what I present here is an analysis 
of Pakhtun’s perspective on the complexity of Pakhtun identity. I have investigated the 
processes of identification set  in their changing social conditions by inquiring how do 
Pakhtuns identify themselves? Part of this enquiry focuses on the intra ethnic and inter 
ethnic aspects of identification and part of it looks into the debate about Pakhtun 
religious and national identification. By intra ethnic I mean processes of categorization 
and identification within the Pakhtun population and by inter ethnic I refer to 
2
2 Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam is the product of 19th century reform movement in India. See chapter 8 
for details. 
identification vis a vis other (non Pakhtun) ethnic groups. It is through this intra ethnic 
and inter ethnic I will elaborate the dynamic, contextual and segmentary ethnicity  and 
identity  of Pakhtuns. Moreover, by national and religious aspects of identification I 
mean the sense of belonging to Pakistan (Pakistaniat) and Islam (Muslimness). Through 
such analysis I will explore the interplay  of ethnicity, religion and nationalism in 
Pakistan.        
Inter ethnic and intra ethnic
Since the classical anthropological studies of Barth (1959a,b) and Ahmed (1980) there 
has been rarely any cogent anthropological enquiry that could reflect on Pakhtun 
identity  and its changing form in a time of flux. Any  such enquiry would have exposed 
the complexity of identity  embedded in the multiplicity  of Pakhtunness. The multiple 
aspects include internal and external or intra ethnic and inter ethnic processes. 
Discussion on Pakhtun identity often includes the ecological variation that influences 
Pakhtun identity. It  is this variation that provides background for exploring the internal 
processes that affect the maintenance of identity. It constructs the categories of Tribal 
Areas Pakhtun and Settled Area Pakhtuns. 
 In Pakistan the major classification of this variation is categorized into 
administratively autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or simply 
Tribal Areas and constituent districts of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, known as 
Settled Areas. The Tribal Areas have been historically and traditionally autonomous 
from the influences of the centralized State of Pakistan and Afghanistan with relevantly 
a greater proportion of population organized on tribal lines. The acephalous, segmentary 
tribal organization, (mostly) untaxed pastoral economy  and egalitarian ethos manifested 
in tribal council known as Jirga make Tribal Areas different from Settled Areas. It is 
here that the ideal Pakhtun cultural code, Pakhtunwali, is practiced in exacting manner 
(cf. Ahmed, 1980). 
 However Settled Areas fall into the region that has been under the influence of 
States and empires through out history. Pakhtuns have arrived to these places through 
conquest, migration and settlement. These areas have irrigated land that nurtures a 
feudal economy (Ahmed, 1976: 82-83), generates taxes for the State and produces 
stratified and hierarchical society (Barth, 1959b; Lindholm, 1980). These situations and 
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the consistent socioeconomic changes have created conditions where autonomy is 
compromised and some of the tribal features of organization and culture have become 
weakened or redundant. Therefore, the identity is renegotiated by  changing the content 
and minimum requirements of identity (Barth, 1969b). Most importantly a huge 
population in the Settled Areas has lost the memory  of their ancestry  and therefore can 
hardly  establish their claims over the land distribution associated with tribal conquest 
and settlement.3 This population is often described as the descendants of the conquered 
people, members of the occupational groups accompanying the Pakhtun tribes, migrants 
of different origin or previously of Pakhtun descent (but lost the status due to loss of 
landownership). These people are denied Pakhtun identity by the landowning tribally 
organized Pakhtuns (Barth, 1959b; Lindholm, 1980). 
 The difference between tribal and Settled Areas has been meaningful in a sense 
that the social stratification has different consequences. The Settled Areas demonstrate 
that stratification has caused some discontent  in the lower status groups. This discontent 
is recorded in the anthropological literature (Barth, 1959b;1981) but has been taken as 
insignificant phenomenon due to the general consensus on cultural ethos. The cultural 
values are perceived to be conspicuous and desirable. However, it can be assumed that 
in Tribal Areas such discontent is insignificant for a very  small proportion of the 
population falls in this category (cf. Ahmed, 1980; Anderson, 1983). However, 
discontent in Tribal Areas is manifested differently. The younger clansmen hold grudges 
against the patronage system of the encapsulating State and the primary beneficiary of 
this patronage i.e Maliks (tribal chiefs). The Maliks, enjoyed various inducements and 
privileges from the State which elevated them to a special status in otherwise egalitarian 
society (Ahmed, 1980). 
 The anthropological literature on these societies refer to internal cleavages 
(tribal, ecological and status) and the hierarchical configuration of status groups in 
Settled Areas (Barth, 1959b; Ahmed, 1976), but fail to relate these issues to the identity 
crisis generated through contestation across these fissures. These processes of 
contestation do engender a question; who is Pakhtun? However, the dearth of literature 
that focuses on these internal processes is pivotal in obscuring the problematic Pakhtun 
identity. I will argue that it is imperative to problematize Pakhtun identity in the current 
4
3 In some cases like Swat the proportion of this landless people is close to 80% of the entire population 
(cf. Barth, 1959a,b). 
context to comprehend its complexity. However, equally  important is to revisit the 
external aspects of the identity  despite the problematic character. Where the internal 
processes are characterized by  contestation, the external is a dialectic between 
contestation and consensus. It is this internal external aspect of Pakhtun identity that 
makes it imperative to revisit  the literature on Pakhtuns. Most significantly, such trends 
in the Anthropological literature on Pakhtuns refers to some broader debates and 
contestations in social and cultural Anthropology on how ethnicity be conceived and the 
broader paradox, either to focus on ‘cultural stuff’ (internal content) of the ethnic group 
or their ‘boundary’ vis a vis others.
  The choice of Malakand as a case study  to investigate the inter ethnic and intra 
ethnic aspect of Pakhtun identity is due to its position on the margins of tribal and 
settled distinction. The hybridity  of Malakand also reflect broader socio economic 
changes in the region that has consequences for the Pakhtun identity.  In exploring the 
case of Malakand I will be able to explain the complexity of Pakhtun identity  in the 
time of flux that characterize Malakand.  
 The inter ethnic processes of identification demonstrate the contextuality  of 
Pakhtun identity. The way  they configure, maintain and employ identity in various 
contexts allude to the contextual Pakhtunness. Moreover, in general terms the entire 
society is often perceived as tribal society where tribal identity defines Pakhtuns. In this 
very tribal identity the entire region is included. A person belonging to a certain area 
within Pakhtun region in interaction with other Pakhtuns in Peshawar (capital city of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) would allow the others to assume that the person belongs to one 
of the recognized tribes of the particular region. Therefore, if one is from Mardan, Swat 
and Malakand his or her identity will be assumed as Yousafzai for that is the land of 
Yousafzai tribe, despite demographic diversity in the region. However, such general 
identity  would not count in specific enquiries such as marriages. In those situations the 
person’s  Pakhtunness may be probed to establish his Pakhtun credentials. Moreover, in 
the local context in Malakand, Mardan or Swat the identity  will become more complex 
taking the form of contestation on the inclusion and exclusion. In a locality such as 
Malakand context  itself may be local or non local. In non local more inclusive markers 
such as language may be used to identify a Pakhtun.  
 In local context claims and counter claims of identity  may involve contestations 
for the social stratification, status hierarchies and reinterpretation of Pakhtunwali 
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features may create situation that has consequences for the ethnic identity. The 
consequences are further consolidated by historical processes within localities such as 
migration, economic change, State’s intervention and reforms, etc. These situations are 
dealt with by the social actors in particular ways. They pragmatically  reflect  on their 
identities to get sense of the world and their existence in such a world. More 
significantly, within the local context it  is the inter ethnic and intra ethnic aspects of 
their identity that they contemplate. Therefore, the inter ethnic or intra ethnic aspects of 
Pakhtun identity are significant factors that require research enquiry. It is with such 
understanding that this study  proceeds and probes the complexity  of Pakhtun identity 
and thus contributes to the literature on Pakhtuns. Moreover, focusing on such 
complexity it will also contribute to the theoretical literature on the segmentary  and 
contextual ethnicity and identity. 
Pakhtun Identity and Pakistani Nationalism
Beside the intra and inter ethnic aspects of Pakhtun identity a developing aspect of 
Pakhtuns in Pakistan is their identification with Pakistan. I will argue that debates about 
identification among Pakhtuns are progressive and continuous processes that extend 
from intra ethnic and inter ethnic to the domain of national and religious identification. 
Therefore, it is imperative not only to explore various aspects of Pakhtun identity but 
also through this exploration reflect  on Pakistan’s paradox of nation making. Literature 
on ethnicity and nationalism in Pakistan identify a perennial problem of accommodating 
diverse ethnicities within the national realm. The predicament is certainly not unique in 
the case of Pakistan, as many  post-colonial Nation States are struggling simultaneously 
to cope with ethnic heterogeneity and developing nationality. Pakistan is perhaps unique 
with its post colonial past that has seen such endeavors tarnished by  the secession of one 
of its wings (East Pakistan-1971) to become a sovereign nation State of Bangladesh. 
Notwithstanding, some of the political analysts argued that the task of nation formation 
would be easy in post secession (1971 onwards) for at least the geographical congruity 
and historical commonality  would prevent further break up. Analysis in the literature 
illustrate that  the locus of the perpetual problem is not the binary  relationship between 
ethnicity and nationalism but religion as a thriving factor in this relationship.
6
 The literature discussing the above paradox of Pakistan focusses primarily on 
how nation formation and State building processes are run by post colonial State. It 
therefore, identifies that the paradox directly or indirectly influences all other political 
issues of democracy, institution building, political integration, social cohesion, power 
distribution, role of religion in politics, social development, etc. The debate in this 
literature often elucidate the relationship between Muslim nationalism in colonial India 
and post colonial nation formation in Pakistan. It then includes a variety of 
interpretations of the perennial problem of ethnic resentment and national integration. 
However, currently  the literature is emphatically  alluding to the growing nexus of 
religion, ethnicity and political unrest in Pakistan. These academic interests are 
primarily  but not exclusively  shaped by  the current wave of Islamic radicalism and 
revivalism in Pakistan and reflect the enormous global interest.
 I will suggest that an important  approach to the paradox of nation making in 
Pakistan would be to focus on the identification processes among ethnic groups and the 
ways they relate to State’s nation making efforts. Although, it shifts some of the focus 
off from the ethnic mobilization in form of ethno nationalist movements, the approach 
remains sensitive to the relationship of ethnicity, nationality and Islam. Adopting such 
approach I will show how Pakhtun identification with Pakistan will reveal interesting 
processes that involve pragmatic sense of belonging to a nation in making. Such an 
approach would be useful for future studies on other ethnic groups and their integration 
in Pakistan. Moreover, such an approach will elaborate on the current emphasis on 
religion and ethnicity  on Pakistan for religion represents a continuity from ethnic to 
national (Pakistani) domain. However, despite such continuity it is still debatable 
whether religion has been a unifying or disintegrating factor. 
Perspectives on Pakistani Nationalism:
The argument in this project about the nation formation in Pakistan remains rooted in a 
scholarly debate that is divided into rational choice and discursive positions. These 
positions provide us different perspectives that enrich our understanding of the paradox 
of nation formation in Pakistan. However, the official and ‘esentialized’ perspective of 
Muslim nationalism in South Asia argue that, Muslim nation, identity  and consciousness 
had been persistent since the eighth century  arrival of Islam in the region (Qureshi, 
7
1969; Malik, 1963; Iqbal, 2003).4  They emphasize centuries old objective differences 
between Hindus and Muslims that were reinvigorated by colonial political conditions 
where it  was becoming difficult for Muslims to share a political space with Hindus. This 
perspective is discredited by a number of scholars who argue that the objective 
differences between Muslims and Hindus were not substantial enough to have 
constituted nations and required separate States. However, this very group of scholars 
differ with each other on the relative emphasis on elite manipulation and ideational 
concerns. They constitute two distinctive perspectives of rational choice or elite 
manipulation (Alavi, 1986; Brass, 1974; 1977; Samad, 2007; Jalal, 1985; 1995b) and 
discursive production of nationalism (Van der Veer, 1994; Metcalf, 2004; Verkaaik, 
2007: Shaikh, 1989; 2008; 2009).5  While rational choice or elite manipulation group 
insists that elite interests were a major factor in mobilizing Muslims and demanding a 
nation State for Muslims (Brass, 1974; Alavi, 1986; Samad, 2007), discursive group 
insists that Muslim nationalism was the product of discourse on community, nation and 
power (Shaikh, 1989; 2009), that evolved in the religious institutions and reforms 
efforts going back to 19th century  (Van Der Veer, 1994; Metcalf, 2004; Verkaaik, 
2007).6  Although analytical alienation in these two perspectives and related positions 
may not be very vivid, such division help understanding the complexity of nation 
formation and contested sense of belonging to Pakistan.
 Disagreeing with essentialist perspective, I find the other perspective and its 
internal disagreement useful in analyzing the complexity  of Pakhtun sense of belonging 
and Pakistani nationalism. Elite interests are clearly reflected in State’s effort to 
promote Muslim communal discourse and monopoly of power. The discourse 
perspective on other hand, correctly identifies the normative aspects of Pakistani 
nationalism and contestation on the definition of Islam. In this manner the two can be 
related to the extent that elite continue to manipulate the discourse on Muslim 
nationalism by  projecting communal discourse and discouraging regional expression of 
8
4 Francis Robinson (1974) argues that differences between these categories were perennial; however, the 
elite highlighted them to push for separatism. For an informative debate between Paul Brass and Francis 
Robinson see, Robinson (1977) and Brass (1977).
5  I have borrowed the term elite focused and rational choice from Van Der Veer, who calls it ‘elite-
focussed rational choice approach’ (1994: 29). 
6 This group emphasize the role of Islam as against elite focused group and stresses normative concerns 
of the Muslims of India. See for example the critique of elite interests argument in Farzana Shaikh (2009: 
9-13).   
identity  to retain power. However, where the later overemphasize discourse and focus 
more on contest in the domain of Islam rather than ethnicity, the former ignores 
pragmatic discursive sense of belonging among the masses that calls for accommodative 
principles to constitute a nation. However, I will argue that the usefulness of interests 
perspective in explaining continuous elite manipulation of national identity and its 
ability  in explaining the inter-ethnic discourse among Pakhtuns. Similarly, I will show 
that the normative explanation, discourse on contested meaning of Islam is useful in 
explaining Pakhtuns’ discourse on sacrifice and insistence that Pakistan has yet to 
become a nation. 
National identity formation:
 In this thesis I propose that nation formation in Pakistan can best be understood 
as a process that has been manipulated by elite but at the same time manifested in a 
broader discourse on nation and power. Tracing the history of such a process reveals 
interesting developments that  have consequences for the ways ethnic groups shape their 
sense of belonging to the nation. Both rational choice and discursive focus schools 
provides valuable insights into such process. 
  The elite focused group (Alavi, 1989; Samad, 2007; Qureshi, 1993, Jalal, 
1995b) argue that although the regional and religious divisions and factions within the 
Muslim elite and masses were temporarily put on hold, they  reemerged soon after 
independence (1947). Punjabis and Mohajirs constituting the dominant elite and sharing 
power, suppressed ethnic and regional expressions of identity (Qurashi, 1993; Samad 
2007; Alavi, 1989). They collectively and unscrupulously  retained centralized State and 
projected national identity based in Islam and Urdu. Mohajirs losing power made 
Punjabis the most prominent (Jalal, 1995b: Samad, 1994). Punjabis have therefore 
successively merged their ethnic identity  into Pakistani identity and by doing so they 
wish to recover their lost identity (Jalal, 1995b: 84). Therefore the dominance of 
Punjabi salariat is an incessant phenomenon and with the parallel rise of Pakhtun elite at 
the cost of Mohajirs’s marginalization (Samad, 2007). Moreover, the policy  of the ruling 
elite towards ethnic diversity ‘has been cynically to co-opt or coerce groups that have 
not been accommodative’ which has made center and ethnic groups relations 
problematic (Samad, 2007: 127).  
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 The discursive school of thought has focused more on the evolving and shifting 
discourse on national identity  and ethnic diversity. It refers to historical context of the 
discourse of nation formation (Metcalf, 2004; Verkaaik, 2004; 2001; Veer, 1994; 
Shaikh, 2009). The earlier period (1947-1970) was more focused on communal 
discourse (Hindus versus Muslims) and opposition to India. The State adopted a 
modernist interpretation of Islam that was opposed to traditional, rural and customary 
Islam (considered perverted by Hindu influences). Being discrediting of ethnic and 
regional cultures and languages it emphasized Urdu language and culture (Metcalf, 
2004: ch. 9, 10; Van Der Veer, 1994: 63-64; Shaikh, 2009: ch. 2, 3, Verkaaik, 2001; 
2004). There has been contestation on the idea of nationhood in this period between the 
Mohajirs (immigrants from India) and the natives of the land (Punjabis, Pakhtuns, 
Baluchis, Sindhis, etc) (Shaikh, 2009; 54-56). The communal discourse of the State 
favors Mohajirs and Punjabis who are willing to associate themselves with it (Shaikh, 
2009: 54-56). With the succession of East Pakistan in 1971, this communal discourse 
was replaced by an alternative territorial national discourse.7 Z. A. Bhutto added ethnic 
identity  qaum to national identity  under the influence of this discourse (Verkaaik, 2004: 
40-41). However, Zia ul Haq through his Islamization process introduced a ‘supra 
territorial dimension of identity’ to this discourse which sought to formulate a 
‘denationalized’ Muslim identity  (Shaikh, 2009: 56-57). Moreover, consistent in all 
these discourses is the centrality of Muslim identity, which also is the central symbol of 
identification for most of the Pakistanis (cf. Metcalf, 2004: 232-233).  
 The concluding argument of the discursive debate suggest a ‘conundrum of 
consensus’ that characterizes Pakistan (Shaikh, 2009). This conundrum is manifested in 
the discursive contestation on community, nation and power in Pakistan. This 
contestation is informed by lack of consensus on the meaning of Islam. Various ethnic 
groups in Pakistan kept this conundrum alive and the debates were continued between 
the migrated Mohajirs and geographically based Panjabis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis and 
Baluchis (Shaikh, 2009:3-4). Where the majority  Punjabis identify with Pakistani 
identity, the minorities support the shift in favor of “plural expression of Pakistani 
identity”, and “locally negotiated national community’ (Shaikh, 2009: 46-55).  In my 
analysis (in chapter 6) I will explain how the State’s favored communal discourse and 
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7 This was proposed and elaborated by two renown scholars by Aitzaz Ahsan (1996) and A. H. Dani (cited 
in Shaikh, 2009: 57). 
national identity  based exclusively  in Islam is of less significant for ethnic minorities 
such as Pakhtuns. I will show how they articulate multi ethnic national identity  by 
conceiving nation formation as a perennial process.  
Pakhtun integration in Pakistan:
Relevant to the debate about the nation formation in Pakistan is the question of Pakhtun 
integration in Pakistan. Although differences of opinion on the question are significant 
the progressive social and economic integration of Pakhtuns in Pakistan have convinced 
many to conclude that Pakhtun case represent a possible success of nation formation in 
Pakistan. They do so because Pakhtuns in Pakistan have taken advantage of the 
economic opportunities offered by  Pakistan. They  have control over the land, industries 
and other economic resources in their province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. They have also 
exploited opportunities in trade, transportation, and labour sectors outside their region 
(mostly  in the cities of Karachi, Lahore and in Middle East). Pakhtuns have retained 
their share in the most powerful institutions of the country  i.e military and civilian 
bureaucracy. 
 In the above context the Pakhtun case continues to baffle and divide political 
analysts and scholars. Just as scholars are divided on question of nation formation and 
identification in Pakistan, so are they on the Pakhtun sense of belonging and integration 
into the State of Pakistan.8 Some have argued that Pakhtuns have been integrating in the 
national sphere to an extent that they will soon discard ethnic sentiments (Khan.A, 
2005a; Jalal, 1995a; Ahmed, 1985; Noman, 1990: Ahmed, 1996). Others insist that 
Pakhtun demonstrate sporadic irredentism due to vibrant ethnic sentiments (Cohen, 
2005; Jaffrelot, 2005; Waseem; 2006; Weiss, 1999; Behuria, 2005). Recently, the 
Islamic radicalism and militancy in Pakistan and particularly in Pakhtun region has 
shifted some of these debates to suggest the interplay  of ethnicity  and Islam in the case 
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8  Integration or assimilation of Pakhtuns is not significantly clarified by the literature on the ethno 
nationalism in Pakistan. Some would even suggest that ethnic groups are assimilating slowly into 
Pakistani identity (Shafqat, 2007: xxix) and many would refer to the integration of Pakhtuns (Jalal, 
1995a; Ahmed, 1996). Assimilation in its soft meaning as ‘a process or processes by which the people of 
diverse racial origins and different cultural heritage, occupying a common territory, achieve a cultural 
solidarity at least to sustain a national existence’ (Park, 1930: 281) In this way it is an effort to bring 
minorities to mainstream of a country’s social life (Alba and Nee, 1997: 828). While in hard meaning 
suggests State imposed normative program that is busy destroying the minority cultures (Alba and Nee, 
1997: 827). I suggest that assimilation carried out by Pakistan lies somewhere between these two 
extremes and could be called integration in political sense but include discouragement of ethnic identities 
to become political. 
of Pakhtuns. They argue that  Pakhtuns have been nurturing irredentist  sentiments albeit 
under a transformed ethno-nationalism that includes religion as the most prominent 
constituent (Weiss, 1999; Cohen, 2005). Yet others consider it  part of the broader 
process of ‘ethnicizing Islam’ in Pakistan (Verkaaik, 2007). 
 The striking reference to this interplay  (of ethnicity and Islam) in the current 
context of increasing interest in ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘Islamic revivalism’ 
reveals the significance of otherwise consistent paradox. The paradox refers to the 
divisive or unifying character of Islam in Pakistan and the employing of such diversity 
or fusion in nationalist or ethnic discourses. Moreover, this also highlights the 
significance of religion in the identification processes among the ethnic groups. I will 
focus on how Pakhtuns identify with Islam and whether they have evolved a particular 
sectarian or ideological identity  vis a vis other ethnic groups in Pakistan (chapter 7). I 
will argue that, although, religious change among Pakhtuns is discernible it  remains 
limited to change in performance of certain rituals and practices without internalizing 
any sectarian message. This has also been reflected in identification vis a vis other 
ethnic groups, which are perceived to be lesser Muslims rather than Muslims of a 
particular sect or ideology. I argue that  Pakhtuns do cherish their belonging to Ummah 
but at the same time differentiate between their Muslimness and the others. Such 
analysis will also help us understand the current media focus on the religious extremism 
in the region and its consequent stereotyping of Pakhtuns.  
 
My identity and the field 
My Pakhtun identity  and upbringing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa contributes to the 
significance of this work. Most importantly, it  was my identity  and position that  allowed 
this research to unfold. Unlike non Pakhtun researchers who would have encountered 
extremely different situations, as an insider I was able to gain access to the area that is 
otherwise difficult to access in these testing times. It was through my friends and a 
range of acquaintances that I was able to gather data to support my arguments. 
Inaccessibility is one of the major reasons in the dearth of serious research enquiry since 
the classic anthropological studies (Banerjee, 2000). Most of the current accounts of the 
region and its people depend heavily  on the description and narration of the journalists, 
some of whom are from those particular areas. The fact that this work, through its 
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engagement with extensive literature and ethnographic enquiry, signifies itself in the 
existing literature by improving understanding of the people and society that is highly 
inaccessible. 
 Where my access to the informants was the consequence of my position as an 
insider, my status as an outsider put some restraints on the information that I sought to 
elicit. Being a student in a Western University  and unrelated to the people in the field I 
was an outsider, with its own ramifications related to this work. I will report below 
(chapter 2) how my research was influenced by the precarious security  situation and 
politically  charged environment; however, it is imperative to mention here that such an 
ambiance had its own effect on the people of the region and their relation with me as a 
researcher. My position as an outsider became more consequential in the event of 
enormous media reporting of the religious unrest in the region. In various situations in 
the field my position as outsider meant that I was to be shared with and had access to 
selective information; and as an insider, I was expected to report with sensitivity 
required from any Pakhtun in such a time of crisis. This was particularly relevant in the 
section (of the thesis) inquiring religious change and the relationship of the change with 
identity. The sensitivity of the people and their interest in this work also reveal their 
enormous acumen of the world they are living in and their enthusiasm to share it with. 
 In the last chapter of the thesis on religious identity, I therefore had to report 
what my informants were saying in response to the stereotypes and media presentation 
and then relate it  to various arguments and analysis in the literature. Moreover, delicate 
security situation in the region and my status as an outsider partly restricted my 
observation of religious life in the region (see chapter 2). Therefore, with these 
limitations I made a sense of religious change or reformation in the region. Together 
my outsider and insider positions enabled me to partly unpack a highly inaccessible 
society and show the significance of inherent identity processes but also to suggest 
avenues for future researchers, who will improve our comprehension of these societies. 
Therefore, I concede that future research will probably  look more thoroughly into the 
dynamics of religious change and its relation with Pakhtun identity.  
 Moreover, the significance of this study is partly  due to my own identity and 
position and partly due to the case study I have chosen such as Malakand. Malakand 
provides us with a unique case to explore the tribal and settled division through its 
hybrid administrative and ecological status that has evolved over time. Malakand, 
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previously a full-fledged tribal Agency has been subjected to political and 
administrative reforms since 1969. These reforms have placed it in a situation that is 
neither the status of Settled Areas nor of Tribal Areas. Malakand has also been severely 
affected by the religious militancy  and one of the first regions chosen by the religious 
elements to launch campaign for the implementation of Sharia. Interestingly it  is also 
the only Tribal Agency  in Pakistan that was subjected to comprehensive political 
reforms aiming at incorporating it in the Settled Areas. Moreover, the region also hosted 
a local struggle against the tribal agency status and in favor of recognition through 
various demands of rights including the right of identity.9 Furthermore, the region has 
been affected by economic changes, continuous migration and social changes related to 
literacy, stratification, etc. Therefore, through these socio economic changes, 
marginality and hybridity of Malakand I will explore the complexity of Pakhtun 
identity. It also signifies the relevancy of local contexts where the Pakhtun identity may 
demonstrate complexity  that is often ignored by the literature. Moreover, the situation in 
case of Malakand may  have relevancy for other areas in the Pakhtun region that are 
undergoing similar changes and processes.         
 
The plan of the thesis 
The first  chapter of the thesis will set the theoretical framework for the thesis. It 
illustrates how ethnicity  is explained to represent common descent or shared culture and 
the disagreement in the theoretical literature on whether the emphasis should be on the 
internal content of the ethnic collectivities or the boundaries they draw vis a vis others. 
It also argues that the relevant usefulness of identification as a process. Additionally, the 
chapter refers to the contestation in the literature on what constitute Pakhtun identity 
and more profound contestation in the realm of Pakistani identity. Second chapter sets 
questions derived from the literature review and related to the theoretical framework of 
the first chapter. It also elaborates on the Malakand as a case study and justification for 
various decisions related to research design. 
 Chapter 3 argues that various hierarchical statuses in Malakand are transforming 
into reciprocal categories of Khanan and Ghariban. It therefore, explains the intra 
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9  This movement is known as Awami-khel. It was inaugurate in 1967 and became fully functional in 
1969. Awami-khel was led by a landless immigrant of Batkhela (Malakand), Muhammad Khan. Being a 
local struggle this movement is completely ignored by the literature on the region.   
ethnic processes among the Pakhtuns of Malakand. Chapter 4 extends this intra ethnic 
discussion to the internal boundaries making and the meanings these boundaries convey. 
It elaborates on the behavioral attributes of the major categories and their reflection in 
cultural institutions. Chapter 5 focuses on the question of who is Pakhtun? It illustrates 
how the categorical distinction in Malakand has consequences for Pakhtun identity. It 
also elaborates on the contextual and contested nature of Pakhtun identity. Chapter 6 
elaborates on Pakhtun sense of belonging to Pakistan. It suggests that despite the 
primacy of ethnic identity the evolving sense of Pakistaniat among the Pakhtuns is 
discernible. The last chapter illustrates that despite religious reformation of Pakhtuns 
their identification with any  particular religious sect or ideology  is unwarranted. It  also 
postulates that inconsistencies in Pakhtun cultural code (Pakhtunwali) and Islam are 




Ethnicity and identification in Pakistan: Theoretical perspectives
The complexity of ethnicity  is evident from disagreement on its definition and the 
variety of theoretical approaches to it and the diversity  of its empirical exploration. 
Such complexity  is well explored through diverse theoretical perspectives and 
supported by empirical evidence that has contributed to our understanding of the 
concept. The most comprehensive and ubiquitous perspectives on the concept are to be 
found within the broader disciplines of social and cultural Anthropology. Moreover, 
these disciplines not only  suggest the diversity of forms in which ethnicity  appear and 
reappear but also refer to its enduring character. Related concepts, of identification and 
boundary making, allude to social aspects of ethnicity. They also manifest impressive 
and useful analytical tools to understand the complexity of social classification and 
interaction in the contemporary societies. Ethnicity is defined in the literature with 
relative emphasis on either common descent (albeit putative) or culture. Moreover, 
since the 1960s some of the literature has focused on whether the emphasis should be on 
what constitutes ethnic collectivity  (i.e culture and putative common descent) or on the 
boundary it produces through social interaction. I taken ethnicity  primarily in its social 
constructed sense with mutual impact of its constituent elements and boundary. 
However, the focus of this project is on the processes of identification and boundaries 
making among Pakhtuns.  
 Pakhtuns being the most numerous ethnic minority of Pakistan have been 
subjected to rigourous anthropological and political enquiry  for their perennial, yet 
complicated, sense of ethnic identification. Nevertheless, I explain various identity 
features by referring to the relative debate in the literature on the association of these 
particular markers with Pakhtunness. Interestingly, Pakhtuns in Pakistan have been 
affected by Pakistan’s own paradox of nation making. Nation making in Pakistan not 
only involves the dilemma of relationship  between ethnicity  and religion but also the 
choice of the appropriate means to enact the project. All this can be explicated in the 
context of identification among Pakhtuns. 
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 In this chapter I will elaborate how ethnicity being a complex phenomenon is 
variously  defined and explore the debates about its content. I will then show how 
identification as a process is important and will explicate that identification understood 
in social relational sense would involve boundaries making. I will illustrate a particular 
Boundaries making issue of whether the relative emphasis in anthropological analysis 
be on the cultural content or on the boundary of ethnic groups. I will then turn to 
delineate the salient features of Pakhtun identity  and will also reflect on the studies that 
focused on Pakhtuns identity maintenance in diverse ecological settings. I will finally 
elaborate the theoretical framework exploring the debates about the complexity of 
segmentary ethnicity, multiple identification and their relevance in case of Pakhtuns.   
1.1: Ethnicity, Identification and Boundary Making
 In this section of the chapter I will elaborate on the concepts of ethnicity, 
identification and boundaries making. I will also illustrate how these are related 
phenomenon and seek to understand the broader debates and their usefulness in 
providing a conceptual framework to this project. 
Ethnicity in common descent or shared culture:
  One of the theoretical issue that is central to this project is whether ethnicity  is in 
common descent or shared culture. Ethnicity with all its complexity is reported to 
demonstrate ambivalence in whether emphasis should rest on common descent or 
common culture. Also questions are raised about the nature of ‘self conscious 
claims’ (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 18-21) that  constitute an ethnic collectivity, 
particularly when such claims are characterised by social interaction, relation and 
contrast (Cronell and Hartmann, 1998, Jenkins, 2008a, Eriksen, 2002). Therefore, not 
just the literature is divided on the emphasis (over culture or descent) but is also 
undecided on the combined emphases and the social boundary an ethnic collectivity 
creates in social interaction.   
  I will also show through empirical data I have collected from Malakand that 
Pakhtuns have been employing this difference to generate a debate about who is 
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Pakhtun? The renowned sociologist Max Weber was the first to elaborate the subjective 
sense of shared descent and shared history. 
We shall call ethnic groups those human groups that entertain a subjective 
belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of 
customs or both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration; this 
belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it 
does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exits (Weber, 
1978: 389).
Currently, the literature on ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflicts (with political 
perspectives) has emphasised on kinship, putative descent, historical continuity  of the 
myths and symbols associated with origin. Horowitz (1985) in his seminal work on 
ethnic conflicts has emphasised  the kinship and ascriptive aspects of ethnicity and 
ethnic affiliations. He argues that ethnic identity changes but not often; for varying 
degree ‘ethnic identity  is established at birth for most group members’; however, this 
also may vary  (1985:52). He rather bluntly  asserted that, “the language of ethnicity  is 
the language of kinship” (1985: 57).10
 Ethnic groups are also seen in the sense of cultural groups and cultural 
similarities are explained as primary  to ethnic groups. This explanation prevailed for 
some time (Jenkins, 2002: 34) and in fact replaced to a degree the Weberian emphasis 
on subjective sense of common descent (Cornell and Hartman, 1998: 17). In the cultural 
sense ethnic group  was defined by Farley, “as a group of people who are generally 
recognised by  themselves and/or by  others as a distinct group, with such recognition 
based on social or cultural characteristics” (cited in Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 17). 
 The issue with culture is that, at times shared by the members of one group  with 
that of other and the members of the same group may not share the same culture 
(Hughes, 1994; Moerman, 1965; Barth, 1969a). Barth (1969a) and his colleagues in the 
seminal work ‘Ethic groups and boundaries’ sought to signify  ethnic boundaries rather 
than the cultural content of the ethnic collectivities. He argues that the focus must shift 
to “ethnic boundary that defines the group and not the cultural stuff that  it 
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encloses” (1969a: 15) and from the isolated (or separated) character of ethnic group as 
embedded in the approach that  focus on internal content such as culture (1969a: 10).11 
However, later Barth (1994) realised that the cultural stuff does matter.  
 Within the contested positions on the question of ethnicity  I have used a 
framework that is closer to Eriksen (2002) and Jenkins (2008a). Erisken’s understanding 
of ethnicity  which focuses on interactional aspect explains that cultural differences 
between ethnic groups are not necessarily decisive features of ethnicity unless they  are 
made so in social interaction (2002: 12-13). Jenkins suggests that ethnicity  and culture 
are not ‘what people have’ or ‘belong to’ rather they are, but “...complex repertoires 
which people experience, use, learn and do in their daily  lives, within which they 
construct an ongoing sense of themselves and an understanding of their fellows. 
Ethnicity, in particular is best thought of as an ongoing process of ethnic 
identification” (2008a: 15). Therefore, taking insights from Eriksen’s (2002) and 
Jenkins (2008a) it understands ethnicity in terms of socially  constructed ‘sameness’ and 
‘distinctiveness’ with some reference to culture and putative claims of common descent. 
Moreover, these processes of similarities and differences are not exclusively  enacted in 
political claims but in the realm of everyday existence. In this way I take insights from 
Brubaker for he elaborates how “ethnicity  happens in a variety of everyday 
settings” (2004: 2). There is also some value in Brubaker’s (2004) suggestion that the 
analytical usefulness of term such as ‘groupness’, ‘categorisation’, ‘identification’ to 
avoid reification. 
 In opposition to Primordialists approach to ethnicity and identity, which explains 
the ties of identity  and ethnicity are ‘ineffable’, ‘overpowering’ and ‘coercive’ (Shils, 
1957; Geertz, 1963), I have found the position of constructivist useful. ‘Constructivist’ 
argue that, ‘ethnicity is the product of social process rather than a cultural given, made 
and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather 
than ascribed through birth’ (Wimmer, 2008a: 971). Despite my position closer to 
constructivists, I agree with Jenkins that, “there are limits to the plasticity of ethnicity, 
as well to its fixity and solidity” (2008a: 173). Furthermore, we also know from 
anthropological studies that despite the fact that features of Pakhtunwali have been 
manipulated, discarded and transformed (Bartlotti, 2000; Banerjee, 2000; Barth, 1969b), 
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11 11 Eriksen (2002) argues that Barth had ‘processual’ and ‘relational approach’ to ethnicity, that defines 
ethnic groups ‘through its relationship to others’ (p. 38).
it has been practised for centuries and is often believed to characterise Pakhtun social 
cultural and political life.   
  
Identification:
The second most important conceptual issue to the project is of identification that is 
also related to the complexity of ethnicity. Its multilayered processes, contextuality, 
flexibility and employability  is well explored (Lyman and Douglas 1973; Royce 1982; 
Jenkins, 2008a, Kasfir, 1979). I widely use the term identification in the sense of 
constructing ‘similarity’ and ‘differences’ (cf. Jenkins, 2008a; 2008b). However, the 
construction of similarity and differences is a multiple construction of similarity and 
differences, used contextually by individuals and collectivities.
Cornell and Hartmann (1998) postulated that identity construction is implicitly 
or explicitly about story or narration that  manifest explanation of who we are or who 
they  are. They  argue that ethnicity  or race are the idioms used to compose such a story 
and the narration itself tell us about the significance of these idioms (p. 251-252). 
Therefore, the consequences (good or bad) of these idioms are less important for they 
are constructed by humans, rather it is of greater important to see how they are 
employed (Cornell and Harman, 1998: 252).
There is a growing trend particularly  since Barth’s work on ethnicity in 
emphasising more on the process of identification rather than identity  (Barth, 1969a; 
Jenkins, 2008; Royce, 1982; Brubaker, 2004).12Collective (social) identification 
simultaneously  involves emphasising ‘similarity’ or commonality within a group and 
‘differentiation’ from without (others) (Jenkins, 2008b). These also refer to the process 
of inclusion and exclusion and consequent boundary making (Jenkins, 2008b:102). The 
collectivities of groups and categories are generated through these external and internal 
dialectics (2008b:105).13
All collectivities can be conceptualised by reference to processes of group 
identification and social categorisation: each side of the dichotomy is 
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12  Yunas Samad (1995b; 2007) has used the term identification for the process of Muslim identity 
formation in former India and Pakistan. He criticizes what he argues is official esstentialization of 
Muslim identity in Pakistan. He illustrates that such essentialist view of identity in Pakistan has concealed 
innate ambiguity, subtleties and overlaps and has left little room for diversity and accommodation.   
13 Italics used in the original source. 
implicated in the other and social identification is the outcome of a dialectical 
process of internal and external definition (Jenkins, 2008a: 56-57). 
These internal and external processes of group  identification are central to this study for 
they  are not just employed to draw boundary between Pakhtun and non Pakhtun, as 
most of the previous literature has done, i.e Barth (1959b), but to explain social 
classification and stratification within a population claiming Pakhtun identity. 
Moreover, we are timely  informed by Cornell and Hartmann (1998) that internal 
differentiation within ethnic and racial categories matter and the members at times 
‘contain’ these differences (p. 203-213). 
All ethnic and racial populations have within their experience the bases of 
subdivision, and subdivision in turn offer potential bases for fragmentation, 
leading either to new ethnicities, to alliances across the ethnic boundary, or to 
new, non-ethnic identities altogether (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 213). 
 Nevertheless, within an ethnic group  such processes may have their own significant 
existence. Processes of categorisation and group identification within ethnic group may 
have consequences for the same processes at inter ethnic level; therefore, social actors 
may construct multiple similarities and differences. Differences within the group can 
become irrelevant and similarities could be sought during ethnic group’s interaction 
with others. This paradox is of greater importance and to understand the ethnic 
identification with all its complexities one should refer to it. 
I will elaborate below (ch 3 and 4) how previous studies, Barth (1959b) and 
Lindholm (1982), ignored these processes of categorisation and group identification 
among what Barth termed ‘Pathan’ by focusing more on caste type hierarchical 
stratification. I intend to relate these processes to other such processes at different 
levels of collective identification. I also establish that identification (both self and 
other) are situational and contextual (cf. Brubaker, 2004). Moreover, since “Similarity 
and difference reflect  each other across a shared boundary” (Jenkins, 2008b: 103), my 
emphasis in the next section would be on boundary making and maintenance.
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Boundary Making: strategies and issues. 
Significant research focus has been shifted to the processes of boundary making 
and remaking since the seminal work of Fredrick Barth such as “Ethnic groups and 
boundaries” (1969a). As argued above, Barth insisted that boundaries of ethnic groups 
matter more than the ‘cultural stuff’ (1969a: 15), therefore, focus must shift  to the 
boundaries separating ethnic groups. Barth’s (1969a) emphasis on boundary and his 
‘relational and processual approach to ethnicity’ (Eriksen, 2002: 38) was meant to 
contest ‘cultural determinism’ (Eriksen, 2002: 53) and structural functionalist 
understanding of society, social groups and culture as ‘things’ (Jenkins, 2008a: 12-13). 
Although Barth’s focus on the concept of boundary generated a debate whether he was 
suggesting constant (and fixed) ethnic categories, he is broadly understood to be arguing 
in favour of social construction of boundaries and identities and thus envisaging flexible 
and variable rather than ‘reified’ and ‘hard’ groups and identity  (Eriksen, 2002: 38,53; 
Jenkins, 2008a 12,13, 19).14  I also concede the current understanding of Barth’s 
proposition (Jenkins, 2008a) and therefore explicate social production of the boundaries 
between various categories in Malakand.  
In most meticulous terms the concept of boundaries refers to social classification 
and the networks of everyday relationship based on ‘actions of connecting and 
distancing’ (Wimmer, 2008a: 975). The former is about the division of the world into 
‘us’ and ‘them’ and the later is a ‘script of action’ related to the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a 
given situation (Wimmer, 2008a: 975). These two are cognitive schemes for an 
individual and a social boundary refers to their coincide (Wimmer, 2008a: 975). With 
such an understanding this project employs the concept of boundary to the analysis at 
multiple levels of the project. It concedes that, the concept of boundary is useful in 
explaining the processes of internal stratification and identification among Pakhtuns and 
simultaneously  in explaining the processes of ethnic divisions in Pakistan (among 
various ethnic groups). 
 Different strategies of boundaries making can be adopted by the social actors. 
Besides boundary  strategy of ‘expansion’ and ‘contraction’, ‘Transvaluation’ as a 
strategy (Wimmer, 2008b: 1037-1038), is of particular interest  to this project. 
‘Transvaluation’ could be seen as re-evaluation effort to reject the accepted standards, it 
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includes the strategy  of ‘equality’ and ‘normative inversion’ (Wimmer, 2008b: 
1037-1038). ‘Normative inversion’ as a boundary strategy targets the meaning of the 
boundary and would turn ‘symbolic hierarchy’ on its head, “such that the category  of 
the excluded and despised comes to designate a chosen people, morally, intellectually 
and culturally superior to the dominant group” (Wimmer, 2008b: 1037).  We can trace 
the examples of this strategy in some of the literature on ethnic and racial groups in 
America.15  An alternative strategy within this ‘transvaluation’ category could be 
establishing moral and political equality rather than superiority (Wimmer, 2008b: 
1037-1038).
Boundary or the ‘cultural stuff’:  
Some of the issues identified by  the literature on processes of identification and 
boundaries making are relevant to this project. When we discuss identification and 
ethnicity in social and relational sense we by default are discussing boundaries making 
and maintenance. Therefore, most of the issues identified here are simultaneously the 
issues of identification and boundaries making. Jenkins identified the issue of ethnic 
versus non ethnic in the process of identification and question when would an 
identification process be ethnic and when non ethnic (2008a: 42-45). Similarly, Wimmer 
(2008a) in his discussion on issues of boundaries questioned the political saliency of 
ethnic boundary. He argues that such question is important because “many systems of 
ethnic classification are multilevel character: they comprise several nested segments of 
differentiation in contrast, for example, to gender classifications or ranked social 
estates-all of which might become the main focus of political loyalty” (2008a: 976-977). 
His explanation of situational logic satisfies the question to an extent (2008a: 
977). 
 Another important aspect of social relations, identification and boundary making 
is highlighted by the current literature is the importance of ‘cultural stuff’ that Barth 
originally  discredited (Cornell and Hartman, 1998; Jenkins, 2008a; Wimmer, 2008a). 
Barth later revisited his earlier thesis in light of contemporary perspectives and 
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15Espiritu (2001) has demonstrated how Filipino immigrants to USA have been constructing their moral 
distinctiveness and superiority over the ‘morally flawed’ ‘Americans’ (whites).  Espiritu sought to explain 
“how the ‘margins’ imagine and construct the ‘mainstream’, in order to assert superiority over it” (2001: 
416). Also see Lamont and Molnar (2001) on how the marketing executives in America transform the 
image of blacks and seek to improve their status hierarchy.  
understanding of culture (1994: 13-14). Recognising the importance of culture in his 
current work, Barth argues that culture is reproduced in a sense that as ‘interpretation of 
and action in the world’, it is learned from others but become part of experience and 
thus accumulated as a consequences of such experience (p.14). He also argues, 
“...central and culturally valued institutions and activities in an ethnic group may be 
deeply involved in its boundary maintenance by setting internal processes of 
convergence into motion” (1994: 18).  
 Jenkins (2008a) therefore, argues that boundaries and the interactions across 
them are “...intimately  and indissolubly  bound up with the cultural contents of 
ethnicity” (p. 126).  Jenkins (2008a) and Cornell and Hartmann (1998) taking culture in 
its ‘meaning’ or ‘understanding’ sense, that social actors have of the world around them, 
take up  the issue of ethnic attachments or bonds. Cornell and Hartmann posit that 
culture being ‘ideas’, ‘interpretations’ and guide to life and action provides relatively 
the strongest bond to members of the ethnic group (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 
85-89). Jenkins agrees with most of this argument but posit  that religion in the case of 
Northern Ireland combine institutional and cultural bonds which also demonstrates that, 
‘cultural stuff’ does matter (2008a: 126-127). Also for Jenkins the categorisation done 
by ‘us’ and ‘them’ become part of experience and so part of ‘cultural repertoire’. Social 
actors may  prefer one over the other of such cultural repertoire (e.g language or 
religion) to mobilise, for these markers have greater emotive quality  than others (2008a:
171-172). However, it is difficult to clearly  put the relationship between ethnicity and 
culture in social relationship. Of course we know that at least  at the ethnic level of 
organisation members of group refer to cultural features and agree on the broader 
character of its constituents. However, it become problematic when we explain its 
relationship  to other level of organisation i.e, when members of an ethnic group may 
identify and categorise each other using some markers. In that case the cultural stuff 
does not become a whole but a diverse repertoire as Jenkins (2008a) would put, or, it 
may become a contested tool kit (Werbner, 2002).  
 Eriksen (2002) has demonstrated how the relationship between culture and 
ethnicity has been problematic and the debate in the literature is not conclusive on the 
issue (p. 56-58). Elaborating the relationship he argues that ethnicity and culture have 
two way relationship  and that ethnicity is about communicating culture difference and 
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that ethnicity being relational, situational is between groups while culture is within 
(2002: 57-58). 
 From a different perspective Pnina Werbner, studying Pakistani Diaspora in 
Manchester focused on the multiplicity  of identities, hybridity and contestation within 
the ethnic community. She argues that, “none of the social unites we evoke-identity, 
diaspora, community, nation, tradition-are consensus based wholes: all are the product 
of ongoing debates and political struggles or alliances” (2002: 18). Moreover, she posits 
that, Pakistanis may unite on larger scale to mobilise on certain issues but for most time 
engage in ‘internecine conflict of honour’ within, but their mobilisation reproduce, 
‘transcendent ethnic identities’ (2002:16) such as Umma, South Asian Punjabi, 
Pakistani (2002:66). I also demonstrate that the consensus on say  culture is contextual 
among Pakhtuns. 
 I will demonstrate how ethnicity involves cultural stuff, including belief in 
common ancestry. Such features are made relevant through a social process of 
identification, a process that involves drawing similarities and differences 
simultaneously. Although, ethnicity  is communicated across the ethnic boundary with 
others it also engages with internal processes of classification within the population that 
claims ethnic membership. In this way there could be multiple boundaries contextually 
drawn by the larger population, which in successive arrangement would draw internal 
boundaries among themselves but would dissolve them at higher level. Moreover, 
ethnic identity  through its engagement with internal processes of classification become 
contested, but such contest, conditioned by the contexts, may transform into consensus 
i.e at higher level. All these complex processes necessitated that  we, first of all, 
understand the features associated with Pakhtun identity.  
1.2: Bases of Pakhtun identity
Important constituents of the conceptual framework of this study, are the features and 
markers associated with Pakhtunness. These makers are well explored through 
anthropological research in Pakhtun region, along with contested positions on the 
importance of one marker over the other. This project does not aim at adding to this 
constellation of markers and features of Pakhtun identity. It rather endorses the diversity 
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and range of these markers as pointed out in the literature. The project more 
emphatically problematize Pakhtun identity  not through an external versus internal 
debate (literature on the boundaries), rather through a debate on how among the 
Pakhtuns, ethnic identification means emphasizing one marker over the other. 
Pakhto Language:16
Pakhto belongs to the Indo-Iranian language family (Rahman, 1995). It is widely 
spoken in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, Baluchistan and Afghanistan. The debate about 
the Pakhto language being a significant marker of identity is inconclusive. Barth 
(1981:105) has considered language as ‘a necessary and diacritical feature, but in itself 
not sufficient: we are not dealing simply with a linguistic group’.  He reported a Pakhto 
proverb as evidence in support of his argument ‘He is Pathan who does Pashto, not 
(merely) the one who speaks Pashto’ (Barth, 1969b:119). In his commendable study on 
Pakhto proverbs Leonard N Bartlotti (2000) has explained this proverb as the one which 
in fact recognizes Pashto as an identity marker and then cajoles a Pakhtun for action. 
Benedicte Grima’s (2004) ethnographic report appears to endorse Bartlotti’s claims, she 
writes, “Pashto, as has been illustrated by myself and others in length, is not just a 
language but a complex conglomerate of cultural behaviour. One does not merely 
speak, but one does, one performs, Pashto. As my own linguistic skills grew, so did the 
behavioural expectations the culture had of me” (2004: vii). 
 Some scholars on Pakhtuns have contended that Pakhto is a major or perhaps the 
most significant aspect of Pakhtunness. Pakhto is ‘The most obvious symbol today of 
Pathan identity and the measure of Pathan pride’ (Caroe 1958: 65). So significant is its 
importance in the eyes of Pakhtuns that it can be considered one of the diacritical and 
“indispensable” components of identity  (Evans-Von Krebek cited in Bartlotti, 2000: 70). 
Therefore, ‘...not only practically and historically, but symbolically and expressively in 
oral literature and modern poetry, the Pashto language is closely associated by 
Pashtuns with Pashtunness’ (Bartlotti, 2000: 71). 
 It is posited that  Pakhtun and Pakhto are “inextricable” and that ‘modern trends 
will force more and more Pakhtuns into twilight zone where only their mother tongue 
will remain as a symbol of their ethnic identity’ (Evans-Von Krebek cited in Bartlotti, 
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16 Pakhto, Pukhto or Pashto are different names of the language spoken by Pakhtuns. 
2000: 71). This observation is interesting in the context that when other markers weaken 
the language remains the most important marker (cf. Barth, 1969b: 129). To evidence 
these trends I am reporting a sociological survey of Pakhtun region in Pakistan 
(Hallberg, 1992) which shows some interesting trends in the usage of language. It 
reports that Pakhto is exclusively  spoken by Pakhtuns in the 4 out of 6 domains 
identified by the study i.e home, mosque, Jirga and speaking to women (1992: 28). In 
other two domains, such as school and bazaar, Pakhto is spoken (mostly) along with 
Urdu (1992: 28-36). The survey concludes that  although Pakhtun attitude towards other 
languages is favourable, their attitude towards Pakhto is overwhelming; ‘not only is it 
virtually the only language of use in most domains, it also is seen as a strong mark of 
identity and pride’ (1992: 42).17   
 Although the significance of Pakhto language as an identity marker, the 
language is forgotten by a number of people who still identify themselves as Pakhtuns 
or claim to have Pakhtun ancestry. These include Pakhtuns in urban centres of 
Afghanistan such as Kabul, who have undergone ‘Persianization in speech and 
culture’ (Barth, 1969b: 129) or of India (Rahman, 1994: 134) have long forgotten 
Pakhto language. Similar trends could be seen among the Pakhtun tribes in Hazara 
district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Ahmed, 1997: 109) and the South of Punjab where 
ethnic groups identifying themselves with Pakhtun ancestors have forgotten their 
language and adopted either Punjabi or Saraiki. In all these cases ethnic reference to 
Pakhtun identity is often made but not through the Pakhto language, rather through 
Pakhtun tribal ancestry or Pakhtunwali.18  This raises important questions, if Pakhto 
language is such an important diacritical feature of Pakhtun identity where would those 
non-Pakhto speaking people who continue to identify with Pakhtun ethnicity be placed? 
Conversely, would all those who speak Pakhto but lack other diacritical features such as 
patrilineal descent or Pakhtunwali be identified as Pakhtuns?  These are some of the 
themes on which this project reflects.  
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17  Despite the official discouragement of the use of Pakhto in Pakistan, for its association with ethno 
nationalist movement of the 1950s and the 1960s (Rahman, 1996: 145-154), Pakhtuns have demonstrated 
love for their language. Pakhto music, drama and other literary genre are very popular and promoted 
through private radio and Tv channels and world wide web (cf. NDCP, 10 March, 2007). Monthly 
magazines such as Pakhtun and Leekwal are published from Peshawar.  A monthly magazine with the 
name Nazar is published from Batkhela has sections, both in Urdu and Pakhto languages. 
18 see Rahman for the account of an India poet with Pakhtun ancestry being more proud of what he call 
his Pathanwali (1996:134). 
Patrillineal descent and Tribal identity:
 Pakhtunness is often associated with patrilineal descent from a mythical ancestor 
and with tribal way of social organisation. It could be imperative for Pakhtuns to 
identify their lineage through a record of genealogy that traces one’s link with the apical 
ancestor Qais Abdur Rashid; and it is certainly  reported the most important aspect of 
Pakhtunness (Ahmed, 1980: 84: Rittenberg, 1988: 6).19  Comprehensive genealogical 
tables, called Shajara, are often produced to validate such linkage (Rittenberg, 1988: 
26; Barth, 1959b: 24-28). Therefore, it is important  not only that a Pakhtun should have 
a lineage; he should keep a good track of it.20  The Patrilineal lineage has social and 
political significance in Pakhtun society  (Ahmed, 1980). Patrilineal relations are the 
focus of skirmishes and feuds with in the clan. ‘Tarboor’ or first cousins symbolises 
rivalry in Pakhtun society. Moreover, the landownership is also defined by the 
placement on these genealogies (Barth, 1959b: 24-28; Rittenberg, 1988: 26-27). 
However, there is lack of consensus on the inclusion of various tribes or clans in these 
genealogies. Although, in Swat when landownership and Pakhtun status were extended 
to those who did not have these rights before they were at the same time denied any 
entry  into the genealogical tables (Barth, 1959b: 24-28), Tribes such as Afridis and 
Ghilzay were included in the genealogies at some historical instances (Careo, 1958; 
Glatzer, 2002). 
 Although the importance of the patrilineal descent, lineage and genealogical 
records cannot be denied, their contested nature, mythical character and dependence on 
memories do create problem in modern Pakhtun societies. In Malakand in particular and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in general, people tend to forget their ancestry and therefore, at 
times invite a contest over Pakhtun status, which is often intertwined with these lineage 
memories and records. Moreover, segmentary lineage and partilineal descent are mostly 
associated with ascribed aspect of identification and therefore, contribute in the 
contestation between ascribed and performed  Pakhtunness.  
 Pakhtun traditionally constitute a segmentary, acephalous and tribal society. 
Each tribe draws its genealogy from single mythical ancestor which in turn are all 
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19 Professor Nawaz Tair (2008) in his interview with the author stressed this assertion. 
20 Professor Tair’s (2008) assertion. 
linked with the apical ancestor Qais. The common ancestor had sons, grandsons and 
great grandsons each being the ancestor of tribes and sub tribes. In this manner 
Pakhtuns constitute the largest tribal society in the world. Edwards has pointed out that 
that tribe as a concept in Middle East and South West Asia means ‘a form of social 
organisation’ that has the characteristics of patrlineal descent from an eponymous 
ancestor, territorial and political division of the descent groups on the principle of 
segmentation and complementary  opposition, reproduction of these segmentation at 
each level of social structure and diffusion of political power at each level (1990: 70). 
Edwards argues that the structure of the tribe is sustained through dynamics or tension 
such as reciprocal violence. In the case of Pakhtuns this is manifested in the concept of 
Tarborwali (agnatic rivalry-see below) or Siali (rivalry). Also the characteristic of tribal 
organisation is its principles of ‘competition’ and ‘equality’ (1990: 70-72).   
 However, how much tribal way of organisation is relevant varies from one 
region to the other. In areas where the centralised State has established its authority, 
tribal arrangements have weakened or in many cases become redundant. It is on these 
basis Ahmed (1976: 73-83; 1980: 116-125) has referred to two distinctive and 
antithetical socio-economic categories of Nang (honour) and Qalang (tax, rent). The 
former refers to free and ‘unencapsulated’ form of organisation that centres around the 
concept of Nang (honour), the later is an ‘encapsulated’ form where social hierarchies 
exist. Moreover, according to Ahmed the Nang category  is characteristic of hilly areas 
with pastoral economy, untaxed and out of State system, acephalous tribal organisation, 
egalitarian with Jirga representing the whole tribe, based in the concepts of honour 
(1976: 82-83). Qalang, on other hand have characteristics of plains irrigated areas with 
feudal economy, taxed and within the larger encapsulating State system and hierarchal 
social organisation (Ahmed, 1976: 82-83). Ahmed places Swat society in the Qalang 
and Mohmand Agency’s society into the Nang category (1980: 118-119) but emphasised 
that Pakhtun tribes can be at the same time in both these categories (1976: 78). 
 Anderson (1983; 1978a; 1978b) observing Ghilzai (Pakhtun) tribe in 
Afghanistan suggested the dynamic character of tribe. He also argues that kinship  and 
ethnicity are bound in a single framework of Quom (1978a). He (1978a: 1983) 
explicates that Quom represents kinship ties, primordial solidarity, equality in the ranks 
of tribal segments and its members, and is manifested in tribalism (Tribalism is 
Quomwali). In this way  he tends to find Quom or Quomwali, embedded in kinship, a 
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primary feature of Pakhtun identity. Edwards, following the tradition of Anderson, 
argues that tribal organisation can be at its best in ‘inter-tribal environment’ than in 
‘close proximity’ to non tribal ethnic groups and ‘within an encapsulating State 
system’(1990: 71). Some of the discussion in the ‘maintenance of identity’ section 
would develop  on these typologies of social organisation of Pakhtuns and the way shift 
from one to other may  affect identity maintenance. Although the tribal organisation 
varies form region to region, it is one of the most persuasive markers of Pakhtunness.     
Pakhtunwali:
 Pakhtunwali variously defined as ‘the way of the Pathans’ (Spain, 1962: 25), 
‘the code of honour’ (Ahmed, 1980) and ‘the manner and customs of the Afghan tribes, 
the Afghan code’ (Raverty cited in Glatzer, 1998: 3). It is in fact a conglomerate of 
cultural features deemed ideal by Pakhtuns. Often the list of features gets so exhaustive 
that it appears an inconclusive cultural code. For Barth (1969b) Pakhtun culture is 
embodied in the three primary institutions of Melmastia (hospitality), Jirga (council) 
and Pardah (seclusion of women). 
 Melmastia or hospitality  is to serve the outside or guest in different ways. To 
offer meal to a passing stranger, serving and entertaining friends (Barth, 1969b: 
120-121) and distributing gifts or rendering food to win political following (1959b: 77). 
It is the last form of hospitality on which Barth (1959b) focused in his work on the 
political leadership  in Swat.  Hujra (male guest house), being the site of hospitality is 
having wider cultural, social (Ahmed, 1976:65; Lindholm and Meeker, 1981: 445, 446, 
468) and political functions (Barth, 1959b: 80). The above mentioned literature 
elaborates that it  servers to entertain guests, facilitate to consummate ideal behaviour, 
host social and cultural activities and perform political function under a khan to 
distribute gifts and patronage. However, currently its functions are subjected to change 
due to changing socio-economic situations. 
 Jirga is an important institution of Pakhtun society  which refers to the ‘council 
of elders’ (Ahmed, 1980) or ‘Public assemblies’ (Barth, 1959b: 115) which solve 
disputes and its decisions are accepted by the parties in conflict.21  Barth (1959b) 
reported that Jirgas in Swat are acephalous councils which were constituted of the land 
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21 These councils could be ‘ad hoc meeting’ or an ‘instituted tribunal’ (Barth, 1969b: 121). 
owning ‘Pakhtuns’ (1959: 67,116). However, the multiplicity of forms and roles it 
performs is widely  reported (Ahmed, 1980: 90; Ali and Rahman, 2001: 51; Wardak, 
2002). In its dispute settling role in Tribal Areas, it combines Islam and Pakhtun 
customs to reach a decision and such decisions are binding (Ahmed, 1980: 90-91). 
However, in its other roles it can decide about such minor issues like the site of mosque 
to much greater task of negotiating with other tribes and government (Ahmed, 1980: 
90). There could also be official Jirgas appointed by  Political Agent in Tribal Areas to 
investigate and adjudicate disputes (Ali and Rahman, 2001: 50-57). Similarly, Jirgas 
were recently convened as government electing bodies (Emergency Loya Jirga- 2002) 
or constitution making conventions (Loya Jirga- 2003-2004) in Afghanistan.22 
Interestingly, a series of Jirgas were recently constituted in Pakistan and Afghanistan to 
facilitate debate and dialogue on the current unrest. 
 Pardah is another feature of Pakhtunwali. Barth insists that it means seclusion of 
women and through it  the ‘virility  and primacy of the male’ in society is ensured 
(1969b: 122). Ahmed concedes Barth that Pardah is part of Pakhtunwali and States that 
women are even denied the right to share in their father’s property or to give consent in 
her own marriage; surprisingly both of these practices are against Islamic teachings 
(Ahmed, 1997). 
 These institutions for Barth facilitate performance on certain basic values which 
constitute the basis of Pakhtun culture; these include, ‘male autonomy and egality, self 
expression and aggressiveness’ (1969b: 120). 
 
These three central institutions combine to provide Pathans with the 
organisational mechanisms whereby there they  can realise core Pathan values 
fairly successfully, given the necessary external circumstances (Barth, 1969b: 
123). 
Lindholm (1982: 211) and Ahmed (1980: 90) identified at least three central features of 
Pakhtunwali are Badal, Melmastia and Nanawatee. Both Ahmed and Lindholm were 
studying two different Pakhtun societies i.e Mohmand Tribal Area and Swat, however, 
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22 For details on different forms of Jirga see Wardak (2002). 
the consistency and uniformity in these features proves them crucial aspects of 
Pakhtunwali. Below I elaborate on them briefly.
 Badal, means ‘revenge’, ‘feud’, ‘vendetta’, ‘reciprocity’ and one of the central 
features of Pakhtun life. Melmastia, means hospitality, although Barth (1959b: 1969b) 
focused on the political and economic aspect of it, Ahmed touched its social and cultural 
aspect. Ahmed points out that a Pakhtun to Mohmands is ‘da melma dost’ (a friend of 
guests) and that guests in Mohmand Tribal area are served with greater respect and care; 
even the proudest of Maliks (leaders) would personally serve tea or meal (1980: 90). 
Similarly, Edwards find it a quality demonstrated by rich and poor alike (1996: 67) 
Nanawatee, means ‘to go in’ or ‘refuge’. Ahmed elaborates that  it is evoked when an 
enemy ‘goes in’ to sue for peace. In such situation magnanimity must  be shown even to 
one’s staunchest enemy  (1980: 90). Lindholm has explained a different aspect of it, 
Nanawatee in Swat could be requested by those who fled their homes and would like to 
get into the protection of a khan from their enemy; but in such a case they  would 
become clients of the khan and would join his army (1982: 234-235). 
 Beside these central features, Lindholm extended the list  of Pakhtunwali features 
or values by  including ‘equality, respect, loyalty, pride, bravery, Purdah, pursuit of 
romantic encounters, the worship of Allah and most importantly the unselfish love for 
the friend’ (1982: 211). Ahmed on other hand stresses that the two most important 
operative features of Pakhtunwali are Tarborwali (agnatic rivalry) and Tor (female 
chastity). The central features of Badal (revenge) and Nang (honour) are both translated 
into Tarborwali (agnatic rivalry) and Tor (women chastity) (1980: 91). Recently in an 
interesting study  of elite Pakhtun women, Amineh Ahmed found out that Gham-Khadi 
(sorrow and joy) celebrations are becoming important part of Pakhtunwali and manifest 
the concept of badal in its meaning of ‘reciprocity’ in social relationship  (2006: 03, 
141).  
    Pakhtunwali has served as the ideal model for Pakhtun behaviour. “This model 
provides a Pathan with self-image, and serves him as a general canon for evaluating 
behaviour on the part of himself and other Pathans” (Barth, 1969b:120). Ahmed also 
argues, ‘In the ideal, the pursuit of an honourable life, in the eyes of the actor, is 
equated with a life approximating to the features of Pukhtunwali’ (1980: 91). Therefore, 
being ideal Pakhtunwali also is practised with varying degree in different  regions of 
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Pakhtuns. However, being a necessary part of Pakhtun identity, it refers to achieved 
aspect of Pakhtunness as apposed to ascribed aspect of descent and lineage.  
Islam and Pakhtun identity:
 There is a consensus in the anthropological and political literature on the 
centrality of Islam to Pakhtun identity.23 Barth suggested that, ‘a Pathan must be an 
orthodox Muslim’ (1969b: 119) and Ahmed (1980) has even argued that there is 
inseparable bond between Pakhtunness and Muslimness. 
He is by definition a Muslim just as by birth he obtains the inalienable right to 
Pukhtunness. His place in society as a Pukhtun and a Muslim is thus secured 
and defined from the moment of birth (Ahmed, 1980: 107). 
These very  perception makes Pakhtuns confident and their religion universal and 
tolerant (Ahmed, 1980: 107).24  Ahmed observed significant  ‘Islamic symbolism’ in 
Pakhtun behaviour though little comprehension of those symbols. Moreover, these 
symbols were to be reactivated as they were linked with social status. The proximity of 
the Mosque with the Hujra represents this symbolism in Tribal Areas (Ahmed, 1980: 
105-115). Pakhtuns were also reported to be extending greater importance to and 
practice of rituals such as Prayers, Fasting, Pilgrimage (Haj), Zakat (money paid to the 
poor) and Jihad (Ahmed, 1980: 107-108). Edwards rather bluntly  accepts the centrality 
of Islam to Pakhtun identity but argue that, “it played a passive role in social affairs and 
assumed a self-evident dimension of individual and cultural identity” (1990: 97).
 Barth elaborates that, Pakhtun customs are always imagined to be in line with 
Islamic preaching. Ahmed supports this position and reports, ‘Pukhtunness and 
Muslimness do not have to coalesce they are within each other, the interiority of the 
former is assumed in the latter’ (1980:107). Shah endorses these arguments and posit, 
‘for the Pathan Islam was one of the principal constituents of their self definition, with a 
Muslim way of life and Pathan tradition being taken as complementary attributes of 
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23  See Barth (1969b), Ahmed (1980), Glatzer (1998), Shah (1999),  Banerjee (2000), Rittenberg (1988) 
and Spain (1996). 
24   Also see Banerjee (2000) for the argument that Pakhtuns are tolerant to people of other religious 
groups. 
their identity’ (1999: 34). However, Ahmed argues that where there is contradiction 
between the customs and the Islamic law, such as denial of inheritance rights to women 
and charging interests on loans, Pakhtun would recognise it  with guilt  (1980: 106). 
Bartolitti would disagree with Ahmed and argue that  Islam and Pakhtunwali have 
‘boundaries and disjunction between them’ (2000: 76) and that Pakhtuns construct 
symbolic and situational Muslimness. 
 Edwards (1990) in an interesting study of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, explored 
the relationship between the cultural and religious aspects of Pakhtunness. He 
elaborates from an encounter between the Mullahs (religious group) and the tribal 
Pakhtuns on the issue of music and dance. Mullahs deemed dance and music religiously 
inappropriate and intervened to stop it, this act of Mullah was resented and reacted by 
the tribal Pakhtuns. Edwards argues that social actors attempted to establish boundaries 
between cultural performance based in tribal identity and religious identity (1990: 
95-96). Moreover, he argues that, ‘in refugee context, the political and financial power 
wielded by religious authorities has upset the traditional balance of religion and tribe 
and has created a disjunctive between fundamental aspects of their identity’ (1990: 96).
 Edwards posit  that in the refugee context, the dichotomisation between ‘those 
who uphold tribal patterns and those who profess primary allegiance to Islam as 
practical code of social behaviour’ is increasing (1990: 97). He reports that in the 
refugee environment the balance has swung in favour of religious groups which cherish 
a different ethical ideal then the tribal ideal of gheyrat (defined by  him as ‘self 
determination’). This ideal is taqwa (piety) which is characterised by ‘submission’ (to 
both faith and the religious elite) rather then ‘self determination’ (gheyrat). Therefore, 
‘both gheyrat and taqwa are ideals of personal conduct that express and help to enforce 
general notions of social propriety’ (Edwards, 1990: 97). 
 The significance and closeness of Islam to Pakhtun identity  is reflected through 
its consistent use in the domain of local, national or regional politics. Looking into the 
ethno-nationalist Khudai Khidmatgar (KK) movement of Ghafar Khan, Banerjee finds it 
imperative for any political or social movement to refer to Islam. She argues, ‘One of 
the reasons for the KK’s great success was the extent to which its ideology was 
grounded in both Islam and Pukhtunwali’ (2000: 160). Perhaps it was because Islam is 
also an effective unitary force as it was used as an instrument by the religious leaders to 
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unite Pakhtuns in times of crisis (Rittenberg, 1988).25 Edwards (1996) argue that there 
are three contradictory moral codes in Pakhtun society i.e. Honour, Islam and Rule 
(State); manifested in the institutions of Tribe, religious leaders, and the State. Least 
concerned with the institutional presentation of these codes Edwards worked on how 
these three are incompatible, yet tried to be reconciled in vain (in Afghanistan). 
Recently  the rise and fall of the religious parties alliance MMA (Mutahida Majlis-i-
Amal) in Pakistan was keenly observed by scholars to see the use of Islamic symbols or 
rhetoric in electoral politics in Pakhtun regions. Enormous discussion in the literature on 
the religious ferment in the region focuses on the relationship between Pakhtunwali, 
Islam and the tribal way of living in Pakistan and Afghanistan.   
 It is noteworthy here to suggest that features and notions of Pakhtunwali are not 
fixed and static. Despite external and internal socio-economic and political pressures, 
Pakhtunwali features survive, However, this does not mean that they  have been 
changing and reshaping. Ahmed argues that despite the pressure from the encapsulating 
system (State of Pakistan) Pukhtunwali is still alive among Mohmand Pakhtuns perhaps 
through ‘the rephrasing of its idiom or reordering of its priorities’ (Ahmed, 
1980:348-349). Banerjee also concludes that the ‘notions of Pakhtunness therefore are 
not static but rather the subject of negotiation and innovation’ (2000:14-15). Bartlotti in 
his study  argued that Pakhtuns through proverbs ‘reconstruct and negotiate notions 
associated with Pashtunness and Muslimness’. He argues, ‘Pashtunwali as a symbolic 
system is malleable. It can be used and shaped, manipulated, constructed, 
deconstructed, and contested...’ (2000: 348). 
 The above details explicate the entire gamut of identity features associated with 
Pakhtunness. This study does not  concern itself with the validity or relevant importance 
of one feature over the other, despite the fact that substantial details are provided below 
(chapter 3) about such a process in Malakand. The study has focused primarily on the 
contextual construction of Pakhtunness by Pakhtuns in their emphasis of one marker 
over or the other in various contexts. Therefore, the ontological question of ‘who is 
Pakhtun’ is implied in the statement that Pakhtun identity is based in an elaborated 
repertoire, a ‘tool kit’, that includes diverse elements such as descent, tribal lineage, 
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25 Also see Haroon (2007), Edwards (1996), Glatzer (2002). 
language, Pakhtunwali and religion that can be identified with Pakhtunness by Pakhtuns 
in different contexts.    
1.3: Theoretical framework focused: 
Anthropological literature addresses different aspects of Pakhtun identification and their 
social organization. Literature, extensively focusing on internal classification aspect 
(Barth, 1959b; 1981; Lindholme, 1982, Anderson, 1975) and literature focusing on 
inter-ethnic relations and boundaries maintenance aspect (Barth, 1996a;1969b; 
Edwards, 1990; Anderson, 1978a) can be distinguished, despite representing the same 
phenomenon of Pakhtun ethnicity. These two aspects ask different kinds of questions 
and do not necessarily  relate these questions through an integrated approach entailing a 
vivid interplay  of internal and external. While the former aspect, through its focus on 
divisive tendencies signify the importance of the cultural stuff or internal content of 
ethnicity, the later focus on boundary and external processes that are carried out in 
relation with other ethnic collectivities. Also boundary maintenance literature on 
Pakhtun, focus on identity maintenance in ecological variation and distribution (i.e 
tribal, multiethnic, etc). The internal classification aspect attempt to delineate the 
cultural and social values from the organizational forms; and therefore, brings in issues 
of equality-hierarchy, etc. Such trends in the Anthropological literature on Pakhtuns 
refers to some broader debate and contestation in social and cultural Anthropology on 
how ethnicity  be conceived and the broader paradox, to focus on ‘cultural stuff’ or the 
‘boundary’. Below I elaborate on these themes. 
Internal processes and their complexity: 
Barth (1959b; 1981) and Lindholm (1982), studying Pakhtuns in Swat, elaborate 
extensively  on the social classification and stratification. They  suggested that, although, 
the primary social cleavages were predicated on ‘patron-client’, ‘free-ruled’ (Barth, 
1981: 152) or ‘superior-inferior’ (Lindholm, 1982: 109) the entire population was 
divided in a range of hierarchical status categories. They identified ‘Pakhtun’ (or 
‘Pukhtun’) as landowning category with patrilineal descent and tribal segmentary. They 
were occupying the leadership role with non-Pakhtun religious leaders. The rest of the 
population was divided in hierarchical manner mostly occupational categories with 
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caste like features. These categories were identified as non Pakhtun. They  were 
economically  and socially dependent  and bound in patron-client (voluntary) contract 
with ‘Pakhtuns’. However, the entire Pakhto speaking population in Swat was termed 
Pathan by Barth (1959b). Where the analytical difference between ‘Pakhtun’ and 
‘Pathan’ as postulated by Barth is ambiguous, so is the relationship  of social change 
with hierarchical categorization. Although Barth’s own revisit to the area after almost 
two decades (1954 and 1974-79) provides some reflection on the changes in the region 
but did not envision a comprehensive impact of such change on social stratification 
during his field work for he assume that values on the basis of which such hierarchies 
were built remained intact and enjoyed broader legitimacy. 
 Both Barth (1959b; 1981) and Lindholm (1982) argue that, despite broader 
social economic changes, hierarchical classification remained intact in Swat. Most 
importantly the office of the khan or leader among the Pakhtuns continue to hold 
aspiration for the lower categories, as they value the qualities and requirements of the 
office/status. In fact if there was discontent (Barth’s reference to peasants in Thana) 
against Khans’s status it was constructed into the failure (of the ancestors) of the lower 
category. Through these findings Barth and Lindholm have constructed an equation of 
land, identity and status. Later anthropological enquiries conceded what these studies 
suggested, and argued that Pakhtun category to be of those who hold tribal lineage 
(Anderson, 1983; 1975 also see Edwards, 1990 for taken for granted Barth’s equation). 
 Anderson found different reason of this equation in his study of Ghilzai 
Pakhtuns in Afghanistan. He brought in kinship as the most prominent and primary 
identity  marker that would make non kinsmen, ‘strangers’, non Pakhtuns and ‘clients’. 
Anderson argues that, among Ghilzai khans were ‘social creditors’ who not only ‘feed 
people’ but ‘tie the knot of the tribe’ (1978b); they were neither ‘merely  first among 
equals’ nor ‘quite a feudal lords’ (1983: 132). Therefore, we need to understand why 
khan being more than just a social creditor in case of Swat (Barth, 1959b) affected by 
socio economic changes and what are the consequences of such an impact on other 
categories. How these developments have consequences for identity. Anthropological 
literature signify  that any study  of Pakhtun must focus on these internal processes that 
are in complex relations with Pakhtun identity. I will revisit some of the literature 
discussed above and relate it to the case study I have chosen to signify  the problematic 
nature of the above analysis and to suggest a new perspective to future researchers.   
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Inter-ethnic processes and identification:
Focusing on the external aspect, this section explicates the tribal-ethnic question and the 
embedded boundary maintenance issue. First, I will discuss tribal and ethnic question 
and for that I will draw the background from anthropological emphasis of one over the 
other; and second, I will explain the variation in Pakhtun forms. Then I argue that it is 
also imperative to see the question of identity maintenance among Pakhtun under such 
variation. 
 As most of the Anthropological studies of colonial time were the studies of ‘a 
single tribal society’ which represented the distance of ‘civilized’ from ‘non civilized’ 
and provided a theoretical framework of ‘non civilized’ social organization (Jenkins, 
2008a: 17-18). However, since 1960 the term ‘tribal’ has been replaced by ‘ethnic 
group’ which retained its meaning as distinct culture bearing collectivity, although 
became more exclusive than the previous exclusive (uncivilized other) ‘tribal’ (Jenkins, 
2008a and Eriksen, 2002). However, since Barth’s formulation in 1969, the discrete and 
distinct character of the group is replaced by the phenomenon of boundaries that ethnic 
groups constitute. Ethnicity  and its related concepts of ethnic group and identification is 
still useful to understand the complexity of the modern society  and the flux and change 
inherited in it (cf. Eriksen, 2002: 10). Moreover, the advantage of using ethnic group  or 
identity  is that we may avoid drawing sharp distinction between us and the people we 
study (as inherent in colonial or earlier anthropological literature) and can still 
conveniently relate to Western and Non western cases (Eriksen, 2002: 10-11).  
 The choice between ethnic and tribe may become difficult in the case, where 
tribal marker is still associated with identity, even though symbolically, and where tribal 
and ethnic may  inter-mesh in a single framework such as ‘Quom’ (Anderson, 1978a: 
1982). However, this unconscious anthropological emphasis can be seen in the literature 
on Pakhtuns in post colonial period. Anderson’s study  of Ghilzai tribe across various 
ecological and intertribal settings and Akbar (1980) study of Mohmands across Settled 
Areas and Tribal Areas were primarily the studies of the single tribes, although they 
refer to inter-ethnic contexts. Barth (1959b) on other hand did not primarily  focused on 
Yousafzai for their was greater diversity in the case of Swat where Yousafzai, Kohistani 
and Gojars and a large number of dependent  occupational categories were sharing the 
same geographical place in a kind of multi-ethnic situation (Edwards, 1990). Therefore, 
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where these differences in approach to Pakhtun society are of relative importance they 
also refer to the diversity in forms and organization in absolute terms. 
 Anthropological literature on Pakhtun has discussed how Pakhtuns maintain 
their identity despite wider variation in Pakhtun conditions. Barth argues that despite 
cultural and social diversity   in different regions, Pakhtuns have a self image of 
‘distinctive ethnic unit’ for they ‘select certain cultural traits, and make these the 
unambiguous criteria for ascription to the ethnic group’ (1969b: 117-119). As discussed 
above they include patrileneal descent, Islam and Pakhtun customs, based in the 
institutions of Melmastia, Jirga and Purdah and manifested in the core values of ‘male 
autonomy’, ‘eaglity’, ‘self expression’, ‘aggressiveness’ (Barth, 1969b: 120). Barth has 
also insisted that the three cultural institutions provide organisational mechanism and 
‘facilitate the maintenance of shared values and identity’ (Barth, 1969b: 123). Barth 
elaborates that within these values the central feature of Pakhtun identity  is autonomy 
(political and personal) and to maintain his identity a Pakhtun has to perfect it 
‘moderately successfully’ otherwise he will discard it for other identities or change it by 
changing the criterion (1969b: 132). Barth identifies Swat and Peshawar District 
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) into the region where the influence of the centralised State has 
made it impossible for the entire population to sustain political autonomy so central to 
Pakhtun identity (1969b: 131-133). Therefore, he suggests that the consequence in such 
areas is, ‘the reinterpretation of the minimal requirements for sustaining Pathan 
identity’ (Barth, 1969b: 133).
 Some of the debate in the literature, focus on the whether Pakhtun identity is 
maintained in tribal or non tribal (multi-ethnic) environment. Ahmed after 
differentiating between Nang and Qalang categories, asserts that Nang social forms are 
closer to the ideal of Pakhtunwali and the movement from Nang to Qalang is always 
unidirectional, in a sense from ‘hill to plain’, ‘pastoral to agricultural economy’ and 
from ‘tribal social category’ to ‘peasant-agricultural category’ (1976: 81). 
 Anderson (1983) has explained the tribal and non tribal situation of Pakhtuns 
through certain terms which in dialectical manner explain to them their world.  These 
include,
1. Quom and Gund: Quom refers to unity in kinship and patrilleal descent represented 
by tribe (tribalism is Quomwali). Quom denotes similarity, ‘replicate whole’ and 
equality  conceived through primordial unity  or homogeneity. Gund, in opposition to 
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Quom, represents factionalism that is constructed into situational alliances in 
differences (heterogeneity) and denote ‘complementary  whole’ (1983: 125-126: 
1978a).    
2. Atrap and Shahr: Atrap refers to ‘country  side’ , continuity  in space and time and lack 
of differentiation. Shahr represents city, dimensionality, confinement and partial 
identity. City is where a ‘whole man comes a part in different  roles’ and ‘where 
situationally defined encounters with people of diverse origin’ manifest  individuality 
in contrast to ‘the part which replicates the whole’ i.e in tribal or Atrapi situation 
(1983: 126).  He argues, “The Shahr comes deep into the country  side in the form of 
every  stranger who overstays his welcome” (Anderson, 1983: 144). However, 
Anderson (1983) argues that, it  is the capacity of the stranger (outsider) to affect 
Pakhtun that urbanises the context for Pakhtuns. Therefore, Mullah and Pirs are 
contained by denying them participation in tribal affairs and they along with Nai 
(barbers) are taken in joint clientage by the khels. Other occupational categories are 
attached to one or other khan in a contract as clients (1983: 143-144).
3. Yaghistan and Hukumat: Yaghistan alludes to autonomous, free and equal. Hukumat 
means government, ruled and hierarchies. This represents the relationship between 
tribe and government in terms of their activities (1983: 125-127). The dilemma of 
Pakhtun society is to balance the relationship between Yaghistan and Hukumat 
(1978b: 182). 
 Anderson argues that tribe and tribal formation is a dynamic phenomenon; it is 
at a time ‘given’ and ‘made’; it  is the ‘definer’ and ‘to be defined’. It is through the 
tribal formation that Pakhtun derives the above terms and its is through those terms that 
they  conceive tribe and relate it to other social formations (1983: 122-123). Tribe and 
State are understood by Ghilzai through the above frame. These terms serve as ‘social 
epistemology’ for Pakhtuns (1983: 122-123). Ontologically  (in terms of existence and 
‘being’ Pakhtun), the above propositions are expressed as metaphor that are used across 
different domains such as Nang-Qalang, tribal-settled, etc (Andeson, 1983: 127-128). 
 Edwards (1990) on other hand argue that the distinction is rather clearer in inter-
tribal versus inter-ethnic situations. He argues that tribal organisation and Pakhtun 
ethnicity can best be retained in intertribal situation and not in inter-ethnic situations 
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(1990: 72-73). Edwards suggest that Barth’s suggested institutions that maintain the 
core values of Pakhtun identity may actually, at different instances, unhitch from the 
core values and facilitate the processes of ‘incorporation and diminution of Pakhtun 
ethnicity’ (1990: 77-78). 
 Edwards argues that instead of identity  features, the status of Pakhtun depend on 
the ‘perception by  themselves and other that the circumstances of their existence live up 
to the ethos of self-determination’ (1990: 78). It is in this context he argued that in 
multiethnic situation Pakhtuns are required to set the terms of engagement with other 
ethnic groups and denial of that, as the nature of multiethnic society demonstrate, 
generates a tension where they  lose their identity  (Edwards, 1990: 77-78). In this way 
also the tribal and multiethnic situation are related. As tribal situation is the precondition 
of ‘self-determination’, its dissolution in multiethnic society  means the demise of 
personal autonomy and ‘self-determination’ (Edwards, 1990: 78-80). Edwards work 
(1990; 1996) is significant to vividly  relate identification debate with social cleavages, 
and (inter) tribal and ethnic debates. Edwards (1990) studying Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan concluded that  ethnicity is contextual. Moreover, the nexus of all value for 
Pakhtun is Ghairat, which means ‘self-determination’ and ‘self definition’ and which 
lays down conditions in which self description can be realized (1990: 79).  
They  [Pashtuns] define themselves as ones who define themselves: the act of 
defining is itself the definition. As long as a Pakhtun is able to exert  a degree of 
independence and to maintain his personal autonomy of action-which is to say, 
as long as he can keep from being subsumed within an externally  imposed 
definition, then he can consider himself, in a fundamental sense, a Pakhtun 
(Edwards, 1990: 66). 
 
Barth (1969b) and Edwards (1990) have been emphasising the boundaries making and 
maintenance of identity vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. Barth particularly stressed on 
these boundaries in different ecological conditions and social forms, Edwards like 
Ahmed sought to explain the dilemma of maintaining ethnic identity in multi ethnic 
societies. Similarly, literature on social stratification among Pakhtun merely  discuss 
internal division as social cleavages without any impact on the external or ethnic 
identification. I identify a different aspect of this identification by  insisting that some of 
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this attention must shift to internal processes within Pakhtun ethnicity and explain the 
ways in which internal cleavages and contestations on identification interpret diacritical 
features and the inclusion and exclusion in ethnic identity. Additionally, I have to focus 
on what Edwards (1990) argue ‘contextual ethnicity’ when I elaborate on the ways the 
cultural institutions in Malakand reflect core values, and the interpretation of these 
institutions in the idioms informed by the categorisation process. Therefore, both these 
aspects of approaches have insights that guide this research work. These internal and 
external aspects can be related to the broader literature on ethnicity and identification to 
further shape the central research questions of the thesis. 
 
‘Ethnicity etcetera’ : Anthropological approaches: 
In the above discussion the relationship of ethnic and non-ethnic, external or internal, 
what is described by Jenkins (2008a) as ‘ethnicity  etcetera’ is implicit. Before the 
boundaries work of Barth (1969a), Moerman (1960) working on the Lue ethnic group  in 
Thailand raised questions about the anthropologists choice of criteria (such as language, 
cultural traits etc) of ethnic membership. He argues that such an efforts is futile and that 
instead they should use the criteria suggested by the people they  study. Moerman, 
through his study in Thailand, argues that, “Someone is Lue by virtue of believing and 
calling himself Lue and an acting in way that validate his Lueness” (1965: 1222). 
Although these analysis of Moerman are useful in the sense that he problematized the 
boundedness of the groups with criteria suggested by  anthropologists, he could not 
suggest analytical tools to see when and how ethnic and non-ethnic distinguishes from 
each other (cf. Jenkins, 2008a: 42). 
 Jenkins (2008a) rightly asked the question while discussing the case of Wales in 
Britain. He argues that ethnicity seems hierarchical and segmentary  as it is situational 
(2008a: 42). For Jenkins (2008a), the hierarchical arrangement of Welsh identification 
would be East Swansea versus West Swansea, Swansea versus Cardiff, South-east 
Wales versus South-west Wales, South Wales versus North Wales, Wales versus British 
and British versus Europe (p. 42-43). He questioned, “When does an identity in the 
segmentary hierarchy  of comparison and contrast become ‘local’ or ‘communal’ rather 
then ethnic?” (2008a: 42). His suggestion to understand this hierarchy is to see them in 
the context of ‘nominal’ and ‘virtual’ identities (2008a: p.43). He (2008b) explains the 
nominal alludes to name or label with which an individual is identified and the virtual is 
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the consequential experience of that labeling over some time. Meaning, once labeled, 
individuals go through an experience and cumulative process over time to make it 
consequential. Such process can be facilitated by institutional legitimacy. Although 
nominal and virtual may not always agree, the agreement between them can lead to 
internalization of labels (2008b: 99). Jenkins suggest that the hierarchy of Welsh 
identification is the hierarchy of ‘nominal identification’ that, “overlap an intermesh 
with each other in complicated way, depending upon the virualities of each 
other” (2008a: 43). The difference between local, communal and ethnic lies in the 
consequences (experience) of each, which means in “rights and responsibilities, or 
access to social and economic resources, or social recognition” (Jenkins, 2008a: 43). 
Also Jenkins argue that collective identification in terms of socially  constructing 
differences and similarities (or us and them) is primary to social relations and therefore 
also manifested in ethnicity ‘with some reference to culture’ (2008a: 45). With this basic 
understanding, the local, communal and national are historically  and contextually 
constructed ‘on the basic ethnic theme, allotropes of ethnic identification’ (2008a: 45). 
 Jenkins analysis are very  useful in, first, to ask the right kind of question; what is 
different between ethnic and non-ethnic and to a degree gave a satisfactory answer by 
exploring the hierarchy  within the segmentary ethnic identification. However, we still 
need to understand what forms of collectivities are actually  produced by  these 
identification processes, particularly  when these collectivities would involve cultural 
content, contextually. Second, what sort of relations these different hierarchical 
identifications (although involve the same processes of us and them) have with each 
other and what  if they involve contest  at one level that has consequences for other 
levels. I propose that such questions will be best understood if we differentiate intra-
ethnic or sub-ethnic and ethnic or inter-ethnic. By doing so I mean that it is important to 
see not just what is ethnic and non ethnic but also how the subtext or internal processes 
within multiple layers of identification connected with each other. Moreover, such 
differentiation would not be very different from what Jenkins postulated i.e segmentary 
ethnicity.       
 Jenkin is right to assume that ethnic identity is segmentary and hierarchical. 
Jenkins (2008a) arguments cannot be very fruitful to study the processes of 
categorization and identification at different levels of ethnic collectivity, say at 
Swansea, Cardiff, Wales, British levels; and how would these processes consequential 
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for the same processes at  other levels? What would be the consequence of disagreement 
or contest at different levels? Where consensus is achieved? Particularly, when he 
himself suggested disagreement between categorization and identification, and between 
nominal and virtual. To some extend Jenkins suggest complexity of these processes of 
identification and the obvious disharmony. However, I intend to focus more on 
contestation and consequences of these contestations which would explain such 
complexity. Therefore, I turn to Pnina Werbner (2002) who explains such intricacies 
from a different perspective. 
Pnina Werbner (2002) in her excellent  analysis of Pakistani Diaspora in 
Manchester (UK) explains the complexity  of multiple identification and hybridity. Her 
work elaborates how Pakistanis in Manchester belong to multiple diasporas (Asian, 
Muslim, Pakistani, Punjabi) or ‘hybrid diasporas’ and create ‘invisible spaces’ where 
they  debate and argue diverse issues related to their identity (p.17-18). Therefore, she 
argues,
None of the social utilities we evoke - identity, diaspora, community, nation, 
tradition - are consensus based whole; all are the products of ongoing debates 
and political struggles or alliances (Werbner, 2002; 18). 
Werbner work is also significant to provide insight into the internal divisions and 
mobilization. She elaborates that passionate struggle for honor and dignity  of Pakistanis 
in Manchester cannot be explained exclusively  with inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic 
framework, for their are many overlapping struggles at least at  lower faction level, at 
middle level of community and nation recognition and finally at  upper level in 
mobilization against Satanic Verses (2002: 19-20). She also argues that imagined 
identities such as nation, community, Islamic Ummah and Punjabi-South Asian cultural 
diaspora are rhetorically produced by the ‘local subaltern politicians’ to mobilize their 
support (2002: 20). She suggests that despite internal clashes within the ethnic 
community  (Pakistanis in Britain) there is ‘transcendent unity’, “...centered upon 
overarching values, culture icons and organization the home country, the prophet of 
Islam, the central communal mosque, and so forth” (2002: 66).     
I take insights from her work particularly  on her emphasis that identities are not 
necessarily consensus based and that it is the product of, among others, ‘on going 
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debates’. However, I suggest that we need to focus on the multiplicity of ways in which 
different identity markers could be employed by social actors in a categorization 
process within the community, despite relevant consensus on the basic content of the 
identity. Therefore, in the case of Pakhtuns where identity  markers could be recognized 
by all, they could be reinterpreted in local context to generate a contest over the broader 
Pakhtun identity. The local context is shaped by social conflict embedded in previous 
social stratification (cf. Barth, 1959b; Lindholm, 1982), which also signifies, post Barth 
refocus on the internal content or ‘cultural stuff’. Therefore, this project includes focus 
on the processes that constitute the part  of the internal content of the ethnic group  as 
identified by Jenkins (2008a).
Moreover, an important aspect of multiple identification among Pakhtuns is their 
sense of belonging to Pakistan and Islam. I proceed with a general understanding that 
Pakhtuns extend their identification from intra ethnic and inter ethnic to other domains 
that involve national and religious identities. The scholars working on the relationship 
of ethnicity, religion and nationalism in Pakistan, have been broadly divided on the role 
of elite and discursively generated normative concerns. Although both of these 
perspectives provide insights into the role of State, elite manipulation and ways in 
which national identity is forged and projected, they highlight the complexity of the 
relationship  between ethnicity  and religion in Pakistan. I do emphasize the importance 
of multiplicity, contestation (Werbner, 2002) and segmentary identification (Jenkins, 
2008a) and extend this framework to Pakhtun sense of belonging to Pakistan and Islam. 
Taking this fundamental framework I debate on the disagreement among various 
perspectives on Pakistani nationalism and identity. I found the division between elite 
perspective and discursive perspective useful in explaining State project of nation 
formation and Pakhtun’s perspective of Pakistani and Muslim identity. Thus through 
Pakhtun’s perspective. I will be able to reflect on the multiplicity of identities and 
segmentation in ethnicity. In doing so I am also sensitive to the processes carried out by 
the State in relation to ethnic groups. It is such State run process that signifies the 
importance of Pakhtuns’ religious identity which is more rigorously highlighted by the 




I demonstrated how ethnicity is defined in variety of ways and how the debate on its 
content includes issues related to the choice of emphasis between cultural and kinship 
and the combined emphasis to the social boundary it  generates. Also I argue that where 
this diversity has revealed the complexity of ethnic phenomenon it has also contributed 
to our understanding of such complexity. Therefore, I have chosen the concepts of 
ethnicity to provide analytical framework that will guide this research project and will 
help  in focusing the appropriate questions. Ethnicity  is understood in this thesis in its 
socially constructed sense and is seen to include claims of both culture and putative 
descent signified in social and, to an extent, political relations. Moreover, ethnicity  is 
best explored through the processes of identification and boundary making (as identified 
by the literature) have dissonance in this work. Particularly the issue of ethnic and non 
ethnic or segmentary ethnicity, the issue focus on boundary  or cultural content and the 
relationship of ethnicity and culture. 
 The theoretical position undertaken in this study is close to the social 
constructionist’s understanding of ethnicity, social collectivities, identity and 
boundaries. Focusing on the social processes of constructing ‘similarities’ and 
‘differences’ and drawing boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, this work does not 
envisage ‘objective’ differences and ‘reified’ groups. Moreover, it applies the concept of 
boundary to delineate social stratification within the locality (Malakand) and to the 
broader ethnic differentiation in Pakistan.    
 I have discussed the literature focusing on Pakhtun identity  and its constituent 
markers. I have identified these markers or diacritical features in holistic manner but 
indicated internal disputation on the relevant emphasis on these markers. Such 
disputation also highlights, to an extent, the contested nature of the identity for inclusion 
and exclusion remain problematic in the presence of significant diversity and variation 
in Pakhtun form. However, there is a general consensus on these features to an extent 
that they delineate Pakhtun from non Pakhtun. These markers include Pakhto language, 
patrilineal descent, Pakhtunwali (cultural code) and Islam. Moreover, a conscious 
attempt is not to essentialize or reify these markers but to concede that they are flexible 
and variable and that Pakhtun use them as cultural repertoire with varying degree of 
emphasis in identification process. Shaping a theoretical framework for this research 
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work I have elaborated on internal processes within the ethnic group (Pakhtuns) and 
their relationship with external processes (Pakhtuns versus non Pakhtuns). I have 





Anthropological debate about the cultural content, boundary, segmentary ethnicity  and 
contested identities, provides useful insights and contribute to focusing on the research 
questions in this thesis. Taking insights from these debates I adopt an approach that 
focuses on internal and external aspects of identification i.e focusing on both the 
cultural content and boundary at  same time. I see ethnicity as segmentary and 
contextual. Considering this approach, I ask primarily; How do Pakhtuns identify 
themselves? To answer this fundamental question I have chosen Malakand which 
provides an excellent case study for its hybrid administrative structure due to structural 
reforms, an overwhelming Pakhtun population, social diversity  and current political 
unrest. I have also employed multiple data collection tools such as semi structured 
interviews, participatory  observation, focus group interviews and usage of historical 
documents.   
 This chapter explains the focus of research by  shaping research questions based 
on the theoretical framework explained in previous chapter. I will briefly State the 
research questions and proposed answers to those questions. In the next section of the 
chapter I draw a picture of the field I have chosen to investigate, that includes details 
and justification about specific research sites. I then formulate a brief research design to 
indicate methods, I have chosen to collect data and also to comment briefly on my 
access to the field, interviews and the general experience of the field. 
2.1: Research questions and proposed answers
In the tradition of Moerman (1965), for whom the fundamental question of enquiry was, 
‘Who are the Lue?’ motivated by his own dilemma to answer a question, “Whom did 
you study in the field?” (1965: 1215), I suggest a question that is more directed at the 
processes, how do Pakhtuns identify themselves? Such a question does not imply 
unidirectional identification process; rather manifest both internal and external aspects 
of identification. For how we define ourselves include how people define us. Therefore, 
the emphasis is on categorization (external) and self identification (internal) processes 
48
under the broader identification process. Second, I ask, is there a multi-layered 
identification process? And, if there is such a process how the layers are related? This 
question require us to enquiry into the multiple ways in which Pakhtun could identify 
themselves. Third, to what extent is the interplay of ethnicity and religion reflected 
through such processes? This question requires us to probe into a perennial problem 
extensively  articulated in the literature on Pakistan and Pakhtuns. Following is a detail 
sketch of the questions and proposed answers to them.     
 My own understanding of the relationship between ethnic and intra-ethnic is the 
relationship  between ‘similarity’ and ‘differences’ (us and them) that can cut across the 
intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic boundary. I question, for Pakhtuns, who identify themselves 
as an ethnic group, do the internal cleavages (explained above) refer to internal 
processes of identification and categorization? Are these isolated processes? Are these 
processes related to similar processes at inter ethnic levels? Do they use markers such 
as landownership or Patrilineal descent at intra and inter ethnic levels? What 
particular binding feature besides the cultural markers are perceived at inter group 
level?
  In order to understand the internal process within a population that claim ethnic 
identity  for itself, we need to, at least for analytical purpose, differentiate between 
ethnic and intra-ethnic. This is also required by the observable social tension that was 
significant enough, at one historical stage, to  mobilize a large population, demanding 
rights (citizenship, economic, social and recognition). I also identified how some, 
otherwise excellent, research work (Barth, 1959b; Lindholm, 1982) in the region 
ignored to elaborate on the internal processes related to such classification. However, 
such work identified hierarchical castes that have been organized with fair chance of 
upward social mobility  for the members of the lower castes or categories. I intend to 
focus on the complexity  of such social classification and rather concentrate on the 
processes of identification within the larger society  that mostly identifies with a single 
ethnic group. Therefore, earlier work has identified social classification in the region 
signifying the relevance of studying the intra-ethnic situation, I intend to take it further 
by identifying identification processes (intra-ethnic) and relate them to the broader 
processes of identification at ethnic group level that also include nation and religion. 
These enquiries are significant in a way  that, in relation to tribal situation inter-
ethnic situation has the tendency to make identity ‘murky’ and the central features of 
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competition (between the segments of the tribe) and the equality give way to hierarchies 
and distorted opposition (Edwards, 1990: 73). However, I propose that in inter-ethnic 
situation, identity is sought through re-establishment of equality by challenging 
hierarchies.26 I would argue that these demands were articulated in the image of tribal 
ideals particularly  egalitarianism or equality. The use of this ideal in a struggle for 
recognition in itself is significant, since such equality in tribal organisation is between 
agnatic or segmentary clan members and accompanied by  reciprocal competition 
(Edwards, 1990: 70-71).  
 Although I am aware that the proposed differentiation between inter-ethnic and 
intra-ethnic would be less helpful to explain the hierarchical, multiple, overlapping 
identification ( cf. Werbner, 2002) we still need to elaborate on the processes that are 
significant within the ethnic collectivity and that they are consequential for ethnic 
identification. Moreover, I do not intend to delineate and draw a fine line between intra 
and inter ethnic processes for I suggest that these levels are inter-connected and have 
consequences for each other. I may choose the line identified by Barth (1994) in his 
recent work on boundaries and ethnicity  and see it in micro (interpersonal), median 
(inter-group) and macro (State) levels of analysis. However, such differentiation become 
difficult for micro and median are linked closely in our work and median can be 
multiple medians for I suggest  collectivities (of how less stable character they may be) 
within collectivities or boundaries within boundaries. Although, all these approaches are 
relevant to an extent, but in more holistic way I structure my argument in a way that it 
reflects a persistent and evolving sense of multiple belonging. 
  Therefore, from this focus on intra and inter ethnic I relate my work with the 
State’s effort  of nation making and with the broader identification with religion. I do so 
because religion primarily  has been reported by anthropologists to constitute the part of 
Pakhtun identity  features and at the same time centered in the State’s nation making 
project. Therefore, the project in the broadest sense involve identification among 
Pakhtun at intra ethnic, inter ethnic, national levels. In other words it is a project to 
explore multiple processes of identification among Pakhtun that drawn on the processes 
of similarities and differences.
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26 By inter-ethnic I refer to Edwards’s identification of Swat as ‘multiethnic’ and ‘proto-state’ (1990: 75) 
and also the fact that Malakand is inhabited by people who have tribal organization, immigrants and other 
non-Pakhtun groups such as Gojars. 
 Moreover, in this study I focus primarily on ethnic and other identification in 
routine or day to day understanding, negotiation and accommodation and has left 
political mobilization, saliency of ethnic movements largely unattended. The reason for 
this focus is my own engagement with the literature on the issue of ethnicity  in Pakistan 
which I found fairly  rather exceedingly focused on ethnic movements or ethnic 
mobilization and ignore identification as processes that engages at micro, median and 
macro levels (cf. Barth, 1994). However, this does not imply the relative significance of 
ethnic movements for I suggest one approach to the study such mobilization would be 
to relate these identification process with ethnic mobilization and although I have not 
attempted it. I also think it will have a greater contribution to our comprehension of the 
ethnicity as a recurring phenomenon rather than a diminishing one, as some political 
analysts have predicted about Pakhtun in Pakistan. 
 I have discussed in previous chapter that literature on nation making in Pakistan 
discuss and contest on the interplay between nationalism and Islam. It also relates such 
interplay  with ethnic diversity in the State. Arguments presented in this literature 
indicate a fault line to bifurcate those who see significant role of elite manipulation and 
those who see the discursive and normative influences on the nation making. Across this 
division the literature address the same kind of issues such as nation making, role of 
religion and accommodating ethnic diversity. Most of the literature approaches these 
issues through discussion on ethno-nationalist movements, State integration, 
government structure (federal, provincial autonomy) and resources distribution. 
However, I propose an approach that is a based in Pakhtuns’ perspective; Pakhtun 
identification with the State. Therefore, the questions of concern to this project are not 
‘State centered’ rather pinpoint the processes run by ethnic groups such as Pakhtuns. 
However, this approach does not imply that State generated processes are avoided to 
focus on Pakhtun processes exclusively. Instead, questions and propositions suggested 
by this thesis include State’s project of nation making in relation to Pakhtun 
identification process. I ask, do Pakhtun construct a sense of Pakistaniat? does their 
identification involve Pakistaniat? How is such identification different from the State’s 
nation making and imagination? Does religion being unifying and divisive phenomenon 
affect Pakhtun identification with Pakistan? The last question, takes us to another 
important aspect of Pakhtun identification. 
51
 This thesis, through the religious aspect of Pakhtun identification, investigates 
into the interplay of religion and ethnicity. Also through current focus on this interplay 
in the context of religious unrest in the region, it is imperative to look into the religious 
reformation of Pakhtun and its relation to Pakhtun ethno-nationalism. Although, the 
current literature mostly  focus on the revivalist tendencies in the region and religious 
contestation I approach the above issue through investigating Pakhtun identification 
with Islam and its relationship with State processes of nation making. I question, Do 
Pakhtun identify with a particular sect of Islam? How is the centrality of Islam to their 
ethnic identity related to the centrality of Islam to Pakistani identity? Does the State’s 
nation making has an impact on Pakhtun religious identification?
 I propose that  Pakhtuns do not identify with a particular sect despite religious 
change in the society. I also suggest that Islam remains central to Pakhtun identity  and 
the State nationalism predicated on religion has a broader impact on Pakhtun. However, 
none of the arguments in the literature concerning religion as unifying or divisive 
phenomenon completely satisfy the case of Pakhtun identification with Pakistan. 
I will therefore, provide a different theoretical perspective on the issue of nation 
making and identification. I propose that Pakistan continues to be a nation in the making 
with its national harmony determined by the shift from exclusivity  in Islam and 
discouragement of ethnic expressions to more plural, diverse and nonrestrictive Islamic 
national identity. Moreover, where such perspective discredit the essentialist and 
restrictive approach to ethnicity  and project the dynamic nature of identities, it also 
disagree with the argument in the literature (Verkaaik, 2004; 2007; Shafqat, 2007) that 
Pakistan has successfully  pushed ethnic groups towards assimilation into a nation that is 
being consistently located in Islam alone. I suggest that ethnic groups such as Pakhtuns 
have been identifying themselves primarily with their ethnicity (although such ethnicity 
is contested) within Pakistani nation that has been perceived as a multi ethnic nation. In 
this manner my work may also contribute in bridging the gulf between scholars who 
insist that nation formation efforts have so far been ineffective and therefore, its vibrant 
ethnicities may threaten its solidarity (Jaffrelot, 2002; Cohen, 2005; Harrison, 2009) and 
those who have predicted that State nationalism and its Islamic identity has been 
successful in co-opting ethnic groups (Verkaaik, 2007; Shafqat, 2007).  
 My approach is to combine State centered and ethnic group centered approaches 
in the context of identification. I will elaborate how through these processes we may 
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explain the paradox of nation making in Pakistan but also the complexity  of the 
relationship  between ethnicity and religion. I also insist that  choosing generative 
processes rather than forms as center of focus I will be avoiding the reification that  is 
criticized in State centered approaches and will bring in State in the analysis that has 
been found missing in some of the anthropological literature on Pakhtuns.27
2.2: Case study 
In this section I first explain my choice of Pakhtun, in general focus on the processes of 
identification in Pakistan. I will then elaborate on my choice of Malakand as a field of 
investigation. This will include a brief account of the region, its historical, social and 
political distinctiveness, with the justification for its choice. This is followed by brief 
sketch of the two towns within Malakand that  hosted this research and explanation of 
why I made this choice. 
 There are multiple reasons why I decided to study Pakhtuns. First, my Pakhtun 
credentials and my access to the area through the network of acquaintances would make 
this study possible. Second, it is to indicate the oscillation of focus in the literature on 
ethnicity and nationalism in Pakistan. Since 1980s this swing has been towards the 
emerging ethnic group i.e Muhajirs and away  from other ethnic groups such as 
Pakhtuns. However, currently  (since 1990s) the pendulum swing is again towards 
Pakhtun with exceeding emphasis on the relationship between Islamic resurgence and 
their ethno-nationalism. Third, to expose that the perennial and contested literature on 
ethno nationalism that either demonstrate integration (if not assimilation) or irredentism 
has been taking simple view of otherwise a complicated phenomenon. Fourth, to 
explore the often taken for granted socio economic changes in areas which are subjected 
to structural reforms either from the State’s own needs or expedited by the reaction to 
those reforms. All this expositions put Pakhtun at the center of the problem, as they are 
assumed to have hot or cold, thick or thin ethnic (and other) sentiments and thus are 
attributed off and on significance. This pendulum oscillation require the rereading of 
Swinson’s assertion about Pakhtuns, “They may be hated or loved but never can they be 
ignored” (1969: 21). It is thus to bring back Pakhtun in spot light with an element of 
consistency in emphasis. This is done by problematizing their relation with Islam and 
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27 Barth (1959b) is criticized for such negligence by Ahmed (1976). 
Pakistan, probing dynamic process manifested in their own transformation and by 
enquiring all this through the process of multi-layered identification. Nevertheless, this 
approach to the ethnic issue of Pakistan would not over blow the importance of 
Pakhtuns at the cost of other ethnic groups but to suggest consistency through which all 
ethnic groups can be approached. 
Justification for the case of Malakand: 
Malakand is chosen as a case study  for various reasons. First, it  is a district that  is 
inhabited by people who overwhelmingly identify themselves Pakhtuns and thus 
provide a lay man justification for this study of Pakhtuns. Second, Malakand is a 
distinctive place in the region that has shown remarkable transformation both through a 
number of reforms but also through the socio-econmic change in consequences of such 
reforms. Also this transformation is in the context of evolution from Tribal Area into 
(nearly) a Settled Area, thereby providing a prototype for other such Tribal Areas. 
However, it also represents tension between centrally imposed reforms and popular 
dissatisfaction. As the focus of this project is on Pakhtun identification, the socio-
economic changes and the reforms provide an excellent context to see such 
identification through this period of flux.
 Third, Malakand has been witnessing the religious fervor and probably was the 
first in region to have hosted a radical movement demanding Sharia in involving means 
other then electoral struggle. It continues to be vulnerable to tendencies that threaten the 
very legal and political system in the region. Fourth, various anthropological studies in 
the proximity of Malakand (Barth, 1959b; Lindholm, 1982) have signified the 
hierarchical social stratification and the issues related to identity. It is the reading of 
these brilliant ethnographic details and anthropological analysis that fascinate and allure 
a reader to revisit the region marginally touched by these studies. 
 Finally, Malakand offers us two distinctive cases of transformed society in their 
own distinctive ways. Batkhela being transformed from a village of insignificant past to 
a thriving market town where diversity is cherished through incessant migration. Thana, 
on other hand with its glorious past has preserved its distinctiveness by transforming 
itself into a kind of educational hub and securing place in public and private services 
sector of Pakistan. Thus the flux in the character of these towns represent  the generative 
processes and dynamism consequently signifying their importance. 
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Political and historical Profile of Malakand: 
Malakand Tribal Area or Agency before, 1969 included the States of Chitral, Swat and 
Dir, along with Malakand Protected Area and Bajaur. However, currently  Malakand 
District known as Malakand Protected Area is divided into sub districts or tehsils of 
Sam Ranizai and Swat Ranizai.28 
 The tehsil headquarter of Sam Ranizai is at Dargai while that of Swat Ranizai is 
at Batkhela. The administrative head of the district is Nazim who is assisted by DCO 
(District Coordinating Officer) formerly known as Political Agent and stationed at the 
district headquarter in Malakand. The total population of Malakand in 1998 was 
450,000 and the current  projection is of 610,023.29  Overwhelming number of people 
identify themselves as Pakhtuns, 98.2% speak Pakhto and 99.6% practice Islam (almost 
all Sunni Islam).30 Although Malakand has a mosaic of people, Yousafzai have been the 
most prominent for their conquest of the region and thus constituting the ruling elite. 
Yousafzai living in Malakand are from Ranizai and Baizai clans. Baizai live in the 
village of Thana and Palai, while Ranizai are extended from Alladand to Totakaan 
villages (Government of Pakistan, 2000; 4-5). 
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28  In this thesis I use the name Malakand for the district of Malakand, however,  when the context is 
historical it refers to the entire Malakand Agency before 1969. 
29  see 1998 census (Government of Pakistan,  2000). The recent projection is done by NCHD, National 
commission for health and development. 
30 Figures from 1998 census (Government of Pakistan, 2000). 
Map 1: District Map of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and FATA
(Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, cited Khyber.org, 2010)
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Map 2: Administrative division of Malakand
Source: District Census Report of Malakand, 1998 (Government of Pakistan, 2000).31 
Map 3: Administrative division of Swat Rani Zai sub division Malakand 
Source: District Census Report of Malakand, 1998 (Government of Pakistan, 2000). 
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31  Map of Malakand Division, first published by Survey of Pakistan in 1988 and reproduced by Census 
Report of Malakand, 1998.  
Historical sketch of the Malakand:  
The history of Malakand is recorded probably in more details since the arrival of 
Yousafzai tribe in the region. Yousafzai was a powerful tribe, originally  inhabiting the 
area currently in Afghanistan. Most of their chiefs were massacred by  the ruler of Kabul 
in the later half of 15th century AD. They migrated in the leadership  of Malik Ahmed to 
the plans of Peshawar valley.32 After settling in there for some time they were attracted 
by the fertile valley of Swat33. Passing through Malakand Pass they surprised and 
defeated the Swati rulers of the region somewhere close to 151534. Once conquered the 
whole valley of Malakand and Swat, the issue of land settlement was solved by a 
reputed religious figure Sheikh Mali. He invented a system of land distribution often 
debated in historical and anthropological records on the region (cf. Barth, 1959b; 
Lindholm, 1979: 487-488: Rome, 2003). The lands allotted to Pakhtun tribes were 
known as Daftar and lands allotted to religious men as Serai, the system itself was 
known as Wesh (Rome, 2003).35  
It was a periodical land redistribution system (known as Garzindah Wesh, 
meaning ‘redistribution’ in Pakhto) where land was exchanged in the related segments 
of the tribe at regular intervals of 5, to 10 years36. With this settlement and distribution 
Yousafzai also entered into a social contract with the conquered people; and by 
acquiring the status of ruling class they constituted a stratified, hierarchical social 
system (cf. Barth, 1959b and Lindholm, 1982). 
Yousafzais had intermittent relationship with the Mughal rulers of India. 
However, when British were extending their rule and influence in India during the early 
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32  The ruler of Kabul was the uncle of Mughal King Babur. Malik Ahmed was one of the surviving 
leaders of the Yousafzai tribe and remained the chief of the tribe through out their journey and conquests. 
He is buried in Malakand in the village of Alladand. 
33  These details are based on the chronicles collected by Olaf Caroe in his comprehensive historical 
record of Pakhtuns (1958).  Caroe argues that these chronicles are not a very valid source of information 
as they are not scientific and don’t show dates. He even doubts whether these migrations would have 
happened at all (1958: 176). Therefore, these chronicles have mythical character although they are dully 
attested from Yousafzai and non Yousafzai Pakhtuns of Malakand. 
34  This date is suggested by Caroe (1958: 181). Bellew (1864[1977]: 64) also suggests almost the same 
time. 
35  Daftar means ‘register’ in Persian and Serai means alloted in Pakhto. For details on this system of 
distribution see Bellew (1864: 193-200)
36Practiced in Swat till the creation of Swat State. See  Lindholm (1979) and Rome (2003). 
19th century the entire region inhabited by  Pakhtun tribes was hosting a Jihad of Syed 
Ahmad of Rai Bareilly (1826-1831) against the Sikh rulers of the region (see Jalal, 
2008). Later, in 1849 British established themselves as rulers in the valley  of Peshawar, 
but they  never intended, at least at  that time, to penetrate deep into Malakand or the 
valley of Swat. Their interests lay in the State of Chitral, close to the border of 
Afghanistan and across the Wakhan to Russia. Russian advances in the region and the 
behavior of tribal Pakhtuns were a source of concern for British Empire. Moreover, they 
wanted a safe passage to Chitral through Malakand. 
The frontier was the key defence against the ‘Russian Expansionism in the 
East’ which was becoming almost a national paranoia in England” (Spain, 
1977: 06). 
  British concerns increased since 1892 when a scramble for the throne of the 
Chitral State alarmed them (Caroe, 1956: 383-385). A military campaign was launched 
in 1895 to establish British influence in Chitral37. This time the British adopted a 
different route to reach Chitral, the Malakand-Dir-Chitral route. They, therefore, needed 
to secure Malakand to approach Chitral. The campaign was successful and a new 
agency of Malakand was established formally  known as ‘The Agency of Dir, Swat and 
Chitral’.38 This status was different from the settled districts of Frontier region for the 
strategic reasons and would always be remembered later on with the name Tribal Areas. 
The British at the time had established three more such agencies or Tribal Areas such as 
Waziristan, Khyber and Kurram. The First  officer in charge of the Malakand Agency 
was Harold Deane. 
  Soon after these developments in 1897 an armed resistance was launched by the 
people of Malakand and Swat39. This resistance was motivated and led by the religious 
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37 See attached  map: 1. 
38  Yousafi remarks the Swat Ranizai and Baizai (clans in Batkhela and Thana respectively) did not 
participate overwhelmingly in 1895 campaign in fact the chiefs of the region signed agreements with the 
British and they were promised a biannual allowance. However, they overwhelmingly took part in 1897 
campaign. Agreements were signed after this campaign (Yousafi, 1960: 281-82).
39  For detail account of the British military campaign in Malakand see Churcill (2005[1898])), Mills 
(1996[1897])) and Khan (1995).  For Urdu sources see Khan (1986) and Yousafi (1960). 
leader Mullah Mastan40 known to the British as ‘Mad Mullah’.  This was not the first 
armed attempt from the people of the region against the British administration. The first 
one was led by  more charismatic leader and more consequential in its scope i.e. 
Ambela41  battle (1863). Ambela was well before the conquest of Malakand and its 
results were a peace agreement in the region for almost 10 years. Ambela was led by a 
religious leader well reputed and revered in the entire of Pakhtun country  from 
Afghanistan to India Known as Akhund of Swat, Abdul Ghafur42. 
 British evolved a system of ‘loose control’ (Hussain, 2005: 4) over Tribal Areas 
which could be conceived as a kind of compromise between local autonomy and 
imperial control. The compromise itself was reached through treaties between the 
British government and the local tribal chiefs. In this way it  was a distinct form of 
government. Salient features of this form of control included, the creation of the office 
of Political Agent, Frontier Crimes Regulation, Malaki system and Riwaj (customs). 
Political Agent was to ensure compliance of the treaty, keep peace through a number of 
inducements and punitive measures, negotiate between the government and the tribes 
and ensure the presence of the government in the area. He also had, a sort of, police 
force know as Levis or Khasadars on his disposal (Khan, A.H. 2005b: 96). Political 
Agent of Malakand had also to deal with the tribal area of Malakand as well as the 
princely States of Dir, Swat and Chitral (Khan, H. 2005c:108). Frontier Crimes 
Regulations or FCR were the laws tailored in 1901 (earlier version in 1872) by the 
British to suppress crime rather than administering justice (Ali and Rahman, 2001: 53). 
These laws were a bunch of severe punishments to facilitate Political Agent to keep 
peace in Tribal Areas. They included collective punishment, no right  of Habeas Corpus, 
etc. However, it was under FCR that the Political Agent appoint a local council known 
as Jirga to adjudicate civil and criminal cases. Besides FCR, the institution of Maliki 
was created to facilitate British rule. Maliks were tribal chiefs being paid by  the British 
government through various ways to ensure good conduct from the tribes. Riwaj being 
an important  component of this rule. It broadly means the customs, traditions and 
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40 His original name was Saad ullah khan and he belonged to Rega (Buner-Malakand division). He was 
known with different names among Pakhtuns such as Mullah Mastan and Sartor Mullah while British 
called him ‘Mad Mullah’ (Khan, 1995: 24-25).  
41  A detail of this campaign is given by the first ruler of Swat in his autobiography (Sahib, 1962). For 
details on Islamic movements in the region see Sana Haroon (2007). 
42 Known locally as ‘Saidu Baba’. His grandson later established the State of Swat. 
conventions of Pakhtuns. Jirga was to interpret this Riwaj which had advantage of 
legitimacy of centuries old usage.  
 All these features administratively and politically distinguish Tribal Areas from 
Settled Areas of the North West British India. A North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
was created in 1901 with five settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and 
Dera Ismail Khan; and kept directly under Governor General through a Chief 
Commissioner (Khan, A.H. 2005b: 88). Later it  was granted the status of full province 
in 1931. Therefore, the province had different governance dispensation than the Tribal 
Areas, which were always treated as special case. 
 In 1947 when Pakistan was created the tribes in the Tribal Areas were impressed 
upon by Jinnah and Muslim League to re-enter into treaties with the State of Pakistan in 
return for the continuation of British Policies and incentives (Khan, 2005c: 25-27). 
Therefore, such treaties were signed immediately  in 1947 between tribal leaders and the 
government of Pakistan, which recognized that Tribal Areas part of Pakistan and 
guarantee policy continuation (British) in administering these Tribal Areas. In 1951-52 
the government of Pakistan reentered into agreements with tribal chiefs to acquire 
greater control (Khan, R. 2005d: 27-28). Till 1955 the governor of the province of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (previously NWFP) was to serve as agent of the Governor 
General of Pakistan to enjoy authority on the area; however, from 1955 to 1970 this 
control was exercised by the government of West Pakistan (during One Unit 
administration from 1955-1970). However, through out this period laws made by  the 
elected Parliament were not applicable to Tribal Areas and the President of Pakistan 
through his agent (in the province) would govern the region. Major developments took 
place since 1969 when the government decided to merge the princely  States of Dir, 
Swat and Chitral to Pakistan, which were formerly part of the Malakand Agency.43 
 In January 1971 the government of Pakistan implemented certain laws into the 
region that were functional in the settled districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; these 
include. Police Act, Evidence Act, Jurisdictions of the Supreme Court, etc.44 Soon after 
The Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1972 (Articles 260 and 
61
43  The merger of these States was announced in July,  1969 (Rome, 2008: 286). See also the official 
regulation of such merger as, “The Dir, Chitral And Swat (administration) Regulation, 1969” (Ali, 2009). 
These States were previously part of the Malakand Agency (Khan, H. 2005c: 105). 
44  This information is based on the letters written by the local chiefs to the President, Governor of the 
province and constituent Assembly, and Khan (undated). 
261) created a new category of Tribal Area i.e Provincially Administered Tribal Area 
(PATA) besides Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), which included Malakand 
Protected Area, districts of Swat, Dir, Chitral, Tribal Areas of Hazara district and former 
State of Amb. Later The constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, retained 
this arrangement through Article 246 and 247. Article 247 of the constitution explains 
that the executive authority of the Provincial government should extend to PATA but the 
provincial assembly cannot legislate for it unless the governor of the province so 
approve under the direction of the President (The Constitution of Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, 1973). However, since the merger of Dir, Swat and Chitral States in Pakistan, 
the administrative status of Malakand Protected Area has been complicated (Khan, H. 
2005c: 105). Dir, Swat and Chitral have been made districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province within PATA, Bajaur which was previously part of the Malakand Agency  was 
made a separate Agency and included in FATA, and Malakand Protected Area has been 
something between regular district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Agency (Khan, H. 
2005c: 105). 
 The status of PATA enjoyed by Malakand Protected area has been a distinct 
governance system that manifest “hybridity  of ‘settled’ and tribal area laws, as the 
people of the area enjoyed the right to vote, and normal court  system and other laws and 
institutions prevailing in the rest of the country were in place here” (Ali and Rehman, 
2001: 54). A number of regulations and laws have been extended to PATA which 
includes Malakand Protected Area since 1970, which drastically  changed its status.45 
Prominent among them are known as PATA regulations, that include; Regulation I of 
Provincially  Administered Tribal Areas Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Regulation 
and Regulation II of Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedures (Special 
Provisions) Regulation, 26 July, 1975 (Sultan-i-Rome, 2009: 12-13). These regulations 
were generally resented and therefore challenged and declared null void by  Peshawar 
High Court in February, 1990 (Sultan-i-Rome, 2009: 13). Subsequently, the provincial 
government challenged the decision in Supreme Court  of Pakistan which upheld the 
decision of the High Court in February 1994. 
 In this legal battle and confusion an important religious organization became 
active to demand Sharia instead of regular laws of the State. Tahreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-
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45 All these laws are passed as regulations under the article 246 and 247 of the constitution of Pakistan. 
For various regulations introduced by the government in Malakand see Ali (2009). 
e-Muhammadi (TNSM) was established in district Dir of Malakand Division in 1989.46 
It created unrest in Malakand in May, 1994 which resulted in the loss of some life, and 
consequently an agreement with the government was reached to implement Islamic law. 
Provincially  Administered Tribal Areas (Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Shariah) Regulation, 1994 
was promulgated which attempted to implement the agreement with TNSM. However, 
due to TNSM’s dissatisfaction another regulation was introduced, called Shari-Nizam-e-
Adl Regulation, 1999 and it repealed the previous regulation of 1994 (Sultan-e-Rome, 
2009: 14). Sultan-e-Rome argues that these regulations did not satisfy  the people and 
TNSM (2009: 15). 
 In post 9/11 scenario, a break away faction of the TNSM under the leadership of 
Mullah Fazlullah joined the Tahrik Taliban Pakistan (Sultan-e-Rome, 2009: 27-28).47It 
is after the government’s action against this faction that created one of the worst 
confrontation between the State and the Islamic militants in Pakistan’s history. The 
government has currently  issued a new regulation known as Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 
2009 ‘to provide for Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Sharia through courts’ in PATA (Daily Times, 15 
April, 2009). This regulation is not yet implemented for the situation remains tense in 
the presence of the army and militants in the region. Currently, Malakand is a PATA 
district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and enjoys its ‘hybridity’ for it has Local Government 
system like the settle districts, Levies instead of Regular Police force, exemption from 
certain taxation, etc. The Devolution of Power Plan48  2001 took an extra step to bring 
more reforms and abolished divisions and elevated districts as highest units of local 
government. 
Research field: 
Arguments presented in this thesis are based on the data collected from two places in 
Malakand, i.e Batkhela and Thana. following are the details of these areas. 
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46  Officially this organization was known as Ibtidai-Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi and its 
leader has been a resident of Dir, named Sufi Muhammad (Marwat and Toru, 2005: 10). Also see, Sultan-
e-Rome (2009: 26-28).  
47  TNSM led by Sufi Muhammad did not agree with the armed struggle of this faction,  although, he 
primarily agrees with their aim of enforcing Sharia in the entire region (Sultan-e-Rome, 2009: 28). 
48 Local Government Plan introduced by  President Musharaf. 
1. Batkhela:
 Batkhela is the Tehsil headquarter of Swat Ranizai and the only  recognized 
urban area of the Malakand district (Government of Pakistan, 2000). It has its own 
uniqueness for various reasons. First, Batkhela is probably the only  place in Malakand 
that has rapidly extended its economic base to trade, commerce and businesses. This has 
not only added to create economic opportunities for its inhabitants but significantly 
improved its status in the region. It was once a small village on the main road from 
Nowshera-Madran-Chitral Road and historically  overshadowed by the regal presence of 
Thana in its proximity (11 km). Perhaps that is the reason, most of the historical and 
anthropological literature gives it but a passing reference.49Its remarkable 
transformation has improved its significant vis a vis Thana. Second, in Batkhela all such 
transformation has brought in certain consequences. Its own status has changed from 
rural to urban in at least official usage.50 Batkhela has recently (since 1970) witnessed a 
huge influx of immigrants from diverse regions and backgrounds, which has 
transformed the demographic landscape of the town. This influx has created a general 
resentment against the strangerness of these immigrants. Batkhela has been the locus of 
social and economic tension in the region manifested in the rise of Awami-khel 
movement, Kisanyan activism, TNSM  blockage of 1994 and hosting its leadership in 
the detention of Sufi Muhammad. 
 The total population of Batkhela according to 1998 census is 43, 179, with 
literacy ratio of 39.3 (Government of Pakistan, 2000). Although 1998 census shows that 
Agriculture, fishing, forestry  and hunting is the largest sector of economy in terms of 
employment, the combined share of whole sale, retail trade, restaurants, hotels, 
construction, community  and social services is 62.2 % of the employment in Batkhela. 
The census demonstrates that 99% of the people in Batkhela speak Pakhto and 99.4% 
are Muslims by religion (Government of Pakistan, 2000). 
 Batkhela is divided into old Batkhela and new. Old Batkhela which is often 
known as central Batkhela is mostly inhabited by the Yousafzai clans and the rest of the 
Batkhela is inhabited by the immigrants and other communities. Yousafzai of the 
Batkhela claim to be from the Ranizai clan  and they include sub-clans of Ibrahim khel, 
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49 See Churchill (2005: 68-73), Bellew (1977: 40) and Barth (1959b). 
50 It has the status of municipality and has its municipal committee (Government of Pakistan, 2000). 
Umerkhel, Madey  Khel and Bali khel.51There is a pocket of population in the mid of 
cultivated track parallel to Swat River towards the West on the road to Jolagram, 
inhabited by  the peasants community. The population is spreading with high pace and so 
is the construction of new colonies and localities, mostly on the back of the market and 
main road.
 Batkhela also hosts a number of private and public sector education institutions 
where students from the entire region get education. Besides education, people from 
surrounding areas also visit  Batkhela for medical treatment as district  (headquarter) 
hospital is located in Batkhela and there a number of private clinics and hospitals in the 
town. Important government offices including tehsil administration, courts, National 
Commission for Human Development (NCHD), National Database Registration 
Authority  (NADRA), different NGOs, etc. Also most of the banks, transport station, 
veterinary  hospital, general post office are located in Batkhela. However, the most 
important feature of Batkhela’s economic and social life is its thriving market. Locally 
known as Batkhela bazar, this market is stretched on both sides of the Nowshera-
Chakdara-Chitral road for almost two kilometers (Government of Pakistan, 2000) and 
has a range of business mostly  of consumer goods in retail and wholesale. It  also 
includes hotels, restaurants, technical services, financial institutions, etc. The Batkhela 
bazar not only serve the local population but the entire region from Malakand Pass to 
Chitral. It is due to this market that Batkhela has secured a reputation of trade center of 
the Malakand or market town.    
 Most of the research work is conducted in Batkhela for it has been the locus of 
social unrest through out the recent history ( since 1960s) of the region. It was here that 
Awami-khel organization was founded, it was here that landless peasants refused to 
hand over rents to the landlords and adopted violent means, it was here that  TNSM 
received hospitality during its blockage of road in 1994 and stationed its leadership for 
some time. Batkhela also represent much greater diversity than Thana in its social 
fabric. It is also a place where most people could talk to me openly  about some of the 
historical tension in different  strata of the society. Moreover, in Batkhela I got diverse 
perspectives from a range of professional and amateurs, from a laborer in the market to 
a businessman, from a professional doctor to a literary organization, from a peasant to a 
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51 see also Yousafi (1960: 376) and Khan (1984: 396-422).
landlord from a religious leader of TNSM to the former office bearers of Awami-khel. 
Therefore, most of my fieldwork was conducted in Batkhela. Thana was kept as 
comparative case study where I could reflect on dormancy of the above mentioned 
organizations and approaching social change through multifarious means such as 
education and services. However, both these cases have similarities in a sense that they 
had similar hierarchical societies which are transforming, the lineage landowners in 
both these areas are cousins on the Yousafzai tribal charter. Moreover, the tension and 
concerns among different  strata vis a vis others remain the same in Thana and Batkhela. 
Shared history and experiences under similar administrative and political setup create 
similar political and economic conditions. Therefore, most of the analysis in this thesis 
are valid for both these areas.
2. Thana:
Thana is situated at, approximately, 11 km distance from Batkhela and historically the 
most prominent town in the area. It fits well in the Barth’s thesis (1959b) of factional 
politics, for the presence of two powerful ruling khans who had been influential both in 
the affairs of the Malakand Agency and in the politics of Dir and Swat States, signified 
its importance. These khans were awarded the title of Khan Bahadur, place in the 
provincial durbar and an annual allowance of up to Rs 3000 by the British government 
for their services to the British Empire. These khans hailed from Bazi khel and Baba 
khel clans (Khalid Khan, interview, 2008) and were leaders of two different factions 
that either supported the ruler of Dir or Swat in their mutual clashes. It was in the 
presence of these powerful figures that Thana had asserted its influence through out the 
history of Yousafzai in Malakand.
 The Yousafzai of the Thana claim to be from Baizai clan and identify following 
sub clans in Thana; Bazikhel, Ali khel, Kator khel, Babakhel, Ismael khel, Khan kor 
khel, Shah Ahmed khel.52 These clans own most of the land in Thana and have been less 
inclined to other economic activities except government services. It also has huge 
population which do not claim their ancestry from one of the above clans and which are 
divided in different occupations. Currently Thana is divided for political and 
administrative purposes into Thana Jadeed, Thana Khas, Thana Bandajat. 
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 Currently Thana has retained its agrarian base but there is substantial increase in 
the share of services sector and limited increase in trade and commerce. Thana has its 
own bazar which caters the need of the Thana and its surrounding villages. However, it 
is less prominent in comparison to Batkhela. Thana had monopoly over education sector 
of the Malakand. Its secondary school had the privilege of being one of the oldest in the 
entire North Western region. However, recently educational institutions have been 
opened in many other parts of Malakand and Batkhela has a number of public and 
private institutions to cater its growing population. 
 Growing literacy or education is the most remarkable thing ever happened to 
Thana. In 1998 Thana Khas had 50.7% of literacy rate which is higher than the national 
average of 43.92 and much higher than the FATA (17.4%) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(35.41%). Such remarkable trend has its own consequences for Thana people, most of 
whom tend to join services sector. The educated people look for jobs in diverse areas i.e 
from education to law enforcing agencies, from practicing law to medicine, etc. There 
are number of ex-army  officers of higher ranks, bankers, doctors, engineers, professors, 
civil servants etc, from Thana who create an extensive network of these servicemen in 
the entire country. Most  importantly, the fruits of this achievement were equally 
distributed among different  strata of the society. Education and services have brought 
benefit to the broadest population and not limited to particular strata or group. There are 
countless stories of how ordinary men with no prior social status shined by securing a 
place for themselves in regional and national services by becoming doctors, engineers, 
lawyers, army officer or civil servant. Such achievement of Thana is often related to 
Batkhela’s achievement in business, commerce and trade. Therefore, previously  the 
presence of the powerful chiefs made Thana prominent, but currently the outstanding 
achievement in education and services sector adds to its influence.  
 Despite, all this Thana has witnessed some unrest during 1970s in the form of 
peasants insurrection.  However, that was a brief encounter that did not sustain itself for 
long. Moreover, Awami-khel and TNSM had limited influence in Thana. Although 
people from Thana did participate in these movements, it was not substantial enough to 
have caused larger unrest in the town. Therefore, my focus in this thesis is more on 
Batkhela for its greater diversity, significant social tension which in itself brought 
transformation in its character.  
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2.3: Research design
This study is carried out through a comprehensive research design which includes; the 
background of the field work, how I access the area and my informants, who are my 
informants and how they are helpful in carrying out this research, and finally explaining 
decisions on the methods to collect data. 
Background of the field work:  
An important factor in the field work was the timing of this project. Post 9/11 situation 
is of social and political unrest in Pakistan in general and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 
particular. The MMA government in the province was about to complete its tenure in 
office and religious organizations such as Taliban in the entire Tribal Area putting up 
resistance against the State. Sufi Muhammad under the banner of TNSM gathered 
10,000 people form Swat, Malakand, Dir and Bajaur and crossed the border to support 
Taliban against the NATO forces. He was imprisoned by the security agencies in 
Pakistan on his way back to Pakistan. In his absence Maulana Fazal ullah (his son-in-
law) emerged in Swat by  establishing relations with Taliban in the Tribal Areas. He also 
spread hatred against the government in the area through radio transmission. It was in 
2007 that regular clashes started between security forces of Pakistan and the Taliban of 
Fazal ullah group. The clashes continue to cause enormous damage in form of 
causalities and deaths.
 Malakand in close proximity  with Swat was not unaffected by these events, 
occasional attacks in the army convey, isolated incidents of bomb blasts in (music) CD 
shops, alcohol and drugs selling shops occurred through out Malakand. The situation 
remained quite tense due to the heavy presence of army in the region and covert activity 
of Taliban in Batkhela and Thana. However, later when I finished my field work and 
returned to York, I was told by my friends that situation further deteriorated in Thana 
and Batkhela due to military operation and frequent curfews in the region. 
 It was in this background that I had to plan my  field work. The only source to 
rely  on was to get consistent guidance and information from my friends in the field. It 
was through them I received information about the situation in the field. I was told to 
plan short  visits to the region instead of single (longer) stay as most ethnographers 
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would prefer. I have to do so to avoid exposing myself to elements that  could undermine 
my research work or pose any  threat  to me. I therefore, planned two short visits of 
almost a month each and one longer visit of two months. The first visit was a 
preliminary visit  (December-January, 2007-2008) in the background of elections. It  was 
during this visit that an unfortunate assassination of former prime minister Benazir 
Bhutto occurred. During this visit, I gathered most  of the data from candidates 
contesting elections who reflected on the general issues of local concern. However, I 
also focused on the possibility  of conducting interviews with informants and gathering 
background information on the region through narrations of my informants. My second 
visit in April, 2008 was the most intensive session of field work. I tried to conclude 
most of interviews in this session. My third and final visit  was the longest one (Oct-
Nov, 2008). In this session I extended my filed interviews to informants out of 
Malakand and in Peshawar. These informants were not directly related to Malakand but 
provided broader perspective on the Pakhtun society and the ethnic issues in Pakistan. 
Besides these interviews in Peshawar, I revisited Malakand to do some follow up 
interviews and some new interviews that I could not cover in the second session.   
Access to the field and informants:  
My introduction to the field is not through a chance or accident, it  was through my 
experience of being born and raised near the field. My home town is with in the 
province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and through out my educational upbringing and 
professional career I have come across a number of people from the field I am studying. 
This has enabled me to make life long friendships with in the area. Through this 
friendship  I had a better view and insight of the people and the field. My  education as 
well as teaching in the most respected and major educational institutions of the province 
enabled me to experience a mix of cultures and traditions from a broad range of tribes 
and clans of Pakhtun lands stretching from the North West to the south of Pakistan. I 
had an opportunity to ponder over a variety  of case studies that could help  me in 
unfolding my research questions. Malakand was obviously the choice I made after 
giving a thought to those possible cases. 
 The choice of the two sites of the research field such as Batkhela and Thana was 
less because they represent the urban and rural divide in Malakand but the fact that the 
people of these places demonstrate relative difference in their approach to life. The 
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behavior of my friends at both these places instigated me to question why the friends 
from Thana were taking greater pride in their achievement in education and found 
themselves more inclined to jobs in government departments? And why  my friends 
from Batkhela found themselves less inclined towards government jobs. This in no way 
refer to intellectual abilities of the two people or their approach to education. For I 
found the most vibrant literary and intellectual culture in Batkhela, but probably to 
highlight that  the presence of Batkhela bazar amidst the people have influenced their 
approach to life. This approach to life is tacitly recognized by the people in these town. 
Moreover, this diversity would help  me in locating answers to my questions of 
identification and boundary making in contrasting ecology (cf Ahmed 1980). 
 My access to the area is made easy by the friendship  I have and the students I 
have taught. Interestingly this friendship is not limited to one particular area or a social 
category within the region but to a wide range of people. I claim all this on the account 
that all of my friends from the region had different backgrounds. Furthermore, I also 
made new friends in the course of my field work, particularly, in Batkhela through the 
friendship  circles (see ch. 4). Besides, the most important feature of Pakhtun society 
that facilitated me was ‘Melmastia’ (Hospitality). This feature enabled me to visit  the 
area much before this research project was conceived. These early  visits enabled me to 
gain familiarity that later helped me in shaping this project. Therefore, it is through 
friendship  and Melmastia that I gained initial insights into my research field and it 
would be through these two I proceed to the field. 
Field work experiences:  
Before embarking for my field work I had to contact my friends in the field and they 
readily accepted to assist me in my research work. They helped me in shaping the 
sample and lists of interviewee for this thesis. Additionally  I have a number of friends 
within the journalists, literary and academic community of the area who were of greater 
help  in collecting data from their respective community. Therefore, I took extra care to 
approach my informant from a particular community through a friend who is from that 
particular community. 
 In Batkhela I chose to stay  with a friend who happen to be from the Yousafzai 
clans but at the same time his family is among the most successful and well established 
business families in Batkhela. In this way my friend and his family is well respected in 
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both categories i.e businessmen and landlords. Moreover, the most  important factor was 
that I was guaranteed protection, for the influence this family had in Batkhela and to 
some extent in Thana was contributory. In Thana I stayed for a short while with the 
family of a friend which again was influential and respected in Thana. Moreover, the 
family again was from one of the sub clans of Yousafzai and the head of the family was 
by profession an agriculturist  and lawyers at the same time. The family  was extremely 
useful in accessing influential people in Thana. I also used some of my links in Batkhela 
to contact some non Yousafzai categories in Thana. 
 I also learned through my experience in the field that to explain your research 
topic to your informants become extremely difficult, even to the educated. Therefore, I 
conveyed that I was working on the people of the region and their social and economic 
conditions. My informants thought I was investigating the political history of the region 
and from that context the people living in the region. Most of the communication with 
informants was smooth due to my command over Pakhto language. However, where I 
needed the assistance of my friends I did use them to communicate well.
 The most crucial aspect of my field experience was my positionality as an 
insider and outsider. These positions not only explain how I was received in the filed 
but also enabled me to give different  perspectives an insider and outside. Being 
Pakhtun, my ethnic background was not different from most of the informants in the 
field and therefore, did not make me a complete stranger as would have happened with 
Barth and Lindholm. Therefore, my position as an insider allowed me to settle quickly 
in the field and communicate and report Pakhtuns’ perspective with ease. Moreover, to 
my surprise the informants felt more delighted to the fact that  a researcher from their 
own ethnic background is investigating. 
 The informants were also aware of my status as an outsider to the region, for I 
belonged to a different part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and therefore did not share the 
remarkable experience of transformation with my informants. Furthermore, my 
association with a foreign university  and location (being stationed) in Europe also added 
to my status as an outsider and thus providing me an opportunity to have an outsider’s 
perspective. The response to such a position was a mix one. Where it created excitement 
in the people that I was representing a foreign university  and foreign interest in the local 
people, it also generated suspicions in some cases whether I was working with ulterior 
motives often associated with western concern in the region. Although, in general the 
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response from the informants in the field was very supportive as I got few refusals, I 
still had to deal with some silences in the field related to religious transformation and 
political unrest. 
 The people in the field were conscious of the fact that religious and political 
unrest in the region was of primary importance to the world and particularly  to the 
media. Most of the responses related to the religious change and its relationship with 
Pakhtun identity were informed by the media reports implicating the local population. 
While, some of the respondents were upfront and articulate other were cautious and 
calculating. Such a mix response influenced analysis on the dynamic of religious change 
below (chapter 7) where I could have commented on the dynamic nature of religious 
change. Moreover, I was also restricted by the precarious security situation in the region 
and limited resources to involve substantial sample of madrasa students and to observe 
popular religious observances. Most of my analysis indicate the significant  religious 
change and reformation in the area but is less exhaustive of the dynamic of such a 
change. I suggest that such an area will be an interesting attempt for future research. 
 
Limitations of the study:  
This study  with all its effort has certain limitations. First, the field work was to be 
shortened for precarious security  situation in the region. This would be done on the 
advice of my  friends who considered themselves responsible for my  security. At times 
when I had a will to stay  without their consent, I was coerced to realized that I would 
risk the danger of losing their support which I so disparately needed. Moreover, it also 
demonstrated that my guest status was not only to facilitate me but to fulfill their own 
cherished feature of Pakhtunwali i.e Melmastia; which included my protection in the 
field. 
 The second limitation was the heavy presence of the security forces in Malakand 
during my  field work. When I had the opportunity  to interview some top ranking 
civilian official in Malakand, I also encountered a situation that revealed the dominance 
of military  over civilian bureaucracy in these conditions of war. I was promised access 
to the official documents, reports and correspondences on Malakand in the library  and 
archives of the former Political Agent in Malakand. However, despite several attempts 
the librarian could not let me in through the heavy barricades erected by the military 
stationed in the proximity. Therefore, my access to those documents and archival 
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material would have certainly contributed to shaping historical context of this thesis. 
Unavailability  of such material left  me with no choice but to rely mostly on the local 
accounts.  
 Third, I had initially planned to interview female informants in the field with 
this realization that it would save me from presenting an exclusively male perspective; 
particularly, when Ahmed (1980) took help from his wife to gather information from 
female members of the population. However, when in the field I discussed this issue 
with friends I could not get an encouraging reply. This is because female continue to be 
highly  unaccessible in the region despite increasing literacy rate among male and 
female members of the population. This difficulty is not just faced by  interviewer from 
opposite gender but by some of the female researchers working among Pakhtun who 
could find it  hard to penetrate into women lives (Grima, 1998: 88-107) or encounter 
Purdah system determining their field practices (Ahmed, 2006: 43-44). 
Research Methods:   
The initial sample of informants was based on the anthropological studies conducted in 
the region (Barth, 1959b; Lindholm, 1982) and my own preliminary  field visit. I could 
roughly divide the population into landowning khans, the occupational categories and 
the immigrants to Batkhela and Thana. I have focused on Pakhtuns in Malakand 
particularly and mostly skipped other groups previously reported to identify themselves 
as non-Pakhtuns such as Gojars or Kohistanis (Barth, 1959b: Lindholm, 1982) for I 
wanted to focus on the internal processes, problematize them and see the significance of 
their relationship with broader ethnic and national identities in the State that is multi-
ethnic. I wanted to do so in the non local context where these inter-ethnic processes 
could not be dominated by  other smaller groups (i.e Gojars) but by the broader national 
(Pakistani) context and ethnic groups that strive for political and cultural dominance 
over other groups. In this way I bring in State in the perspective which Barth is 
criticized to have left out (Ahmed, 1979). 
 During my preliminary field work I realized the most useful methods could be a 
mix of participatory  observation, semi structured or unstructured interviews. Ahmed 
(1980) conducted his research in the Mohmand tribe with a formal questionnaire 
distributed among a carefully shaped sample. Banerjee (2000), Amineh Ahmed (2006) 
and Bartlotti (2000) on other hand used their semi structured or semi standardized 
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interviews to get information and I most certainly  relied on this method to ask the 
broader field question of: Who is a Pakhtun? How would you describe people living in 
Batkhela or Thana? How you see the social, political and economic changes visiting 
your city or village recently? How they see Pakhtuns in Pakistan? All interviews were 
audio taped with the permission of the interviewee. Edwards (1996) used stories 
narrated by his informants which I found is a useful method to elicit information from 
the elderly informants who provided valuable historical perspective and explain in form 
of narrations (cf. Ahmed, 1980). An important source of information was an informal 
chat, conversation or discussion (cf. Bartlotti, 2000), gossips on meals, tea, or walk or in 
the friendship circles. All these observation were not audio tapped. I did more than 40 
taped interviews at Batkhela, Thana and Peshawar, including the follow up interviews.  
 I also came up with the idea to use focus group interviews when I was invited to 
a literary  organization in Batkhela. This would be the first test of method used in 
anthropological studies on Pakhtuns. I therefore, did two focus groups interviews in two 
literary  organizations in Batkhela and Thana. In Batkhela I did MAL and in Thana I did 
Thana Adabi Tolena. Both these associations particularly MAL had professionals such 
as doctors, engineers, technicians, journalists, amateur poets, teachers, etc as it 
members. Therefore it  was more like a circle of individuals interested in promoting 
literary  activities and most of these literary activities were in Pakhto language, poetry, 
etc. Discussion in these focus groups was informal but semi structured which generated 
free expression of opinion. Being learned people their response to questions regarding 
the processes carried out in Malakand certainly  generated more questions (cf: Berg, 
2007; 144-146).  Moreover, it was in these focus groups and in informal discussions and 
chats that cross arguments would clarify some of the ambiguities.    
 Besides interviews, focus groups, participatory observation this work benefited 
from a range of historical documents I collected from the field. Particularly, the personal 
collection of interview of Muhammad Khan (leader of Awami-khel) pamphlets 
published by  Awami-khel, letters written by  the khans of Malakand to the President of 
Pakistan, governor of the province and legislative body, regarding the reforms in 
Malakand. I also collected British published report on the important people the area 
titled who is who? I was also able to get hold of locally  prepared genealogical tables of 
Yousafzai clans inhabiting Malakand. Besides all these documents I got hold of number 
of official documents such as 1998 census report of district Malakand, various 
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regulations published by  provincial government. I also studies a number of journals and 
magazines published in vernacular to get a sense of what explanation and arguments are 
offered by the journalists and writers for the current political crises in the region. 
Conclusion
The focus of this research work is on the Pakhtun identification. It  proposes that such 
process is multilayered and therefore, has internal and external aspects. Moreover, it 
suggests that these layers are related to each other and reflect the interplay  of ethnicity, 
religion and identity. To enquire such a formulation it has chosen Malakand district in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as research field. It has emphasized that Thana and Batkhela 
within Malakand provide excellent sites for research for their recent transformation and 
diversity. My field work was at the time of religious and political unrest in the region 
which impelled me to use my friendship network in the region and conduct research 
work in stages. This facilitated me to conduct research work in an area that has greater 
potential to provide empirical evidence in support of the arguments made in this thesis. 
Moreover, besides semi structured interviews, participatory observation, I used focus 
group interviews as a method of data collection. 
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Chapter 3
 Collective Identification and Categorization in Malakand
Currently, people in Malakand categorize each other as Khanan and Ghariban.53 
Previously, the literature (Barth, 1959b; 1981; Lindholm, 1982) elaborated on social 
stratification in Swat  and argued that although, the fundamental division was of 
‘patron’-‘client’, ‘free’-‘ruled’ (Barth, 1981:152) or ‘superior’-‘inferior’ (Lindholm, 
1982:109), people were divided in a range of hierarchical status categories. The patron 
or superior category  was identified as ‘Pakhtun’ or ‘Pukhtun’ and the rest as ‘non-
Pakhtun’ or ‘non-Pukhtun’ (Barth, 1959b; Lindholm, 1982). In this chapter I argue that 
through historical developments, hierarchical categories, with a degree of continuity, 
have transformed in two oppositional categories of Khanan and Ghariban. Moreover, 
the previous patron-client, superior-inferior statuses are undergoing a change and social 
organization has become confrontational between Khanan and Ghariban. Discussing 
the historical developments and pattern of change in categorization process, this chapter 
elaborates on the processes of collective identification in Malakand. Subsequent 
chapters will illustrate confrontation between these broader categories on the contested 
meaning of categorical boundaries (chapter 5), which then shapes into a broader contest 
over ethnic identity  (chapter 6). Therefore, through this chapter I intend to set the 
argument for dynamic intra-ethnic processes, pursued in detail by the following 
chapters.   
 The pioneering work of Fredrik Barth (1959a,b) on Swat focused primarily  on 
political system, internal stratification and patron-client  relationship within a population 
that identified itself as ‘Pathan’. Later (1981) he tried to study  continuities and 
discontinuities in what was reported earlier. However, Barth (1981) could not grasp  the 
depth of change brought forth by the entry of centralized states and the collapse of 
traditional edifice of authority  in the region. He could not reflect on the reorganization 
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53 Khanan and Ghariban refer to collective identities. The singular of these are khan and gharib (literary 
meaning poor). see below for further details.  I have borrowed words ‘Pakhtun’ (Barth, 1959b; 1981) and 
‘Pukhtun’  (Lindholm, 1982) from literature to refer to Khanan category. However, I use the term Pashtun 
for the entire population instead of Barth’s term ‘Pathan’. People in Malakand use the word ‘Pukhtun’  to 
refer to ethnic identity and differ on inclusion and exclusion in it.  
of categories, breaking of hierarchical statuses with consequences for the internal 
boundaries, although his purview grasped the discontent among various client 
categories and the emerging organization such as labour unions and peasants movement. 
Later Lindholm (1982) working in a Swati village could only see in this discontent a 
desire and opportunity  for the members of client categories to replace the patron 
category and enact the continuity  of the system. I intend to address rather broader 
changes in the region and their consequences for the processes of collective 
identification.  
 Taking insights from Jenkins (2000; 2008a;2008b) this chapter discusses 
collective identification enacted in social interaction. Identification involves synthesis 
of relationships similarity and differences (Jenkins, 2008b:18). 
Our understanding of who we are and who other people are, and, reciprocally, 
other people’s understanding of themselves and of others (which includes us) 
(Jenkins, 2008b: 18). 
Jenkins also stresses the importance of identification in our life. He insists that, ‘we 
cannot live routine lives without identification’ and ‘would not be able to relate to each 
other meaningfully consistently’ (Jenkins, 2008b: 27). Moreover, the internal and 
external dialectics of self or ‘group identification’ and ‘categorization’ shapes collective 
identification. The former being external shapes the internal identification and vice 
versa (Jenkins, 2008b: chapter 9). In this chapter I will demonstrate that these internal 
external processes of collective social identification in Malakand are crucial aspects of 
social life and generate context for the broader contest over ethnic identification 
(chapter 6). However, the emphasis would be on the categorization process which 
contributes to shaping ‘group identification’ or self identification. 
 My focus in this chapter would be to reflect on various social, economic and 
political changes and their consequences for the collective identification in Malakand. I 
demonstrate how the processes of identification shape in time and space and how they 
are meaningful to social actors. I locate these processes in social interaction and argue 
that they  create conflictual situation for the social actors. In this way I draw a broader 
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picture that relates comprehensive change with the processes of identification in the 
region, something I posit, is ignored by the existing literature. 
 This chapter will first  take up the anomalies in the available literature on the 
social categorization in the region and then will elaborate historical processes 
generating change in Malakand and affecting the processes of categorization. I will then 
elucidate current processes of categorization in relation to the historical developments. 
Categorization involves time and space (Lamont and Molnar, 2002); therefore, to make 
their identification meaningful and get sense of the historical processes the people in 
Malakand also categorize time into two successive periods, such as Jirga Period (Da 
Jirgey pa wakh) and Post Jirga period (Da Jirgey na Pas). I adopt their categorization of 
time and structure this chapter around these historical periods, so that I relate the change 
with the processes as perceived by the social actors. These two periods being successive 
are also interconnected, the former sets the context for the later.   
3.1: Jirga Period (Da Jirgey pa wakh)
Various studies have reflected on the social stratification in the region with some 
consistency (Bellew, 1864; Barth, 1959b, Lindholm, 1982). Such stratification 
demonstrates the dominant presence of Yousafzai tribe in the region and various other 
occupational categories as dependents. Occupational categories are thus, interdependent 
in a patron-client relationship and ranked hierarchy. However, I argue that, despite 
analytical value of this proposed intelligible and uncomplicated categorical 
arrangement, as understood by  the literature, it cannot explain the complexity of social 
classification in Malakand.54 I suggest that the literature could not explain the social and 
economic changes that have gradually produced complexity in social classification in 
Malakand. Therefore, by studying the processes of categorization in relation to broader 
social, economic and political changes I intend to expose anomalies in the existing 
literature. Moreover, discussion in this part would explain how historical processes have 
produced conditions, that in self explanatory  manner would show non feasibility  of 
categorical hierarchies of the past. 
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54Although Barth in his later study (1981: chapter 7) did take up a dynamic approach to focus on the 
changing circumstances and life experiences of various ‘castes’ in Swat.
Anomalies in social categorization:
It is imperative to study categorization and boundaries making as incessant processes 
through historical account, as only  then can we identify aberrations in the earlier 
categorical schemes identified by  the anthropological literature. I therefore, explain 
social classification reported by earlier anthropological literature and then take up a 
position to question how social and economic changes require us to revisit such 
schemes of social classification. 
The entire population of the region (Malakand and Swat) was socially  stratified 
into various occupational categories, termed ‘castes’ by Barth (1959b: 16-22).55 
The hierarchical type of category is usually called qoum-people, religious or 
ethnic group, caste. The different qoums of Swat constitutes patrilineal, 
hereditary, ranked occupational groups, conceptually endogamous... 
Sociologically they might be classified as estates or castes...Caste in present 
context is important because of the way it defines a ranked hierarchy  groups, 
and the relations between these groups in local communities (1959b: 16-17). 
Barth (1959a; 1959b) and Lindholm (1982) report that religious group locally 
known as Stanadars being the descendants of the prophet or saints are on the top of the 
categorical arrangement. They are followed by ‘Pukhtuns’ who identify themselves with 
Yousafzai tribe and are patrilineal, segmentary group. These two in patron roles live 
along numerous landless dependents or client groups called ‘vassals’ by Bellew (1864: 
180-190).56 Yousafzai clans of ‘Pakhtuns’ inhabit Malakand since their conquest (1585) 
and provided leadership (along with the Saints) to the whole population. They  were 
organized by  their ethnic identity  embodied in the institutions of Jirga (council), Hujra 
(men house, hospitality) and Purdah (seclusion of women). ‘Pakhtuns’, in their 
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55 Malakand has been traditionally associated with the Swat region and despite its separate legal and 
political status in British India was considered lower part of the Swat valley and therefore included by 
Barth in his study of Swat ‘Pathans’ (Barth, 1959b: 08) .
56 Except mullahs as Quran readers who are given land by the ‘Pukhtuns’ (Lindholm, 1982: 93).
leadership role, had to demonstrate the qualities of strength and bravery along with 
patronage for the clients, to retain their leadership  status. They also had to trace 
genealogical links with the epical ancestor (Yousaf) and maintain their ‘actual land 
ownership’ (Barth, 1959b: 21). The loss of these two meant loss of ‘Pakhtun’ status and 
downward movement in the hierarchy (Lindhom, 1982; Barth, 1959b). The agnatic 
rivalry among ‘Pakhtuns’ (Lindholm, 1982) and their consistent  efforts to make and 
break political alliances contributed to violence and fractions (Barth, 1959b). Saints in 
these situations mediate and settle disputes among the warring parties (Barth, 1959b). 
Land has been an important commodity  for the ‘Pukhtun’ chief. It has not been 
just an economic possession, but also a guarantee of his membership in the local Jirga, 
his confirmation in tribal lineage and his social status. 
Land rights are granted through the patrilineal genealogy, and one who has no 
land is, in effect, no longer a Pukhtun. Land and personal identity are deeply 
intertwined in local thought, and efforts to increase one’s own holding from the 
leitmotif of Pukhtun life (Lindholm, 1982: 56-57). 
Through a complicated system of land ownership in Malakand and Swat a ‘Pakhtun’ 
landowner possessed land through his ‘share’ in the larger ‘estate’ of his descent group, 
called ‘Daftar’ (Barth, 1959b). Traditionally, land was allotted to the descent segments 
for a certain period; and after the lapse of that period the land was re-allotted to another 
descent segment for another period. Share in the land allotted to descent segments 
confirmed the ‘Pakhtun’ status and membership in Jirga. Selling his share to a member 
of his own segmentary descent group would mean the sale of not just the land but also 
of the right to Jirga membership and ‘Pakhtun’ status (Barth, 1959b). Often the agnatic 
rivalry (Tarburwali) is for the control of land (Lindholm, 1982: 66). However, land 
could not be sold to a person out of the descent group. This system slowly and gradually 
changed and the permanent allotment took place to various segments of descent group.57 
Consequently, the ‘Pakhtun’ from a segmentary descent group could sell his land to a 
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57 In Swat it was abolished by its first ruler in five long years 1924-1929 see Sahib (1962).
non-group member (landless non-Pukhtun) but he cannot transfer his ‘share’ (which 
includes his ‘Pukhtun’ status and membership in Jirga) to the buyer. This will be done 
through the conversion of land from dafteri land (inherited estate) to serai land (private 
property  of a non-Pukhtun). The seller, however, cannot demand land on the basis of his 
“share”; and if he looses his entire ‘share’ to his descent group or to non member 
through its conversion to serai land, he will lose his membership  of the jirga as well as 
his ‘Pakhtun’ group membership (Barth, 1959b: 64-67).   
Moreover, land was also the source of further distinction between a ‘Pukhtun’ 
and a ‘Khan’. Lindholm in his study of a village in upper Swat identified that those with 
larger holdings of land are known as ‘Khans’, they  are like elite among the ‘Pukhtuns’, 
and those who have small holdings are known as ‘Pukhtuns’. Similarly the landless are 
known as fakir meaning laborers (1982: 74).  Barth (1959b) uses the title ‘Pathan’ for 
the entire population of the region. He writes,“The Pashto-speaking people of the Swat 
valley belongs to a group loosely called Yousafzai Pathans or Afghans. This category 
includes all the descendants of a common distant ancestor, Yusuf, and those persons 
who are politically dependent on them” (1959b: 05). He reserved the title of ‘Pukhtun’ 
for the chiefs or the leadership category among these ‘Pathans’ (1959b: 16-30). 
However, generally among Pakhtuns (unlike what Barth has suggested) the most 
common titles are Pashtun or Pukhtun and rarely Pathan.58 Barth’s analytical difference 
between ‘Pathan’ and ‘Pukhtun’ leaves a larger population as ‘Pathan’ but not 
‘Pakhtun’. These non ‘Pukhtun’ Pathans are further divided into ‘castes’ hierarchy of 
dependency and are clients of the ‘Pakhtuns’. Such clients are not a fraction of the total 
population, instead the number of aristocratic Pukhtuns range from ‘one half to one 
tenth of the population’. In Swat Valley, in an area of ten miles on the west bank of Swat 
River controlled by Nikbi khel lineage, out of 40,000 people only 8000 were 
‘Pukhtuns’ (Barth, 1959a: 7-8). Moreover, in Batkhela these Yousafzai landowners were 
joined by a huge number of immigrants who now constitute roughly 80% of the total 
population. 
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58  Although Barth insisted that the whole population of ‘Pathans’ acted on cultural features defining 
Pakhtun identity but see the society divided into different castes having different expectations. His label 
of ‘Pathan’ and “Pakhtun” are problematic to analyze the major division in society i.e.  patrons (Pakhtun) 
and clients (non-Pakhtun). Such labels had greater consequences for the entire population in Malakand 
when a contest would shape around who is a Pakhtun? (chapter 6).
 Categories placed lower in the hierarchy are reported to be the dependents, the 
Yousafzais brought along (when they were on conquest), the defeated local people and 
those weaker Yousafzais who have lost their land and ‘Pukhtun’ status (Lindholm, 1979: 
490; 1982). Every individual was ascribed to certain category which determined his 
occupation, political role and his ‘marital and affinal relations’. Therefore, ‘sharp  social 
boundaries’ existed between these groups as highlighted by their social stratification 
(Barth, 1959b: 16-22). They included peasants, tenants, artisans and other skilled 
people. Despite their high number these non-Pukhtuns were politically less organized, 
and had always considered landowner ‘Pukhtuns’ “unnecessary  imposition” (Barth, 
1959b: 68-69). The occupational categories were in dependent  positions but were free to 
associate themselves with one or other ‘Pakhtun’ chief. The ‘Pakhtun’ chief had to 
distribute gifts, bribes and other benefits among his followers including these non-
landowners to keep  them on his side. It was difficult  for the poor skilled people to be 
away from these chiefs as they depended heavily on their economic support. Moreover, 
among the followers of chief were land contract holders, services contract holders 
(craftsmen-skilled people) and the house tenants. The first two categories were more 
dependent on their chief while the last one was less inclined to be a follower, though 
they  were still controlled by the chief through the threat of eviction (Barth, 1959b: 
77-90). The landless had no right to property or claim political participation in the 
egalitarian council called Hujra. 
 Lindholm (1982) has reported change in such occupational specialization and 
categorization. He argues, ‘But as the economy of Swat has begun to enter mass market, 
a number of specialities have been all but eliminated by competition’ (1982: 96). With 
such economic change the high degree of occupational categorization has vanished. 
Many categories have simply disappeared and new categories are emerging such as 
m i s r i ( ‘ w h o f i x e s m e c h a n i c a l i m p l e m e n t s ’ ) u s t a z ( t e a c h e r s ) a n d 
‘Dokandars’ (shopkeepers). Moreover, the previous category  of muleteers (Parachas) 
have accumulated wealth, purchased lands and call themselves ‘Pukhtuns’. Such 
changes also refer to horizontal mobility within the hierarchy, ‘Pukhtuns’ after loss of 
land can move downward and become landless peasants and muleteers (Parachas) after 
buying land acquire the status of ‘Pukhtun’ (Lindholm, 1982: 96-99).59  However, this 
82
59 Buying and selling of land started with the reforms introduced by the State in Swat in 1930s.
mobility  seems problematic currently  due to increasing tension between elderly and 
young generations among the Pukhtuns. The later deny that the status of ‘Pukhtun’ is in 
land rather they insist, ‘being Pukhtun is a matter of blood, and not land’ (Lindholm, 
1982: 109).  
 Lindholm (1982) argues that despite ‘proletarianization’ of the poor, money 
economy, tension or occasional clashes between clients and patron, class struggle or 
class interpretation cannot apply to Swat. It is because the client does not question the 
‘value system of the society’. 
The social premises which motivate the elite are the same premises by which 
the poor would like to live. The hope of the poor is simply  to become exactly 
like the Pukhtun landlords who dominate them (Lindholm, 1982: 110). 
However, Lindholm pointed out the growing tension among the Pukhtuns and the 
refusal of younger generation among them to accept such mobility of lower categories 
and acquisition of ‘Pukhtun’ status. Whether such denial from ‘Pukhtuns’ and increasing 
pressure from non Pukhtun for inclusion would create a conflict in future is not foreseen 
by Lindholm. 
Only through transformation of consciousness and an awareness of class 
solidarity could real change come about, but this does not seem likely at the 
moment (Lindholm, 1982: 110).  
Barth has also pointed out that below the religious group, ‘the intervening groups are 
differentiated by wealth and power alone’ (1959b: 18). The source of such power and 
wealth in agrarian society like Swat is land. 
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In Swat, land, wealth and power are all one and the same, and there is no 
question that some men and some lineages have more than others (Lindholm, 
1982: 90). 
Internal feuds among the ‘Pukhtuns’ in form of agnatic rivalry (Tarboorwali) to control 
land not only  ‘structures society on violence’ but also confirms that land is a precious 
commodity  which ensures the continuity of status (Pukhtun), power and wealth; ‘A 
man’s identity, his pride and his land are united’ (Lindholm 90-91). It raises an 
important question, whether this equation of land, power and identity  will be maintained 
in the face of growing economic changes, some of which are identified by Lindholm 
(the Paracha case). Does accumulation of wealth by non ‘Pukhtun’ categories will 
redefine this categorical hierarchy? Will power be relocated from land to some other 
sources of wealth or will land become a source of contention between all categories. 
Will the ‘social value system’ which associates land ownership with status (Lindholm, 
1982) continue to enjoy broader acceptance in such situations. All these questions 
require revisiting the relationship  of identity, land and statuses. These are themes 
shaping the remaining part of this chapter and the next.  
The traditional social system based on social status categories defined in terms of 
descent, land ownership  and occupation was already at time of Barth and Lindholme 
analyses, being affected by historical developments. Principle among these 
developments were related processes of migration into Malakand and the growth of 
commerce and trade, notably in the Batkhela Bazar.  
Migration to Malakand:
The period of 1950‘s and 1960‘s was characterized by large scale migration in 
Malakand (particularly in Batkhela).60  Lindholm has reported that immigrants in a 
Swati village were those who had left their home as they were chased by their enemies 
and finally  took refuge with the village ‘khans’. Such asylum seekers were recruits of 
the armies constituted by the ‘khans’ and now serving as laborers. In both these 
positions they  were dependent on and part of khan’s ward (Lindholm, 1982: 235). 
Migration to Malakand is not limited to such asylum seekers and it  is not  a single event 
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60 Migration to Malakand continues and its pace has substantially increased since 1970’s.
in history. There is a mosaic of immigrants who have migrated through a gradual 
process over decades and going back as far as 1920 in some cases. It  mostly  included 
individual or family  migrations.61  Nevertheless, we assume that the impetus to this 
migration process could be the consequence of migration of Hindu community  to India 
after partition (1947). Hindus being businessmen, traders and moneylenders in the area 
(Bellew, 1864) produced a niche with their migration to India. Local landowner 
Pakhtuns considered business a non-Pakhtun activity  and remained associated with 
agricultural. However, people from other areas who took refuge in the region would 
have chosen to opt for business. Despite the gradual nature of such migration, people 
identify periods of pace in migration, such as the current phase of migration (1970s) 
encouraged by the opening up of the political system. Interestingly, immigrants gave 
different reasons of their migration but insisted that post 1970 migration is largely 
because of flourishing businesses in Batkhela Market. 
Migration itself is categorized differently by these immigrants. A distinction is 
made between those who migrated  from areas within the boundaries of Malakand 
Agency such as Thana or Aladand Dheri and those who migrated from different regions 
including the States of Dir, Swat, Chitral, Bajaur and other districts of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa.62Interestingly, these categories of migration are conceived differently. 
Immigrants of the former category did not recognize their act as migration rather they 
insist that they just moved their families from one place of the region to the other due to 
unfavorable conditions. They  did not discontinue their relations with the places they 
have left, however, they identify themselves strongly with Batkhela rather than with 
their previous villages. Moreover, those who migrated from places other than Malakand 
had mostly  lost their links with their ancestral villages. In this way  relationship with 
space varies among these immigrants. The reasons of their migration also varies. 
Respondents disclosed the following major reasons of their ancestors’ migration; 
agnatic rivalries, loss of land, atrocities committed by  the rulers of the Dir, Swat and 
Chitral States, better education opportunities, businesses, crimes committed, etc. The 
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61  It was also reported that there were migrations of the whole clan such as Swatians. However, this is 
fairly controversial.   Some say they are the descendants of those who have been conquered and pushed to 
Hazara region by Yusufzai in 16th century, some say they have migrated to Batkhela later as whole in a 
clan (Abdali Khan, interview, 2008).
62 There are migrants who claimed that they have come from of a variety of districts including Nowshera 
and Mardan.
number of immigrants settled in Batkhela are greater than any other part of Malakand. 
In 1947, Batkhela was a small village and the local market was located out of the village 
compound on the road between Malakand and Swat. The earlier immigrants had to 
adjust to their new situation which was characterized by restricted property, citizenship 
and political rights and society organized in segmentary  lineage clans (landowners), 
implying that they have to occupy the social status of a client. Most of these immigrants 
were poor therefore, they had to rely on the landowning segmentary lineages for 
economic support. They had this understanding that the political and economic system 
was not favorable but their hope was in the growing market which they thought was an 
economic opportunity. This social and political situation or to be more correct this 
context (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 155-160), in their perception, was very  highly 
biased in favor of the landowners who were represented by the institution of Jirga.
Coming to a place where landownership was still restricted to the established 
clans and the social and economic niches available were of client status and places 
available at the lower level of occupational hierarchy, immigrants had limited choices. 
However, with their diverse backgrounds these immigrants did not join any  particular 
occupational category but rather spread in different economic activities. Those with 
sufficient means started their own businesses, those with no such means initiated 
ordinary  labour in the town and market, some even joined the lower level occupational 
categories such as peasantry, etc. The landowner clans would deny them landownership 
as well as the status of Pakhtun (chapter 5 and 6) despite the claims of these immigrants 
that they had been from different tribal lineages (inhabited in other parts of the region). 
Immigrants were entered into house and shop tenancy contracts and therefore placed 
lower in occupational hierarchy  in a non Pakhtun and client status. An understanding 
was reached between the landowning Pakhtuns and the political administration of the 
Malakand Agency to let  local customs (known as Riwaj) function which will ensure the 
autonomous status of the region within British India and later Pakistan. These 
customary laws were later (1964) compiled into a document titled Riwaj-Nama.63 This 
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63 These customs were locally known as Riwaj and was orally transmitted by the landlord Jirga members. 
However, I was told that a former Political Agent Zafar Khan insisted and finally produced this Riwaj into 
a written document.  Such efforts were resisted by the landowners. The need to produce this document 
was felt when the political agent came to know that contradictory clauses were referred to in similar 
cases. Moreover, I was told by Afrasiyab khan (2008), a high ranking Awami-khel office bearer that his 
organization used the written document as a propaganda tool in press. This further annoyed the Khanan. 
historical document categorized local population into Agriculturists (those who own 
lands-included lineage clans and religious class) and non Agriculturists. It also clearly 
stated that immigrants from different regions could not buy  land from the local people. 
It also established preemption rights of the Agriculturists over local non-agriculturists. 
The reason behind this restriction, as described by Riwaj-Nama, was the scarce land and 
the Riwaj (Custom) followed by  the people for generations (Khan, 1964: 38). We can 
assume, these immigrants, were viewed by the local Pakhtuns, as a potential threat to 
their political interests associated with land ownership.   
The emergence of Bazar (market): 
Business opportunities grew with the growth of the bazar (market) in Batkhela. Initially, 
businesses in the market were limited to selling retail goods but later it  evolved into 
wholesale businesses. Location of the market close to the intersection of the roads to 
Dir, Swat, Chitral, Bajaur and Malakand increased its importance. Soon the market 
spread on both sides of the Malakand Road, which spread its thriving business to the 
far-flung areas of Chitral, Dir, Swat and even Bajaur. Batkhela soon established 
monopoly  on the retail and wholesale distribution of consumer goods in the entire 
region. These developments generated another set of significant social and economic 
changes. The economy gradually spread its base by decreasing reliance on agriculture 
and including trade and businesses which opened new opportunities for all including 
landowners and non landowners.  
Earlier, the economy of Batkhela and Thana was primarily agrarian. The entire 
population was either directly or indirectly dependent on the agriculture sector. Land in 
Batkhela was divided into Shorgera (Agricultural land), Ghareza (mountainous) and 
Damana (non agricultural). The last category was further divided into land for 
residential purpose and land for market or commercial purpose. Political and social 
statuses were associated with the kind of land. With the freezing of re-allotment in 
Malakand (date unknown), clans in Batkhela were left with a particular kind of land. 
Before the development of Market and flux in migration those in the possession of 
Damana were in better situation than those with Shorgera. However, after the pace in 
migration and increase in market activity, clans in possession of Damana land became 
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more powerful than the others. This changing power dynamics within the landowning 
category was caused by increase in the value of Damana.
 The development of the market  in Batkhela brought economic and social 
change. Substantial part of the economy is constituted of the businesses in the market 
and therefore characterized by  receding reliance on agriculture. The Market is a source 
of income to a substantial part of the population. It  provides new opportunities for the 
landless people, and  decreased their dependence on the Pakhtun landowners. However, 
these developments also  benefited landowners. The value of their land (Market  and 
residential) increased dramatically. Moreover, earlier, most of these landlords were 
having subsistent level of agricultural production but with increase in the value of 
market property and rents helped them accumulate wealth.64 Businesses in the market 
are mostly  occupied by immigrants, but the ownership (almost 50%) of the market 
remains with landowner clans.
 The market in Batkhela also produced and consolidate the status and category of 
the immigrants as Raghelay Khalaq (those who migrated) and Dokandar (Shop 
keepers). Interestingly  Dokandar is relatively high on the occupational hierarchy  drawn 
by Barth through his study of the region (1959: 17). The landlords comprehended these 
people through their profession of Dokandari (shop keeping) and their status as non 
local, immigrants. The only available scheme of classification in form of categorical 
charter of occupational hierarchy  would put them at  the place of Dokandar category. 
However, landowners of Batkhela tailored a category which reflected both their 
immigrant status and profession of Dokandari and by  doing so they would perhaps 
differentiate them from the existing Dokandar category. Such process also testifies that 
market in Batkhela is a ‘site of identity construction’ and offers categorical scheme in its 
division of labor, which Cornell and Hartmann succinctly  puts, “Every society’s 
division of labor offers a ready-made categorical scheme” (1998:160). 
 Social and ethnic boundaries in such a situation are reinforced by  occupational 
and residential concentration (c.f Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). Residential 
concentration has been changing since the demographic change in the town of Batkhela 
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64 This was the situation of Batkhela only. In Thana there were very powerful landowners who had greater 
wealth on their disposal due to their agricultural production. Moreover,  they were also getting Majab 
(subsidies) from the government since the British conquest (Barth, 1959b: 77-78).
and, in social demographic sense, due to the transformation of the village into a town. 
There were known quarters in Batkhela for different clans of the landlords and their 
dependents. Every quarter had Hujra and mosque. Nevertheless, slowly and gradually 
these quarters became a small part of the sprawling town. Currently, these quarters are a 
part of the central Batkhela (known as old Batkhela), while the town has spread to 
include Upper and Lower Batkhela with mix population. 
An important arena where identity construction or maintenance is carried out is 
the arena of social institutions. Marriage is one such institution, which has far-reaching 
consequences. Intermarriages between social categories affect the boundaries making 
processes. In Malakand, intermarriages between various status categories were rare and 
predominantly relations were endogamous. Such “normative prohibition” designates 
people to eligible and ineligibles categories or involves respective worthiness of groups, 
which results in boundaries reinforcement (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 171). 
 The overall conditions produced by these changes are differently  interpreted in 
local narratives. Such interpretations are the consequence of the experiences different 
categories had of that particular time. For some the jirga time was a period of 
persecution, inequality and enslavement. It was colonial construct and devoid of 
Pakhtun values of egalitarianism and moral integrity. For others it  was an ideal time of 
order, harmony  and tribal values. It was this diametrically  opposed interpretations that 
shaped a struggle between various categories to protect or dissolve the system. 
The transition:
The historical period between 1960 and 1980 can be categorized as transitional period 
in Malakand. Developments during this period were partly the product of social and 
economic changes taking place in the earlier period and partly the political change at the 
center of the State of Pakistan. This period corresponds to the rise and fall of Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto, a charismatic political leader of Pakistan Peoples Party. His rise and fall had 
greater impact on Malakand than any other ruler, the country had ever been. However, 
more importantly, political changes in the region were preceded by growing local 
consciousness and effort to bring change in political setup. 
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 This was the period when the market in Batkhela progressed dramatically. This 
development was parallel to the growing consciousness among the landless people 
about their rights partly informed by Bhutto’s political activism. It was in this 
background that in mid 1960s an indigenous struggle was launched by the non 
landowner categories of Malakand under the leadership of Muhammad Khan against the 
political and social system in the region. First, they launched an association of 
businessmen known as Bazar Anjuman, to provide a platform for articulating their 
concerns and grievances.65 Initially issues of concern were, rent increase, preemption, 
displacement, etc. Later it  was replaced with Awami-khel organization, which was well 
organized, much articulate and more comprehensive in its scope. It was led by 
Muhammad Khan and masterminded by Pir Gul, both of immigrant status. 
 This movement constructed local history in its own particularistic way and 
linked social identification issues with the issue of rights, deprivation and prejudices 
against the majority  by a minority. Awami-khel simultaneously consolidated the 
boundary between landowners and non landowners and blurred boundaries among the 
diverse non-landowning categories through a process of inclusivity. Although its most 
active membership was still among the immigrants (businessmen), the local categories 
other than immigrants extended their support covertly and overtly. Awami-khel 
achieved its goals when its objectives and interests converged with that of the State. A 
series of political and administrative reforms were introduced in Malakand from  1970s 
onward, through which the traditional system was abolished and political rights of 
citizenship, adult franchise and political participation were granted to everyone. 
 Parallel to these developments, was the rise of another very  important movement 
known as Kisanyan (peasants) movement launched by the peasants of the region against 
the landowners.66 Such movement in Malakand was not an isolated event and occurred 
in other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Bangash, 1972; Pakistan Forum Investigation 
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65 Barth emphasized that the discontent among the clients in Swat could organize only when alternative 
organizational model existed. He identified labor unions during Bhutto’s tenure to have acted as 
organizational alternatives (1981: 148-150). However in Malakand such unions were preceded by Bazar 
Anjuman. This organization later transformed itself into a more broader organization of Awami-khel.
66  This movement was linked to a national movement of laborers and peasants. The national movement 
was lead by a political party known as Mazdoor-Kisan party (workers-peasants party). Its leader from 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Afzal Bangash in a speech to party convention in Lahore termed the clashes 
between Kisanyan and landlords as a class struggle (Bangash, 1972)
Report, 1972; Lindholm, 1996). In Swat it had greater ramifications as it involved the 
rise of non Pakhtun Gojar community against  the powerful landlords (Lindhom, 1996; 
Barth, 1981). Such movement was informed by Z. A Bhutto’s land reform rhetoric and 
was more violent in its methodology. Kisanyans attempted to claim lands, refuse to 
hand over the produce of the land on the pretext that they had ownership rights over the 
land. Armed clashes between Pakhtun landlords and their peasants followed. This 
brought the Pakhtun landowners in direct clash with their peasants. Consequently, 
categorical boundary became more salient between peasants and the landowners. 
Violent clashes between these two categories resulted in the loss of property and life. 
Kisanyans were more active in Batkhela where the landholding limit  was low while 
they  were less active in Thana where landholding was much greater and where 
landowners were more powerful. These events organized kisanyans into the most 
organized and articulated group among the others. Violent means were one of the 
reasons why the movement never merged with Awami-khel, which largely kept its 
struggle non violent. However, Kisanyan movement did extend its support to the cause 
of Awami-khel for both identified the landlords as usurpers. With the fall of Z. A. 
Bhutto the influence of these kisanyans decreased substantially. However, they still 
work as an interest group or ‘ethnic association’ (c.f Cornell and Hartmann, 1998) when 
‘Pakhtun’ landlords challenge their interests. 
 Significant contribution to social change was made by  the flow of remittances 
from the Middle East  in late 1970’s and mid 1980’s. Such remittances were the 
consequence of Z. A. Bhutto’s policy of encouraging labour export to Middle East in 
response to oil boom in Arabian peninsula. Local population particularly  the landless 
categories benefited substantially  from the money sent by  their family  members and 
consequently, generated social change. These changes also demonstrate how sate policy 
can effect a social change in the Tribal Areas. The cash sent was invested in buying 
property, now open because of legal reforms, in businesses and buying consumer goods, 
etc. These remittances also improved standard of life especially for the poor. Also, the 
influx of this money meant more market activity  in the region, more construction 
activity in housing sector and more investment in real estate. It generated more wealth 
for the business class, which was mostly constituted by immigrants. The spiral of 
economic change that such developments generated was multidimensional. Where such 
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change provided opportunities to immigrants businessmen, who accumulated wealth 
and purchased property in market, it also pushed landlords towards businesses. The 
landlords who were forced by their economic situation to start businesses were those 
who have lost substantial land property at the hands of immigrants. However, there 
were landlords who made wealth through their property in the market area, kept their 
ownership intact and at the same time joined businesses. They were beneficiaries in 
both ways. Moreover, Kisanyan (peasants) also accumulated wealth through these 
remittences and heavily invested in agricultural land. I was told by the representatives 
of this community  that currently, every household of kisanyan has one or two younger 
members in Middle East. Therefore, categorical occupational roles under go a change in 
the face of these changes.
 Barth argues that  changes in clientship  and patronage in 1960’s Swat ‘was one 
where landowners as political leaders were drastically weakened, but came out 
strengthened their superiority and security vis-a-vis tenants’ (1981: 143-144). However, 
Barth saw these changes in a society which was still agrarian but where non-landowners 
such as shopkeepers, muleteers and goldsmith were amassing wealth. The landowners 
were no more traditional political leaders competing for power through their wealth, 
while the State provided them security of their landownership.67  The landless also 
gained ‘freedoms’ from ‘personal arbitrariness and tyranny’ (1981: 143-144). Moreover, 
the integration of the State of swat with the State of Pakistan brought down the ‘whole 
traditional edifice of authority’ (Barth, 1981: 146). However, in Malakand, landlords 
have been continuously losing their land assets through subdivisions and socio-
economic need. Consequently, they have become more conscious of the changing 
situation and growing power and influence of immigrant category, and increasingly 
reluctant to sell their property  despite increasing social and economic pressures to do so. 
Roughly 50% of the market property is still owned by  the Khanan, although they are 
less then 10% of total population of Batkhela. To search for alternative source of 
income these landlords have now either joined government services or started 
businesses. Such initiatives are taken in face of extreme pressure from fellow clan 
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67  Previously landlords were responsible for the security of their land and ward. However,  with the 
establishment of Swat State this task was taken over by the state.  
members who still categorize business as non Pakhtun activity and admire those who 
have avoided businesses and limited themselves to agriculture. 
 Discussing various anthropological studies conducted in the region and recent 
social, political and economic changes visiting Malakand, I sought to explain that it  is 
imperative to explore the historical context of the processes of categorization and 
boundaries making. The above discussion also suggests that categorization and 
boundaries making would take new shape in new situations. It underscores the need to 
reflect on the extent of change in these forms and patterns. Moreover, by  exploring such 
processes and probing the ways social actors classify  each other and manipulate 
ethnicity in changing situations, the dynamism in ethnicity can be exposed.   Next 
section of the chapter will focus on significant processes of identification, 
categorization and boundaries making currently carried out in Malakand and will reflect 
on the extent of change in such processes.     
3.2: Post Jirga Period (Da Jirgey na Pas)
Social, economic and political conditions of Malakand have affected the processes of 
categorization and identification. Currently, these processes demonstrate enormous 
effort put in by the social actors to get sense of the changing situation around them. In 
this way they have also shown consistency with the past by categorizing each other 
(drawing from previous patron-client categories) despite changing conditions which 
make previous caste like hierarchies non viable.  
‘Group identification’ and ‘Categorization’:
Currently, the people of Malakand, in their social interaction categorize each other as 
Khanan68  and Ghariban.69  Previously  the whole population was categorized into 
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68 Khanan is the plural of Khan.  Khan is a title used extensively in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the Pakhtun 
landowner. However, it symbolizes feudalism as well as richness. A person is khan because he has Jaidad 
(property).  Khan is also considered the title for the leader who is in commanding position due to his 
Jaidad and demonstration of Pakhtunwali by keeping Hujra.  Malik is a chief of Pakhtun who is having 
land but is lower in status (cf. Barth, 1959b]) than the Khan.  In Thana when I referred to the khans of 
Batkhela,  the informants objected and said Khans are only in Thana, however, there are Maliks in 
Batkhela.  They pointed out that these Maliks of Batkhela were members of Jirga but they could not 
compete with the khans of Thana in Jaidad and political influence since the very earlier time of Yousafzai 
settlement. Astonishingly, this opinion was held by the administrative officers in Malakand. 
69 Ghariban is the plural of Gharib meaning poor. Previously this word was alternated by the word Faqir 
(destitute) or Hamsaya (one who is in protection).  The entire ‘non-Pukhtun’ (landless) population was 
previously called Faqir-nama. Bellew (1864:180-184) also confirms the usage of these words for the 
population other then ‘Afghans’. 
hierarchal ‘caste’ groups (Barth, 1959b; Lindholme, 1982), which appears to have 
changed into more mutually  oppositional categories of Khanan and Ghariban.70 These 
two categories may get other labels, in social interaction, such as Khankhel71and 
Awami-khel, or Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun respectively. While the first and most broadly 
used categorical labels of Khanan and Ghariban literally denote two classes of rich and 
poor, the later types of labels, refer to the tribal or ethnic identification. Surprisingly, 
class features do not define these two categories as there is substantial number of poor 
among the ranks of Khanan (rich class) and there are considerably rich among the ranks 
of Ghariban (poor) and the previous widespread believe in status exploitation, at  least 
in Batkhela, is receding. The inherent aberrations in these titles make them metaphoric. 
However, in general sense these titles entail the social and political statuses associated 
with the Jirga time; and therefore, suggest continuity with the past. Ironically, such 
categorization is retained and internalized by those, who were previously  opposed to it 
with a subjective sense of achievement and limited sense of occupational similarity. On 
numerous occasions, I heard prominent politicians, businesspersons and others 
addressing the lineage landlords as Khan in comparison to them calling themselves with 
variation as Ghariban, Awami-khel or simply ‘aam khalaq’ (common people); while 
lineage landlords consistently  called them as Ghariban, immigrants or non pukhtun. It 
appears that  negotiating these status titles and the embedded categorization have been 
less an issue for both continue to keep the reciprocated oppositional relation intact. It 
also gives an impression that there is a broader consensus in these two categories, 
largely, on the use of these labels. At times people may avoid using these labels 
publicly, though they may not when the gathering and context is political.  
 Identification processes cannot be unilateral and as we demonstrated that various 
categories in Malakand have categorized each other in mutually related but oppositional 
pattern. It is however, imperative to show more vividly that how, and to what extent, 
such categorization is internalized and therefore, influenced self identification. It is 
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70 Although Lindholm referred to categorical hierarchies in Swat, he has reflected on how ‘Pakhtuns’ and 
the larger population are organized in superior-inferior relations and both define each other through such 
contrasting relations. He also elaborated on the openness of the system to all to compete and acquire these 
statuses (1982: 109). Barth also emphasized on the hierarchal arrangement of ‘castes’  but insisted, “...the 
most fundamental criterion of hierarchy in Swat may be that differentiating patrons from clients,  or the 
conceptually ‘free’ from the ‘ruled’...” (Barth, 1981: 152).
71 These two labels are also used at times in Malakand. 
argued that the broader consensus in the population is on the existence of two categories 
Khanan and Ghariban. Such consensus also means that Khanan see themselves as 
landowning, tribal status group which is organized in segmentary clans and having a 
lineage tracing back to the epical ancestor Yousaf. In comparison to such identification 
the Ghariban, both immigrants and ‘native’ occupational categories, have identified 
broadly  with a landless72, non-lineage73  and mostly  business people. With these 
differences and similarities, these two also have a subjective sense of similarities within 
the collectivity. Khanan have subjective belief in their tribal and kinship solidarity while 
Ghariban have a subjective sense of achievement rooted in historical struggle against 
Khanan. These senses are necessary conditions of collective identification, as Jenkins 
put it, ‘people must have something intersubjective significant in common-no matter 
how vague, apparently unimportant or apparently illusory- before we can talk about 
their membership of a collectivity’(2008b: 102). Through such ‘external and internal 
dialectics’ (Jenkins, 2008b) categorical boundaries are drawn and maintained by social 
actors in Malakand. Moreover, the force and social relevance to these processes is given 
by the mutually oppositional nature of the categories and the boundary therefore 
communicates different meanings through contested interpretations (see below). Such 
oppositional character is maintained despite discernible sub divisions within these 
categories.  
 Another configuration of categories cut across the above broader categories and 
connects more with the changing demographic and economic conditions and situations. 
Zaathi Khalaq or Zaai Khalaq (indigenous or local people) is a label used by  the 
Khanan (lineage landlords) for themselves and for their dependent occupational 
categories living and sharing the same space and time: while Ragheley Khalaq 
(migrated people) for immigrants. Being embedded in time, and not statuses, these 
categories are less oppositional in nature and therefore, contested. Ghariban challenge 
these labels on the pretext that every one in Malakand has  migrated, it is just the matter 
of time that Yousafzai Khanan have come earlier. Khanan on the other hand refer to 
their arrival as conquerors and therefore, have right to the land and resources. Ragheley 
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72 Does not necessarily means non landowners,  as many do own land such as Kisanyan, but the hereditary 
lineage based landownership. 
73  It refers to the fact that members of this category are organized into segmentary lineage and have 
forgotten or have no record of their descent lineage. 
Khalaq (migrants) are further categorized into Makhkey Ragheley Khalaq (earlier 
migrants) and Wrosto Ragheley Khalaq (later migrants). The later category refers to 
people who have migrated after the socio-economic and political change in the region. 
Such contests also demonstrates the usefulness of mutual oppositional categorization. 
Oppositional categorization (based in historical social statuses) creates consensus and 
non oppositional or less oppositional categorization is less meaningful and often 
contested.   
  Sub-categorization in Malakand is often evident despite its less classificatory 
value and organizational ability. There is an almost deliberate effort at times from social 
actors to keep subcategories dormant to emphasize the salience of broader oppositional 
categories. Often this conscious endeavor makes subcategories mere labels. 
Nevertheless, during such sub-categorization, different markers such as tribe, 
profession, or geographical location are activated. Sub-categorization or divisions 
among the Khanan is tribal in nature and involves social organization based in 
segmentary tribal khels (clans), such as Ibrahim Khel, Umer Khel, Madey Khel in 
Batkhela and Bazikhel, Ali Khel, Khan Kor Khel etc in Thana. Similarly, often among 
Ghariban indigenous occupational categories and Ragheley Khalaq (immigrants) are 
differentiated. Immigrants are further categorized based on their business and place of 
origin. The occupational categories (called castes by Barth, 1959b) are less visible due 
to demographic changes (immigrants being too numerous in Batkhela) and economic 
changes. Due to attached stigma to their statuses (mostly the lower level categories such 
as hairdressers, weavers, leatherworkers, etc) they have either changed their 
professions, joined government services (those who are educated, particularly in Thana) 
or joined immigrants in businesses. With such changes in their economic conditions 
these people are disappearing. In Thana I was particularly told that many  from nai 
(barber) category have opened their salons in the market and no longer depend on the 
landlords. The growth of the markets and large scale migration has required these 
groups to serve now a larger population and thus greater opportunities to earn money. 
 Migrants, being too numerous, make it difficult for Khans or others to remember 
identities (villages or places they have migrated from) they carry. Where their place of 
origin and previous categorical placement is too well known, Khans tailor a new 
category for to them; reflecting both their immigrant and previous categorical status. 
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For example, there are prominent business families in Batkhela that migrated from 
nearby  Thana and Alladand, and were known to be from lower occupational categories 
(such as leatherworkers, weavers and mullahs). They are therefore, categorized both as 
immigrants but also (previously) leatherworkers, weavers and mullahs and are 
consistently reminded of their previous status in social interaction.74 Interestingly some 
earlier migrants also buy  into these kinds of categorizations i.e. a leading businessman 
Hafeez ullah (2008) while differentiated such families from themselves would say, ‘this 
was their earlier Qasab (occupation)’. Immigrants are also categorized, on the basis of 
their place of origin, into Mardanyan (people from Mardan district), Dirojee (people 
from Dir), Bajaurian (people from Bajaur), Talashiyan (people from Talash), 
Chatraliyan (people from Chatral) and Swatiyan (people from Swat), etc. These 
references are challenged at times because all immigrants have a strong sense of 
belonging to the place where they  have lived their entire life (that is Batkhela). Though, 
some of them still keep their previous links and association, they still prefer to identify 
themselves with Batkhela.75  Such sense of belonging is also in reaction to the khans 
who do not consider these people indigenous. 
 One configuration of sub-categorization is based primarily in Batkhela market. 
Being associated with the market such categorization is based in businesses. Families 
are associated with particular businesses and therefore they are referred to with those 
businesses. Such categorization is useful in carrying out business relations and become 
meaningful in situations characterized by market.   
Among Ghariban, Kisanyan (peasants) is the only sub-category  which has 
transformed from the earlier Zamindar (Barth, 1959b:17) category, by their recourse to 
violence.76 It is also the only subcategory which has the potential to stand against khan 
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74  Inayat ullah khan (2008) told me that a member of one such business family was reminded, 
sarcastically, by our elder in a gathering stating ‘my grandmother, God bless her, used to admire the 
cobbler skills of your father’. Therefore, reminding him his previous status. 
75 Dr. Anwar Alam (2008) and his family still keeps their links with Dir from where his family migrated 
decades ago. He said that his family prefers even to burry their dead in Dir. He disclosed that his extended 
family still lives in a village of Dir.  However he said he would prefer to associate himself with Batkhela 
where he is born,  raised and educated.  Therefore,  in hierarchies of available identities and categories he 
would prefer to associate with Batkhela identity. 
76 A particular clash between these farmers and the landlords in Thana is remembered as kisani problem. I 
heard many landlords saying os kisani neshta ta (  kisani does not exist these days). Nevertheless, in 
Batkhela it is a continuous phenomenon.
out of the oppositional khan-gharib categories. However, Kisanyan have broadly 
identified with the Ghariban category. As mentioned earlier Kisanyan were inspired by 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s (1969-1979) political rhetoric; and used violent means to achieve 
their goals. Organized in an association these Kisanyans in Batkhela, have raised arms 
against khans on different occasions. They  negotiate their share in land selling price 
with khans. Failure of negotiation may  erupt into armed conflict between the parties. 
Khans in Batkhela always complain against Kisanyan and see them exploiters for they 
exploit their deteriorating economic conditions (in face of increasing demands of Gham 
Khadi).77  On the other hand these khans refer to improving economic conditions of 
Kisanyan (due to remittences and investment in land) and their status transformation 
from landless peasants to landowning peasants.78  However, these peasants identify 
themselves and are categorized by others as Kisanyan.79 Land selling trend is greater in 
Batkhela than it is in Thana. The khans in Batkhela are more concerned with Kisanyan 
than the immigrants now, primarily  because immigrants challenged their social and 
political prerogatives while Kisanyan challenged the source of those prerogatives as 
well as identity such as land.
 Categorization in Malakand is also situational and contextual. As explained 
earlier there are number of ways sub-categorical labels are attached to people inhabiting 
Batkhela. It is situation and context which highlights a particular sub-categorical 
identity  to be enacted. A Khan will be a ‘Yousafzai Pakhtun’ or ‘Khan’ when compared 
with the immigrants or other occupational categories, while among the ‘Yousafzai 
Pakhtuns’ of his town he will be Umerkhel, Madykhel, etc. Similarly, immigrant in the 
company of Khanan will be an immigrant and ‘non-Pakhtun’, but when he is compared 
with other of his category, he is either Diroje, Bajauri (regional identity), or in the 
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77  Often these khanan are left with a small piece of land to sell and Kisanyan insist on their share. 
However, I was told by Saif ullah, that they negotiate their share and extend concessions in such cases. 
Unlike Batkhela in Thana no such practice exists although landholding is much higher in Thana.
78  Much of the remittences are invested by Kisanyan in buying agricultural land. An active member of 
their association, Saif ullah (2008) explained this change in these words, “Malikaans (owners) are 
becoming Ghariban (poor) and Ghariban are becoming Malikaan”.  It is also noteworthy that business 
class is less interested in buying agriculture land, which is mostly bought by Kisanyans.  Khanan left with 
Jaidad (property) prefer to maintain the land in market area then agricultural land, because of its higher 
economic and social value. An aged khan, Asfandyar Khan told me, ‘Khani (khan status) is in market 
land’ .
79  Saif ullah (2008) told me that in a public gathering the provincial minister from Jamat-Islami who 
happens to be khan, expressed that he is owns lesser land than that particular Kisaney (singular of 
Kisanyan) but still he is called Khan while the other is referred to as kisanay or Gaharib.
market he will be the cloth or leather dealer. For a Kisaney, the most salient identity will 
be his own category of Kisaney or Gharib, although it has practically lost its character 
of landless farmer.
 Political reforms (1970s) introduced in Malakand have considerable impact on 
the leadership roles, factional interests, and electoral politics. Political reforms 
introduced electoral politics by extending adult franchise to entire population and 
opened opportunities for previously  disqualified strata of the society  (Ghariban) to 
choose their representatives and run elections. Moreover, generally these reforms 
increased the State presence in the region. A closer look at the electoral politics and the 
pattern of leadership emerging in the region elaborates on the processes of 
categorization and identification. 
 Political parties are locally perceived to represent the interests of different 
categories. Although the elected representative of Pakistan People’s Party is a khan from 
Thana, the customary political rhetoric of PPP has been serving the poor; therefore, 
perceived as voted into power by the working or labor class.80  Awami National Party 
(ANP-Pakhtun nationalist party) on the other hand is locally represented by another 
khan from Batkhela and popularly  known as the party of khans. Locally ANP is 
perceived to be the party of scoundrels, gundas (extortionists) badmashans (who exert 
pressure and threaten others) and exploiters.81 Jamaat Islami has an image of religious 
party, however, I have observed that its leadership and active supporters, without any 
ideological inclination (see chapter 7), are mostly the influential business families in 
Batkhela. Recently, an intense debate within Jamaat Islami in Batkhela was about a 
local khan who secured provincial ministry  (representing Jamaat) and was accused to 
have used his position to favor his kinsmen.   
Khan-Gharib or Pakhtun-Gharib idioms have even shaped the political debate in 
Malakand. In Batkhela, particularly  political rhetoric and discourse would prominently 
involve symbolic reference to the exploiters who exploit Ghariban. The metaphor of 
Gharib is so overwhelmingly  associated with the previous power relations that wealthy 
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80 Labor here means those who do a variety of menial work in the market and not industrial labor.
81  I was told by the political workers of Jamat Islami, PPP and even general public that its leadership 
employ such elements to influence voters.
businessmen (calling themselves Gharbian) get through and let the poor Khanan fall 
into the definition of Gharib. Similarly, ‘Pakhtun’ and Gharib labels carry so heavy  a 
baggage that when ANP raises slogan of Pakhtuns it is perceived as the slogan of the 
khan (called exclusively Pakhtun- in previous power relations) for the khan. 
 Moreover, the categorization is not limited to the people inhabiting these two 
towns. In backdrop of all these developments the towns of Batkhela and Thana have 
developed different kinds of images, which subject these two places to categorization. 
Such categorization is again informed by the larger social categorization. Batkhela with 
its sprawling business and trade and its huge immigrated population has been 
categorized by Thana people, a place and society  which has a business spirit and 
therefore subordinate status to Thana which is identified with political, agricultural and 
literary  spirit. The people of these places are often recognized to reflect these two 
spirits. Batkhela people categorize Thana people aristocratic, conservative and majab 
khware (those who are paid by  the State) and identify  themselves as liberal, egalitarian 
and hospitable.82  Thana people categorize Batkhela people to be Dokandar (shop 
keepers), illiterate and rootless (non local and too diverse) and identify themselves 
educated, enlightened,  indigenous and having leadership qualities. 
 After discussing the historical developments, related socio-economic changes 
and the categorization processes in current time I intend to elaborate a bit on the 
relationship  between historical discontent of the Ghariban and their simultaneous 
identification with the same values (Barth, 1981). Barth recognized the discontent 
between the ‘patron’ and ‘client’ categories in his earlier work (1959b). In his later work 
(1981: chapter 7) he focussed more on the character of this discontent (being both class 
and cultural). He argues that discontent  was not only with the ‘poverty and toil’, 
subjugation and maltreatment, but also because of kowtowing before anybody's 
authority against Pakhtun ideals of pride, autonomy and assertion. Therefore, he insists 
that such discontent can only  be understood if studied from cultural perspective and not 
class (1981: 147). He adds,
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82 Powerful landlords have been paid by British administration in response to their loyalty to British India 
and later the practice continued by the state of Pakistan. Therefore, Batkhela people construct them to be 
people who have compromised their autonomy and honor.
The zest with which such persons plunge into the role, the care with which they 
orchestrate their performance to exhibit  recklessness, autonomy, assurance and 
tactical shrewdness, indicate that these are properties which the person values 
and wishes to embody. In a life situation where such modes of expression were 
frustrated or could only rarely and imperfectly be realized, yet where others 
were given the opportunity to excel, one has no reason to doubt the strength of 
discontent, or the intensity of awareness of it (Barth, 1981: 147).  
Barth added an interesting comparison of contradictions such as discontent and 
admiration or identification, elaborates on Swat society. He explains that there was 
discontent among the clients, as explained earlier, but there was also admiration for the 
strength, greatness, glory and assertiveness of the khans with an added sense of justice 
in mutual beneficial patron-client relationship. Therefore, there was ‘marked 
identification with existing leadership and institutions, and dissatisfaction with them’. 
He adds, “The dissatisfaction was however, conceptualized not as an awareness of 
common interests with other unfortunates with a vision that suppression could be 
eliminated, but rather as a frustration of one’s own drive to achieve influence, wealth 
and rank” (1981: 150-151). 
Lindholm elaborated on it further by asserting that the clients accepted the same ‘value 
system’ and were aspiring to be and live like the ‘Pukhtun’ landlords (1982: 110).
Some of my informants from Khanan put  this argument in a context that manifests the 
social classification and the changing from of statuses. A young khan, Yousaf Khan 
(2008) in Batkhela said, ‘If Pakhtun status was a skin on sale at Batkhela market it 
would have been, certainly, worth hundreds of thousands’.
The statement was meaningful enough to indicate that the status of Pakhtun was still 
aspired for. Nevertheless, it has two implied consequences first, the status has lost its 
achieved character (cf. Barth 1959b) and is shaping into an ascribed status. This 
implication would of course weaken the arguments made by Lindholm and Barth 
regarding the hierarchal mobility and aspiration for the rank of ‘Pakhtun’. Second, it 
will have greater consequences for the argument I make in the next section and the 
coming chapter, probing why would Ghariban discredit behavior emanating from 
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ascribed status of Khanan. If they have to discredit such behavior why they would seek 
the status which would produce the same despised behavior as Lindholm argues they 
did previously. I therefore, argue that the Khanan status after becoming ascribed has 
also become unachievable and certainly to my understanding is not sought by Ghariban, 
rather confronted with reorganization of statuses and abolishing of hierarchies (see also 
chapter 5). Only then it was possible to conceive the meaning of the boundaries between 
Khanan and Ghariban.   
 Barth (1981) recognized that  clients had discontent for deprivation and failure to 
be autonomous, proud and assertive; but they kept abusing their elders for such 
conditions and were looking for an opportunity  to achieve the rank and status of khans 
(p. 150-151). However, I assume that there was no such desire on the part of these 
clients, the desire was of equality  and not the rank and status of a khan. Malakand case 
demonstrate such desire on the part of Ghariban. Moreover, difficulty in hierarchal 
mobility  is demonstrated by various cases where categorical ascription is not affected 
by wealth, power or changing economic conditions. Kisanyan have become landowners, 
immigrants have accumulated greater wealth, occupational categories are vanishing and 
previous landlords have successively lost their lands, however, despite losing some 
hierarchal character, the categorical ascription (Khanan and Ghariban) continues to 
draw from previous categorical scheme. Nevertheless, in significant  way categorical 
ascription became oppositional in character.
 Barth insists that the castes in Swat think of themselves as ‘highly distinct and 
subject to different  distinctive standards and expectations’ but share ‘most basic cultural 
premises and value orientations’ (1981:153). I have to see how the two categories of 
Khanan and Ghariban think of themselves as different and how they simultaneously, 
share the same cultural values. Do they  keep different standards and expectations as was 
the case with castes in Swat? Why would they judge each other with the same 
behavioral values and standards after the demise of traditional social organization? All 
these questions shape the following chapter which focuses on how both categories keep 
the performance expectations from each other taking from the broader Pakhtun cultural 
values; but would also identify the social conduct of each other being disoriented. 
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Conclusion
Higher degree of immigration, development of Batkhela market and related economic 
changes, the inflow of remittances from abroad, the emergence of Awami-khel 
movement and Bhutto’s ascend to power and finally successive political administrative 
reforms (since 1970) have generated changes that have shaped collective identification 
in Malakand. These changes have necessitated to probe intra-ethnic processes or 
internal processes largely ignored by the literature. Focusing on these internal processes, 
I have argued that Pakhtuns in Malakand categorize each other internally and maintain 
categorical boundary. The two most prominent categories of Khanan and Ghariban 
emerge from such processes. These two categories are related to each other through 
reciprocated identification of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
 Through this succinct account I have attempted to demonstrate that social and 
economic changes since 1970 have greater repercussions for the entire population. I 
have demonstrated the ways in which social actors in Malakand have reorganized into 
categories in reciprocated and oppositional manner. Hierarchal structure of categories is 
successively transforming into an organization in a dynamic way where continuity with 
the past is established by drawing from previous categorical arrangement. However, the 
transformed categories of Khanan and Ghariban  keep mutually antagonistic 
relationship  despite losing previous patron-client character. The earlier social statuses 
which were held by a ‘value system’ shared by  both patron and clients (Lindholm, 1982; 
Barth, 1981) are becoming irrelevant in Malakand example. The following chapter will 
elaborate on how such antagonistic relationship is maintained through conveying of 
meanings across the boundary. It will also reflect how the contested meaning of the 




Categories, boundary and contested meanings
In this chapter I postulate that Khanan and Ghariban interact through social institutions. 
In this interaction they  typify certain patterns of behavior and social conduct. The 
behavioral pattern associated with Khanan in Malakand is ‘self pride’ and ‘ego’ and that 
with Ghariban is a ‘sense of achievement’. The behavioral attribute of Khanan is 
predicated on ascribed status in descent, lineage, landownership and glorious past. The 
‘sense of achievement’ in Ghariban is the product of their struggle against the 
‘perverted’ and ‘exploitative system’ (previous Tribal system in Malakand- see ch. 6) 
and success in businesses. Such behavior is also reflected through the cultural 
institutions they maintain. Furthermore, meanings conveyed by  behavioral patterns 
across the categorical boundary are contested. While Khanan’s ‘self pride’ and ‘ego’ is 
constructed as ‘arrogance’, ‘attempted dominance’, ‘usurpation’ and ‘condescending’, 
Ghariban ‘sense of achievement’ is constructed as ‘thanklessness’, ‘betrayal’ and 
‘devoid of Pakhtun ideals’. Such processes are also informed by the experiences and 
memories of the past. Moreover, without an organized effort, equality or inversion of 
hierarchy (components of ‘transvaluation’) frustrate the initiation of hierarchies in 
Malakand. 
 Barth (1969a) focus on inter-ethnic boundaries has been broadly considered the 
hallmark of anthropological inquiry  of the recent time. Although his work represented a 
shift in the anthropological approach to ethnic groups, I argue that the case of Pakhtuns 
in Malakand require  to focus on intra-ethnic processes that  gets complex with socio-
economic changes. Moreover, these intra-ethnic processes are also consequential for 
broader ethnic identity (see chapter 6). In illustrating the boundary making and 
contested meaning between social categories I will emphasize that Pakhtuns 
meaningfully get sense of the changing social and political world. 
 I will first discuss succinctly some institutional contexts of boundary making in 
Malakand. I will then take up how Khanan and Ghariban typify behavioral pattern and 
demonstrate that in social conduct reflected through them. Some prominent cultural 
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institutions are focused on to see the typified conduct. Finally the discussion will focus 
on contested meanings conveyed by the social behavior and informed by historical 
experience. It will finally  be related to the process of equality and inversion in hierarchy 
initiated by Ghariban.       
4.1: Institutional contexts of boundary making
Social classification as discussed in previous chapter generate boundary  which are then 
acted out in social world. Such acting out is an endorsing process. Social actors interact 
in ‘institutionalized contexts’ (Jenkins, 2000: 14) which are also ‘identity construction 
sites’ where ‘boundaries are established’ (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 153-154). To 
study the behavioral aspect of boundary making as Wimmer (2008) emphasized we 
need to elaborate on some of these construction sites. Intermarriages, gham-khadi 
(sorrow and joy celebrations) and friendships are some of the social institutional 
arrangements identified in this study, which shape interaction. 
 Intermarriages are not common, if not rare between Khanan and Ghariban 
categories. Social and economic changes have pressurized Khanan to give their 
daughters in marriage to Ghariban, who have either accumulated greater wealth or 
secured high ranking jobs in government. Although, such pressures yield at few 
occasions, but never become a norm, for the associated Peghor (taunt) turns such action 
into a social taboo (see below). 
Hindu me de mere ye kho khwarak mey de khwage ye83
‘Let my husband be a Hindu, for I should eat well’. (Explanation: It is considered highly 
unfavorable to marry a person who is outside the religion Islam such as a Hindu, and to 
do so for the money is even more despicable. This proverb explains the behavior of a 
person who gets to the depth of disgrace by choosing material gains).           
Therefore, endogamy continues to be a prominent social practice shaping social 
relations between various categories. 
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83 Shared by Professor Nawaz Tair (2008). 
Gham-Khadi (Sorrow and Joy) celebrations have become an important principle of 
Pakhtunwali (Ahmed, 2006: 03). Amineh Ahmed (2006) argues that it connects 
participants into an ongoing social form ‘tlal-rathlal’ also demonstrating ‘reciprocity’ 
which endorses social relationship (p. 43) and manifest Pukhtun form of exchange such 
as badal meaning revenge (p. 141). Lindholm observes, 
“Significantly, the Pukhtun say of a family with whom they have a close relationship: 
we go to their weddings (khadi) and funerals (ghem)” (1982: 131).
Khanan revealed at several occasions about their relationship with Ghariban in these 
words,
“We do gham-khadi with Ghariban but do not intermarry”. 
However, such gham-khadi is limited to friendship  circles, neighborhoods and male 
members of the Ghariban. Interestingly  the performance on gham-khadi is also 
gendered performance. Both categories invite only the male members of the other 
category to these celebrations. This posits that gham-khadi being an institution where 
categories are produced through gendered relationship.  
 Lindholm argues that friendships being an ideal among Pakhtuns, cannot be 
found among the equals (kin) or dependents (inferiors). Although he observed that often 
those who are inferiors are made friends by the khans, friendship as an ideal demands a 
person who should be out of the his social setting and should involve complete 
surrender, trust and ‘love’ (1982: chapter 7). Friendship  in Malakand is diverse and 
established across the categorical boundary but thoroughly  evaluated. Friends are drawn 
from various institutions such as kinship, businesses, schools, literary circles, services, 
etc. Such networks, in the absence of any substantial kin rivalry  and violence have 
become heterogeneous. However, the heterogeneity of these friendship does not mean 
that they are free  from scrutiny. Friendship  ties are often scrutinized through family 
intervention. Although friendship circles are not sharply defined by  the existing 
categories but well informed by social categorization. Based in mutual respect, 
friendship  circles are active arena where categorical behavior is demonstrated. But this 
may  not mean mutual respect extended to equals; friends can be unequals but 
supportive. The conundrum that ideal friendship cannot  be with the equals or 
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dependents (Lindholm, 1982, chapter 7), remains intact but the rule of mutual respect 
and support guides it. Hujra is a site where friendship  meetings take place. As they  are 
mostly  maintained by Khanan such sites not only  host  friendships but generate 
cognitive processes confirming the social statuses and boundaries. 
 Finally, kinship  being an important and enduring source of ‘primary 
identification’ individuals may learn at  childhood (Jenkins, 2008b: 86-87) and carry 
during adulthood. Kinship  ties bind Khanan into a tribal network, or relational category, 
providing, socially the most visible categorical ascription of ‘them’ and their own 
identification as ‘us’. Ghariban on other hand through its non lineage organization, 
diverse economic activity, diverse origin have been united by their relation to the 
Khanan category. Such relations, as discussed above, are not of interdependence, 
patron-client but antagonistic. They have also through their experience of change in the 
region accumulated a sense of belonging to a category  characterized by  non traditional, 
market activity  and the town (Batkhela). In social interaction surname ‘khan’ carries the 
kinship membership. The fact that most of Khanan category add surname of khan and 
call (in Batkhela only) each other with a little stress on their surname to invoke the 
cognitive processes of; who is that person? how should he behave? Naming is central to 
kinship and significant contributor to selfhood (Jenkins, 2008b: 86) but its usage in 
daily interaction in Batkhela alludes to its centrality in drawing boundaries. From 
prominent political personalities, to commoners among Khanan in Batkhela use the 
surname khan. Interestingly, Ghariban often call a person from Khanan category as 
‘khan’ or with little extension ‘khanjee’ in their interaction with them.84  Adding 
surnames by public figures relative to previous occupational statuses are also in use in 
Malakand.85 
 Barth’s emphasis in his later work (1981) on the changing life circumstances and 
life experiences and argue that they are dynamic processes affecting social and political 
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84 At times where there is surname of ‘khan’  associated with the name of a Gharib, it is avoided by the 
Khanan.  Muhammad Khan (leader of Awami-khel) was referred to, on numerous occasions by the 
Khanan as Muhammad only. Awami-khel supporters interpreted this behavior insulting and pointed out 
that it was very common to address Muhammad Khan in this manner when he was alive. Prominent 
public representatives (local councilors) among Ghariban are not addressed with the surname ‘Khan’ 
such as Irfan Nazim (2008),  Asad Nazim (2008), etc. while such public representatives from Khanan such 
as Arbaz Khan (2008) are always addressed with their surname ‘khan’. 
85 Abu Zar (2008) uses Syed and Raheem (2008) uses Qasab surnames. 
organization. He argues that despite earlier distinctiveness of the castes, currently they 
can be explained not through their distinctive values but through the changing life 
circumstances and life experiences of its members. Previously  castes were characterized 
by shared opportunities and shared life situation for its members and therefore ‘highly’ 
distinctive and meaningful identification (self and others). However, when life 
circumstances changed life experiences of castes members also differed from each 
other; therefore, castes and categories become less salient and less clear to actors. It is 
thus, life circumstances and life experiences which shape caste features and require 
investigation. From the example of leadership castes Pakhtuns and Saints, he concluded 
that the ‘bifurcation and complementarity of leadership roles’ is the product of life 
conditions and not something which Pakhtuns seek for as if it derived from Pakhtun 
‘theory  or ideology of legitimacy or government’. Moreover, when conditions changed 
this ‘organization of leadership roles become less clear and marked’ but the system is 
not sought after (p. 157-164).   
 The emphasis in both Lindholm (1982) and Barth’s (1981) work is on the shared 
values by the whole population in Pakhtun regions, such sharing of values is consistent 
in time and space. Although both recognized the decreasing differences in various 
‘caste’ or occupational categories and blurring of boundaries, they have not forcefully 
elaborated on the breaking of hierarchical statuses, saliency of boundary between 
previous patron and client categories through reorganization of subcategories. With such 
internal processes roles expectations are not  associated with statuses for statuses are no 
more hierarchal and the behavior continues to be judged through the very  basic features 
of Pakhtun culture. 
 Barth and Lindholm would continuously see the change with in the system 
thought to be based in Pakhtun ideals and values. I argue that the changing 
circumstances and categorization processes can be comprehended if we more vividly, 
differentiate between cultural values such as autonomy and assertiveness and the system 
organized on such values. The values remain intact but these social and political 
organization reshapes. We also need to differentiate between cultural values and 
institutions. Moreover, the cultural institutions such as Melmastia, Hujra, Pardah etc 
need revisiting to know how they dispense the cultural values of autonomy and equality, 
etc (cf. Edwards, 1990). 
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 In this manner we may explain the length and breadth of change in more 
comprehensive way than previously  suggested (cf. Barth 1981: Lindholm, 1982). For 
grasping the extent of change I have focused on the boundary making with in ethnic 
group and their interpretation in social interaction. In Malakand the ‘discontent’ among 
the Ghariban was dissociated not from the values of social organization but from the 
systems of organization. I insist that by reorganization of categories, abolishing of 
hierarchy and keeping categorical position despite acquiring or losing wealth strongly 
demonstrate that cultural values, cultural institutions and social system identified by 
Barth and Lindholm, needs revisiting. I concede that the endeavor to accumulate wealth 
and status through mobility  upward in hierarchy of castes (individual or collective) has 
been irrelevant in Malakand. Data from Malakand refers to adjustments to social and 
political changes and discontinuities in social organization envisaged by previous 
anthropological studies. Such readjustments and discontinuities have consequences for 
social values as well. It is also imperative to mention here that in a mutually reinforcing 
manner social conduct and particular behavioral patterns are generated by 
categorization process that also involve institutional interaction and behavioral pattern 
in turn consolidate categorical boundary. These themes are explained in the coming 
section of this chapter. 
4.2: Behavioral Patterns and boundary meaning
Jenkins argues that,‘Similarity and differences reflect each other across a share 
boundary. At the boundary, we discover what we are in what we are not, and vice versa 
(2008b: 103). Categorization and identification processes generate boundary between 
various categories. Such boundary  making is facilitated by institutional configuration 
and distinctive behavioral attributes. In this section of the chapter, discussion will focus 
on these pattern of behavior demonstrated and interpreted by  the  members of different 
categories. I argue that  boundaries are less status oriented in the absence of castes and 
hierarchies but more rigorously  maintained through meaning system that is informed by 
social conduct. These meanings emanate from behavioral patterns typified by  Khanan 
and Ghariban and become source of contention when interpreted variously  by the other 
side. Moreover, these behavior patterns interact with cultural institutions in a dynamic 
way to elaborate the importance of the relationship between cultural values and 
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institutions. They validate what Cornell and Hartman (1995) argued that culture too is 
the site of identity construction (p. 173-189. 
Ego and achievement: defining behavioral patterns:
Boundary making involves an important social element or behavioral dimension. Such 
social or behavioral dimension refers to ‘everyday networks of relationships that result 
from individual acts of connecting and distancing’ and provides ‘scripts of action’ to 
individuals (Wimmer, 2008: 09). Social interaction in Malakand is characterized by 
behavioral traits or performance associated with the two broader categories of Khanan 
and Ghariban and the meaning such behavior communicates which I know as meaning 
of boundary. Therefore, what is getting important in social world is the particular 
behavior demonstrated by various categories. 
 In their daily interactions and experiences different categories in Malakand 
come across differences, enact their assumptions and convey messages about the choice 
of identities (cf. Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 184). These interactions and daily 
experiences mostly take place in the markets or social institutions such as schools, job 
location, literary  associations, friendship circles, etc. However, there are sustained 
relationship established through formal and informal social institutions. 
 The defining behavioral attribute of Khanan is a high ‘sense of superiority’ 
which takes the form of ‘Ego’ in interaction with others (‘them’). Similarly, the defining 
behavioral attribute of Ghariban is a ‘sense of achievement’. The ego or self-pride of 
Khanan springs from their believe that they  have been the Yousafzai conquerors who 
ruled this region until very recently and the pride inherited in their previous ‘Pukhtun’ 
status. Moreover, they refer to the blood right or ascribed status rather then achieved 
status, which was a necessary  condition for achieving and maintaing ‘Pakhtun’ (chief-
leadership) status in Swat society (Barth, 1959b). Lindholm did refer to growing 
insecurity among the young khans in Swat who insisted that ‘being Pukhtun is a matter 
of blood, and not land’ (1982:109). Similarly, Barth in his revisit to Swat observed that 
‘non-Pakhtuns’ have been complaining of ‘Pakhtuns’ considering themselves ‘more 
capable and fit to lead, take responsibility and dominate decisions’ (1981: 157). 
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 Interestingly, the Ego of Khanan is interpreted into a very strong (rather 
offensive) metaphor by the Ghariban, that is, Nasha (literally meaning ‘addiction’, but 
conveys the meaning of arrogance). This Nasha (arrogance) is often reported by the 
Ghariban informants, who disapprovingly consider it a barrier in the relationship 
between these two categories or behavioral trait that differentiates ‘them’ from us’. 
Interestingly, Nasha is not just observed in the Khanan though it is the defining attribute 
of Khan in the perception of Ghariban. Some Kisanyan and the immigrants informed 
me that, ‘there are people among us who also display Nasha’ when they  accumulate 
wealth (Saif ullah, interview, 2008; Afrasiyab Khan, interview, 2008). However, where 
such Nasha of Ghariban is termed unfortunate, the Nasha always emanates from 
Khanan. Khanan’s Nasha is less in wealth and more in their inherited status. Very few 
of them are well off in comparison to immigrants and many have been living rather 
poorly. Barth (1959b: 79) earlier referred to division of world in Swati idiom into two 
kinds of people; mor sari, (satisfied men) and wuge sari (hungry  man). The chiefs from 
the definition were mor and the clients were wuge. From this perspective change in 
economic conditions of Khanan was explained by Asmat ullah khan (2008) in Batkhela,
Ne wuge de, ne mor de; ne pa jama pet de, ne lagher de
(Neither are they wuge (hungry) nor are they mor (satisfied): Neither do they  have much 
to wear nor are they stripped or naked). 
 Therefore, despite deplorable economic conditions Nasha is more prominently 
displayed by the poor among the Khanan or those who have almost lost their ancestral 
land. 
 The sense of ‘achievement’ in Ghariban springs from their earlier experience of 
struggle against the ‘exploitative system’ and successes in business. This behavioral trait 
is received by Khanan as an ‘act of betrayal’ and therefore, the achieved status is 
constructed as ‘thanklessness’. Asmat ullah Khan (2008) complained about immigrants 
in these words, 
“We gave them shelter, food and even security, when they had none of these; and look 
what they did to us, they cheated us, they are indeed thankless people”.   
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Edwards referred to the principle of Nanwate where outsiders would be accommodated 
and the fact that through Nanawate the reciprocal status be maintained i.e guest- host. 
However, if Nanawate was sought by those who fled form their tribe as was the case 
with many immigrants that would require relegating immigrant  to client status. When 
Khanan said they cheated us they meant to say they disrespected the contract reached at 
the time of asylum. Similarly  when Ghariban refuted the ego of Khanan they refer to 
their success in businesses and decreasing dependence on Khanan (during Awamikhel 
struggle and afterwords). This could be the reason they demanded equality. 
 Aurangzeb Khan (2008) in Batkhela revealed a story  of a wealthy  immigrant 
who always remained thankful and appreciative of what the people of Batkhela did for 
him. That particular immigrant told him, ‘I am so overwhelmed and thankful to the 
people of Batkhela that I wish I could clean its streets with my beard’. Through such 
narrations the behavioral expectations from immigrants are set in where the ‘sense of 
achievement’ is negated by a requirement of appreciating the kindness and large 
heartedness of the Khanan. The behavior of the Khanan was to give shelter to these 
immigrants or Ghariban was thought to be in line with Pakhtun ideal of Nenavati 
(shelter) and hospitality  and the expectation from the immigrants was to have 
appreciated and endorsed the leadership or dominance of the Khanan. Unlike what 
Barth and Lindholm would argue the achievement of immigrants to have accumulated 
wealth and secured freedoms were discredited by Khanan. On other hand the ‘ego and 
‘self-pride’ of Khanan is not endorsed by the Ghariban. The expectations from them 
were of equal opportunities for all, typical of Pakhtun acephalous and egalitarian society 
(although such principles are traditionally limited to kinship segments). Similarly, the 
hierarchical status were conceived to be inequalities brought in by  the Khanan and not 
the consequence of their own doing (see Barth 1959b:24-25 and 1981:151 for the 
cursing of peasants in Thana).   
 Therefore, in social interaction, the ‘ego’ of Khanan and the ‘achievement’ of 
the Ghariban are the most prominent behavioral pattern, which are perceived in the 
meaning of ‘Nasha’ (of Khanan) and the ‘thanklessness’ (of Ghariban) by these two 
categories. Such overwhelming is the association of these behavioral pattern and their 
associated meaning with both categories that  the maintenance of cultural institutions are 
taken as if they manifest these fundamental patterns. Following paragraphs reflect on 
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some of cultural features observed during fieldwork and elaborate on how such features 
were interpreted as reflection of ‘ego’ and ‘self achievement’ or ‘Nasha’ and 
‘thanklessness’. Edwards (1990) has emphasized on the contextual operation of these 
cultural features and values. He argues that it is imperative to see to what extent else 
features “reflect core values of the culture” (1990: 98). I have to elaborate whether these 
identity features reflect autonomy, self determination, etc. 
Melmastiya (hospitality): Hujra (guest house) and Dukan (shop):
Melmastiya (hospitality) is an important Pakhtunwali feature widely practiced by 
Pakhtuns. The site of hospitality  traditionally  has been the male guest house, Hujra.86 
However, in Batkhela an alternative site dukan (shop) is increasingly used by Ghariban 
for the purpose to conduct hospitality. Khanan tend to demonstrate more ostentatiously 
their hospitality  through Hujra keeping. It is also one of the most symbolically 
meaningful site of particularization of behavior among the Khanan. Hujra had 
significant political function in Pakhtun society  (Barth, 1959b:80) but its cultural and 
social function was equally significant (Ahmed, 1976: 65; Lidholm and Meeker: 1981: 
445, 446, 468). In Malakand where Hujra has lost most of its previous political 
functions of ‘gift distribution’ (Barth, 1959b: 80), still retains some of its social and 
political role. Besides its function of distributing patronage, in very limited sense during 
elections, it  has primarily  become the site of hospitality to friends and guests. It has, 
thus, become a training institution for the younger generation of Khanan, where the 
ideal Pakhtun behavior is consummated. It guides and teaches the youth, how to behave 
in social interaction, mostly through the diverse friendship gatherings in Hujra. 
Nurturing a particular character, it  reinforces belief in who is who and consequential 
boundary making and maintaining. Wealthy  businessman and Khanan such as Fareed 
Khan and his sons would keep Hujra and make it a point  to entertain their friends and 
kin in their Hujra. Immigrants may find the receding functions of Hujra and would 
consider it  equal to other sites of hospitality such as Baitek or shop. Hujras are kept 
with much more care and grandeur in Thana. Khanan in Thana are very particular about 
keeping it functional and use it symbolically.
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86 Those who don’t own Hujra use betak,  single detached room of the house to serve guests.
 However, Hujra is increasingly perceived by immigrants as status symbol of 
khan and a site where an idle khan is siting and bragging. Although, some rich 
immigrants keep Hujras, most would assert rather naively  that, ‘our meeting place (site 
of hospitality) has become our shop or the site of our business’. Some would even 
question, why Hujra is so different from any other place when, its functions are reduced 
to hospitality alone. They would insist that most  of their friends and guests visit their 
shops and are therefore served there. I also observed that often a place within the shop 
or an extended portion is used to entertain guests. Moreover, regular meetings, often 
political, may  take place at shops or site of business.87  Dukan being a site where 
hospitality  or other social and political gathering are held also symbolically represent 
the achievement of Ghariban vis-a-vis Khanan. 
 The comparison of Hujra and Dukan (shop) could be useless otherwise, but the 
shrinking of Hujra functions (to the activity of hospitality only) makes it  imperative in 
the perception of social actors to see other sites in its image. Moreover, the perception 
of Hujra being meaningful only  when seen in its current functioning. When such 
functioning is limited to doing hospitality, Dukan (shop) can equally perform the 
activity. This also posits, the changing meaning of space brought forth by social 
transformation of Pakhtuns. 
 Changing meaning of space however, does not entail that Hujra be renounced by 
Ghariban businessmen. Certainly some businessmen keep Hujra and some khan 
entertain their guests in Dukan (when they are in the market doing business), but they 
perceive these institutions and interpret their functions in the broader behavioral 
attributes of the two categories ‘ego’ and ‘self achievement’. One way of looking at this 
relationship  of Melmastia and Hujra is to distinguish these two institutions. Melmastia 
being a central feature or institution of Pakhtun culture has to be different from Hujra, 
which only represent a space that embodies Melmastia. However, Hujra could be more 
than just  doing Melmastia, it  can perform a variety of functions as discussed above. 
However, what is important in the current situation in Malakand is the symbolic use of 
Hujra by Khanan. Also is the perception of Ghariban that Hujra and Melmastia 
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87 A leading cloth dealer in Batkhela proudly revealed that his shop is a meeting place of various political 
figures of the town, despite the fact that his family does keep a Hujra. However, he revealed that mostly 
Hujra is used for Gham-Khadi (sorrow and joy) and his family members get little time to sit in Hujra.
represent the dominant status of Khanan rather than the values of equality and well 
being. Therefore, in Ghariban perception Melmastia and Hujra of Khanan, as 
institutions, do not maintaing the values that they should embody (cf. Edwards, 1990: 
74-75). Such a perception also indicates the current understanding of Melmastia among 
the Ghariban as an institution that manifest equality.    
While Khanan demonstrate hospitality with more vigor, I have found the whole 
population extremely hospitable to their guests. Hospitality is perhaps one of the most 
pertinent and general behavioral traits on which the whole population is evaluated. My 
visit to an ordinary  laborer's beitak  (guest room) or to an affluent businessman and khan 
would reveal the same enthusiasm in and display of Melmastiya. However, hospitality 
of Khanan would go an extra mile at  the cost of economic pains (most  of the time) to 
match the ideal Pakhtun behavior and demonstrate their status. Often this would be seen 
by Ghariban as a flamboyant display. Hospitality has also an economic function, 
although it is never sought after. It is also rigorously pursued by Khanan in their 
business relations. Nadeem (2008), a business representative of a private firm, disclosed 
that he found the family of  Fareed Khan (2008) extremely hospitable, something he did 
not see in other communities of Batkhela. Although hospitality brings them some 
business benefits as the guests visiting often become part of friendship network, it is 
usually  a conscious endeavor for non-economic gains. Therefore, as the guest puts it, 
there is a lot of khaloos (intensely warmhearted intentions) in such hospitality.
Honor (Bravery): Business and Landownership:
The behavioral traits of ‘ego’ and ‘self achievement’ are reflected through the conduct 
of Pakhtuwnali features honor and bravery. The immigrants in particular and Ghariban 
in general, interpret  honor and bravery in challenging perceptions which they thought 
were the product of perverted traditions and system. They challenged the odds by 
adopting business as profession. By  doing so, they  established their autonomy and self-
determination so closely associated with Pakhtun sense of honor.88  Their success in 
business and the comparative failure of Khanan in business also consolidates their sense 
of achievement. However, Khanan continue to find landownership a traditional source 
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88 Edwards reported that Pakhtuns in trucking business in Pakistan demonstrate their personal autonomy 
through such activity (1990: 69).  
of Pakhtun honor and autonomy and impress upon immigrants to have allowed them to 
practice business. Although many  of Khanan are turning to businesses, their preference 
usually  is to keep the possession of their ancestral land. Such conscious conduct 
substantiate their ‘ego’ and provide platform to attack the failure of the Ghariban in 
terms set by the previous system.  In this way the values of self determination and self 
definition which are primary to Pakhtun identity (Edwards, 1990) are expressed through 
landownership (by Khanan) and businesses (by Ghariban). 
Gham-Khadi (sorrow and Joy):   
Gham-Khadi (sorrow and joy) celebrations are an important part of Pakhtunwali 
features. Being a central institution, it  has become a site where behavioral attributes ego 
and self achievement are enacted by various categories in Malakand. Ahmed (2006) 
argues that it  connects participants into an ongoing social form ‘tlal-rathlal’ also 
demonstrating ‘reciprocity’ which endorses social relationship (p. 43) and manifest 
Pukhtun form of exchange such as badal meaning revenge (p. 141). Moreover, despite 
the intense emotional nature of gham-khadi, these are the occasions of performance 
evaluation. Lavishness demonstrated at such occasions is a consequence of competition 
between close kin and those who participate. 
 In Malakand the burden of performance on gham-khadi, one of the central features of 
Pakhtunwali is shared by  both categories. However, I found Khanan more complaining 
about such display of performance. They have been worried by  the trend of 
extravaganza in performing and competing among the close kin to have drained their 
resources, particularly when such resources are limited. Siali (rivalry-competition) is an 
idiom of reciprocity between equals, as it is mostly  within the kinsmen (Edwards, 1990: 
70). Such siali in gham-khadi burdens Khanan for they sell their most valuable 
possession, both social and economic, i.e land. Many of them complain that they are 
selling their property  to do gham-khadi. The necessity to do so is inherent in the concept 
of siali which would mean, most importantly, equality  and competition within the kin 
but display of performance equal to the status they have in relation to Ghariban. 
Although, Ghariban spend on gham-khadi, Khanan assert boastfully that only they have 
been doing gham-khadi on higher level than the Ghariban and present it as a proof for 
loss of property. Khanan through gham-khadi keep the tribal reciprocity, but  they  also 
116
replace the violent badal or agnatic rivalry  through such a performance. However, this 
does not mean the absence of badal killings but indicate that it is a receding 
phenomenon.89  Moreover, it  is also important to see how gham-khadi is extended to 
non kinsmen and how it reflects the ego of Khanan. My informants in Batkhela told me 
that the behavior of Khanan regarding gham-khadi is changing for they  mostly limited it 
to kinsmen but they now include Ghariban.   
 Interestingly  the performance on gham-khadi is also gendered performance. 
Both categories invite only the male members of the other category  to these 
celebrations. This posits that gham-khadi being an institution where categories are 
produced through gendered relationship. Here siali also becomes the kin’s affair, and 
the evaluation on performance is limited to rival affinities. Khanan also fail to extend at 
times their gham-khadi circle to Ghariban. It is at times complained by  immigrants that 
khan establish superiority through such relations. Although Khanan deny this but they 
insist that their gham-khadi is limited to neighbors and friends among Ghariban.90 On 
other hand Ghariban often refer to how they were honored by  the visit of Khanan to 
their gham-khadi, which was seldom a practice before. Therefore, manifesting change 
in relations and establishing sense of achievement in Ghariban. Moreover, the gendered 
performance also reinforces the behavioral trait of ‘ego’. Excluding women of 
Ghariban from siali (competition) or badal (revenge) a type of behavior deemed 
workable between equals, establish superiority in itself. 
Political leadership: Party leaders and ‘bazar mesharan’ (market elders):
The central issues in Pukhtun society revolve around the pursuit of power, 
status, and honor, a pursuit that is closely related and limited to agnatic kin on 
the tribal genealogical charter (Ahmed, 1980: 06).  
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89  Even the unnecessary display of arms is considered undesirable by the younger generation. Raheem 
Khan (2008) in Thana told me that he and his family do not like to display arms for they feel awkward in 
carrying them (‘Ma ta zan bad khkare’).    
90 Inayat ullah khan (2008) revealed that he does gham-khadi with a peasant because, ‘my father asked me 
to do so for a reason.  My father told me that this peasant worked on our land and regularly provided me 
the rent (ijara) even in those trouble days when kisanian (peasants) raised against us and refused to pay 
rents’. Such behavior shall be honored. In Thana I was told that Khanan and Ghariban do gham-khadi 
thoroughly.
Political leadership has been the exclusive domain of ‘Pakhtuns’ (also saints) in the 
accounts of Barth (1959b) and Lindholm (1982). Pakhtun life is mostly explained to be 
very political and the leadership qualities were one of very important traits of ‘Pakhtun’ 
behavior (Barth, 1959b). Despite tremendous changes in the political configuration of 
the region, in an interesting way behavioral attributes of ‘ego’ and ‘self achievement’ 
are conducted through leadership  roles. There are two alternative streams of political 
leadership in Malakand such as party leadership and ‘bazar mesharan’ (market 
leadership). The former refers to leadership  of political parties and local governments. 
Although this leadership is not the exclusive domain of Khanan, but leadership of 
political parties is dominated by Khanan. The wealthy business families of Batkhela are 
mostly  associated with Jamat Islami as active supporters and have not stepped in 
leadership role exclusively.91  Therefore, the general perception and political rhetoric 
during elections contain a strong reference to khan-gharib and oppressor-oppressed 
idioms. The other form of leadership is particular to Batkhela. This leadership  is 
exclusive to a greater extent to the immigrant businessmen. These leaders of the market 
in individual capacity and through their association access the State officials as 
representatives of the market. Executive officials in Batkhela often meet the Batkhela’s 
‘bazar mesharan’ and the Thana’s Khanan. One occasion that I witnessed during my 
fieldwork involved Khanan from Batkhela recording protest  with D.C.O (District 
coordinating officer-high ranking executive officer) about a dispute of land with the 
government authorities. The khans participating in this protest later told me that the 
officials were surprised to see such a huge turnout of the Khanan and conceded that it 
was unprecedented. Comparing this situation with the post 1970s period when such 
Khanan had access to State officials through jirga membership, reflects a change. It was 
in one such visits of Khanan, Irfan (2008), an immigrant and public figure, said that 
Muhammad Khan was introduced by the Khanan as Muhammad Dokandar 
(Muhammad shopkeeper in a derogatory  way) and provoked him to launch Awami-khel 
movement (see chapter 5). 
 Leadership is therefore, not exclusive to Khanan, Ghariban have also been 
contesting elections. Moreover, the earlier principle of acquiring power through 
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91  The leadership of Jamat Islami includes Ghariban elements but leadership is not the exclusive of 
Khanan.  Similarly all other parties include Ghariban in lower level leadership but mostly Khanan 
dominate these parties.
accumulating wealth and distributing patronage has changed which helped creating 
more dispersed and heterogeneous leadership; including even lower levels of Khanan 
category. Most interestingly Khanan have also brought in their internal differences into 
politics which gives a satisfaction to Ghariban that corporate unity among Khanan is 
broken down by modern electoral politics (former Awami-khel general secretary).   
 Barth has emphasized that the chief among the ‘Pathans’ of Swat was not only 
serving his interests by seeking power rather he had kept his group (his ward, including 
landless people) interests integrated with his own personal interests. Therefore, it  was 
the ‘rank’ of a khan and not the ‘power’ which was generally coveted by the pretenders, 
but the integration of the two would mean competition for both. He explains that khans 
later, when Swat State was established, sought after State’s support to gain the ‘rank’ 
rather the ‘power’ and the two were separated in this new situation. These khans were 
thought to becoming ‘soft’ in face of ‘criticism’ and ‘shame’. It  was this change in 
khans that the people would assert that the ‘empty and false status’ attract people as they 
are ‘vainglorious’ (1981: 139-140). In Malakand not only the role of a khan or the rank 
of khan disseminates to lower level khans (who have less land and wealth) but also to 
Ghariban. To an extent the Ghariban did not aspire for the rank of khan rather 
constituted another form of leadership i.e bazar mesheran and have also subjected 
Khanan in party politics to public scrutiny as succinctly put by  a laborer in Batkhela, 
“The difference between the past and the present is that, previously it was me attending 
the Hujra of a khan and now the khan comes to my door and beg for my support in 
elections”. 
 Therefore, the changing leadership role of the khan is to be seen in the changing 
context. The context not only  manifests changing roles but decline in power inherent in 
the nature of new leadership. Previously leadership was defined by the wealth and 
power demonstrated through alliances and patronage (Barth, 1959b: chapter 7), 
currently it is characterized by scattered competition, market dynamics, delegated 
power and public service.92 The continuity in leadership role (only  in political parties 
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92 In my interview with political candidates at all levels of government i.e local, provincial and national 
not only the themes were ‘how to serve people through various public projects and address local 
problems’ but also using phraseology of modern politics such as ‘I am a servant of people’, ‘I serve 
people’,‘I will serve the poor’ ‘I have no other objective but to win the support of masses’ etc. These 
phrases were used by all including ‘khan’ candidates.
leadership) is a consequence of strong urge and behavioral particularization of Khanan. 
Their perception that they have natural abilities to lead is often too conspicuous (cf. 
Barth, 1981: 157). 
 Despite such urge and perception of dominance, Khanan may find current 
electoral politics a despised domain, where power is acquire through unfavorable 
means. They would term electoral politics, immoral, hypocritical, deceitful and corrupt 
and would keep a distance by asserting, ‘mong la haya razee’ (literally ‘we feel shy to 
practice’ but shyness in this sense is avoiding immoral or unfavorable things).93  Such 
prohibition can be the consequence of changing role expectation under the new political 
setup. 
 Through this discussion I have demonstrated how cultural features are 
maintained in multi ethnic environment and how these features have demonstrated 
cultural values manifested in it. In this way Edwards insight into identity maintenance 
are incorporated despite disagreement with his argument that such features and the 
values could be maintained in tribal environment alone. However, I also reflected on 
how Edwards assertion that the contextual operation of cultural features in important. 
The case of Malakand reflect how these social categories have used and interpreted 
cultural features. Moreover, I have tried to demonstrated that due to cleavages between 
Khanan and Ghariban the contested interpretation of cultural performance is reflected 
in the idioms of ego and achievement, which are behavior patterns embedded in 
meaning of boundaries. This also means the content in which cultural features are 
demonstrated is defined by  categorization in Malakand i.e Khanan Ghariban just like 
the context in Afghan refugees case was defined by different frameworks set by 
administration and donors. This also endorses what in current anthropological literature 
refer to boundaries and the cultural content reinforcing each other (Jenkins, 2008; 
Eriksen, 2002).   
4.3: Contested meanings and boundary strategies
 The meaning of boundary as understood by various categories in Malakand are 
mutually  oppositional and therefore contested. There is conscious effort on the part of 
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93 Words of the Aurangzeb Khan (2008)  
the two broader categories to interpret the boundary  in contested meanings. Ghariban 
recognize that boundary between “us” and “them” (Khanan) is located in landownership 
and lineage but interpret it  in the meaning of ‘attempted dominance’, ‘usurpation’ and 
‘arrogance’. Such interpretation is informed by historical experience and interactional 
conduct of the Khanan. The boundary location, therefore means exploitation of a 
dominant category through its historically  privileged status and continuous arrogance in 
the present. The rank of khan is thus not aspired but stigmatized for ignoring to 
appreciate the egalitarian values of Pakhtun society. The image of a khan under the 
influence of this interpretation is of ‘usurper’, ‘exploiter’, ‘arrogant’ and 
‘condescending’ and not of a ‘patron’ and ideal person embodying ‘strength’ and 
‘bravery’ as Barth explained (1981: 150-151). In relation to a usurper, condescending 
khans, Ghariban simultaneously  construct “us” into ‘hardworking’, ‘skilled’, ‘humane’ 
and ‘egalitarian’ people. The historical account of their business success and their 
struggle against the oppressive khans make their status privileged one. These very 
successes are conceived by Khanan representing non-Pakhtun, businesspersons like 
character. In changing circumstances khan continue to see their status superior for its 
association with the land and lineage. Also, they successively interpret their status as 
ascribed based in primordial attributes of blood, birth and tribal lineage. This continuity 
reinforces autonomy associated with the landownership. Similarly, for them ‘other’ 
category not only  demonstrates discontinuity but also ‘wrongly’ associate autonomy 
with businesses. Therefore, In such character sketch Khanan emphasize that, ‘them’ are 
devoid of Pakhtun ideal behavior and values. 
 The ascribed status and behavioral attributes represented by  the boundary means 
the ‘others’ (Khanan) to ‘us’ (Ghariban) as Zaliman (those who commited accesses, 
atrocities), Bekara (idle, lazy), Badmashan (committing unlawful things with threats 
and use of force - extortion), Lofar (Loafers) and those who under Nasha (arrogance) 
often exert verbal abuses on others (Ghaletha Khule khwazol). Again in the dialectical 
narrative Ghariban identify themselves as humble and down to earth, even if they are 
wealthy, to the ostentatious Khanan. They explain such contrasting behavior from their 
daily experience and substantiate it  with account of their resistance. Some members of 
immigrant category  was articulate about their confrontation with khans in situations 
when Khanan tried hurt others with their Nasha, or even if such Nasha was to be 
121
broken for the sake of public humiliation. Therefore, the boundary for Khanan is of an 
ascribed statuses representing Pakhtun ideal of autonomy while for the Ghariban it 
means, more generally,  oppression, arrogance and idleness. Such contesting meaning 
would substantiate our earlier argument which stressed that Ghariban would avoid to 
step in the roles of Khanan. Not because the ascribed status this boundary represents but 
because it conveys the meanings undesirable to them.  
 The intensity of khan’s behavior (arrogance) varies; educated being more 
understandable while the younger ones (presumably with less education) more arrogant. 
The younger ones rely  more on the ancestral land and show less interests in either 
business or government services. Being highly  conscious of their privileged status and 
behavioral requirements, their economic means are shrinking in response to challenges 
posed by  immigrants. Most of them, unfortunately, get into nonsocial activities such as 
taking drugs and doing gambling. These activities create the image of a young khan 
being a lazy, rash, addicted person who knows only  to brag on his ancestor’s 
possessions. Some Khanan believe that Ghariban benefit  from such deteriorating 
conditions of younger generation and they therefore, deliberately  communicate their 
social status in social interaction with the young ones to let them suffer.      
 Saliency and ‘transvaluation’ of boundary:
Currently an emerging and most interesting features of categorical relationship 
in Malakand is the saliency of the boundary  between Khanan and Kisanyan and 
‘transvaluation’ (see ch. 2) of boundary between Khanan and immigrants. Our analysis 
of current clashes between kisanyan and Khanan get us closer to the argument of Barth 
and Lindholm on individuals stepping into the role of Khanan. Kisanyan are becoming 
landlords but have not demonstrated leadership skills and have always found themselves 
on the other side of the boundary with Ghariban. They  were also more vocal of the 
oppression of Khanan and have seen the boundary differentiating usurpers from the 
aggrieved. Kisanyan and Khanan most convincingly see each other in categorical terms 
and define each other in adversarial manner. The violent clashes between them since 
1960’s further reinforces the boundary  between these two categories. Kisanyan have 
traditionally  aligned with immigrants and emphatically  locate themselves in the broader 
category of Ghariban. Their close association with Awami-khel and their violent clashes 
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with the Khanan have let them imagine Khan to be a particular person who has land 
since generations (reference to lineage) and has exploited peasants and farmers. Such 
imagination is not affected by the land acquisition of kisanyan and their prospects of 
stepping in the role of landlord.94 For kisanyan the boundary is clearly located in the 
landownership, tribal lineage and it conveys the meaning of oppression and dominance. 
Moreover, like other categories kisanyan have developed their own narrative of struggle 
and success against the oppression of Khanan. This narrative is more powerful because 
of its actual armed struggle and continuity  in the present. The lack of motivation and 
enthusiasm in kisanyan to acquire the title of khan, despite their land acquisition is 
explained by  the dominant narrative. Therefore, interestingly, kisanyan continue to see 
themselves as kisanyan and their category is still meaningful. They also avoid extending 
khan title to those who have secured wealth such as immigrants. Moreover, like other 
Ghariban, kisanyan proudly  assert their achievement vis-a-vis Khanan and unlike 
Barth’s reported peasants, do not curse their ancestor for their current situation. One can 
question why the previously cursing peasant (Barth, 1959b; 1981) became a proud and 
bragging kisane (singular of kisanyan).  
 Additionally, categories in Malakand are involved in ‘transvaluation’ of the 
boundaries. Wimmer (2008) through his analysis of ethnic boundary explains 
‘transvaluation’, to be the process of acquiring ‘equality’ in status and politics; and 
reversing the existing rank hierarchies i.e ‘normative inversion’. Although Wimmer 
(2008) analyzed inter-ethnic situations, his work gives insight to this study of intra-
ethnic processes in Malakand.  In Batkhela the dominance of Khanan was challenged 
by Awami-khel movement and their position changed by political and administrative 
reforms (1970’s). They  demanded abolishment hierarchies and desiring equality  which 
satisfy Wimmer (2008) condition of transvaluation. However, the contested meaning of 
boundary and the latent  stigmatization of the statuses create ambiguity in whether 
equality  is sought to replace inversion of hierarchies in post reforms era. Although it is 
difficult to reach at such conclusion at this State of malakand history but some mutual 
diminution of statuses refer to more than equality. Khanan are still identified as 
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94 Kisanyan have excessively invested in land but such landholding is not significant to make them bigger 
landlords. In fact many of them now own small pieces of land. What is important here that in some cases 
they own land greater than Khanan and openly confess that they have gained land in comparison to 
Khanan who have lost land since 1970’s reforms. Such trend if continued would make them landlords in 
their own right.
‘usurpers’ and they demonstrate ‘Nasha’. However, this does not go well with the 
Khanan who continue to perceive themselves superior and dominant, in terms of their 
historical status and current political leverage. Consequently, disagreement exists 
between the categories across the boundary. Such differences take shape of a contest on 
meaning of the boundary. However, this contest has been certainly consequential for 
boundary making. Wimmer (2008b: 2008b) did not comment on the relationship  of 
these two forms of transvaluation in his work and one can imply, from his work, that 
these two are separate processes pursued by  people. However, these two may follow 
each other in successive order. In that sense Ghariban  construction of the Qasabgars 
(occupational groups) as Hunarmand (skilled people) and the Khanan as Bekara (lazy 
or without work) and Badmashan indicate trends of inversion. 
Lindholm has observed earlier that khans usually remain idle in Swati village. 
As an aristocrat, the khan overseas the labour of other and generally  prefers not 
to get his hands dirty, though there are notable exceptions. It is well known that 
this approach leads to smaller yields, but it  suits the khan’s image and sense of 
dignity to be idle” (Lindholm, 1982: 103).  
However, such idleness is not productive in situation where competitors are 
accumulating wealth. Oddly, in Malakand despite the loss of considerable land 
ownership, some Khanan remain idle. If they do business, their limited success further 
reinforce their perception that they must remain associated with agriculture.95  Some 
may opt for government services and others remain idle.  
 Although it  is beyond the scope of this study to explore these boundary  
strategies, it would not be out  of lace to suggest that, the reworking of the hierarchy is 
not attempted through a systematic and organized effort but through symbolic processes 
of interpreting and associating meanings with boundary. This meaning system is 
informed by the historical experiences transmitted in form of narrations from generation 
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95 There are quite a few successful business families among the Khanan but mostly they are identified by 
immigrants to be failure.  While immigrants believe that Khanan don’t have business acumen, Khanan say 
they fail because they do their khani (behavior peculiar to khans) in business.
to generation and magnified and highlighted by the Awami-khel movement and 
reinforced by social conduct. Nevertheless, I suggest that  organized and systematic 
effort, to cause meaningful normative inversion, would require resources and greater 
‘groupness’, currently lacking, among the Ghariban. Therefore, the contest on boundary 
meaning continues in the absence of previous hierarchies and statuses.  
Conclusion
Social interaction between Khanan and Ghariban involves communicating meanings of 
boundary through social conduct. Interpretation of these meanings is contested, which 
also reinforces the boundary in oppositional pattern. Through these arguments I suggest 
that by discrediting the behavior of the Khanan, Ghariban do not aspire to take their 
position and status. They see the ‘condescending’ behavior of the Khanan undesirable 
and project their own ‘achievements’ and ‘toil’ vis-a-vis Khanan. Therefore, these 
processes demonstrate that effort to achieve statuses within the agreed ‘value 
system’ (cf. Lindholm, 1982; Barth, 1959b) is irrelevant in Malakand case. The two 
categories in their own respective positions have perceived the boundary and interpreted 
the meaning it  conveys in social interaction. They have retained the categorical 
boundary despite the collapsing hierarchies and transforming statuses. 
We have discussed that people in Malakand not only  categorize each other as Khanan 
and Ghariban but also see the categorical boundary  meaningful in social and political 
settings. Both these categories have typified behavior reflected even in maintaining 
cultural institutions and identity.  Informed by historical experiences these patterns 
convey  contested meanings. Such contestation shapes the question for the next chapter 
of the thesis where the focus is on contested ethnic identity. It elaborates on how 
conflictual meanings and interpretations of the categorical boundary shape a discourse 
on who is and who is not a Pakhtun? Therefore, establishing a dynamic relationship 




Pakhtun identity in Malakand is contested and contextualized. The contest is 
insignificant and less discernible when situational and historical contexts are wider, but 
more significant when these contexts are set locally. Two different aspects of 
Pakhtunness are emphasized in the local context to initiate inclusion and exclusion. In 
this process, some basic values of Pakhtunness are reinterpreted. The contest is 
significant in post reforms period when the social statuses and patron-client relations 
have undergone change. Therefore, I argue that there is contest between two broader 
categories of Khanan and Ghariban on which identity marker or aspect to emphasize, 
and in what context.  
This research does not aim at proposing a model (cf. Ahmed, 1980; Barth, 
1959b) drawing on some characteristics and fundamental behavioral traits agreed upon 
by Pakhtuns that define their identity  in a time of transition. To a degree, inclusion and 
exclusion involves  manipulation of ethnic identity. It questions why in a social situation 
affected by changing political and economic configuration, consensus on who is 
Pakhtun is lacking. I also analyze relation between the perviously  stratified status 
oriented social system and contemporary  situation; and question why some internal 
issues of stratification have influenced ethnic identification. This could mean internal 
social categories have realigned after losing their hierarchical structure and have shaped 
contest over ethnic identity. The contest is, thus, not  about social statuses such as 
‘Pakhtun’ - ‘non Pakhtun’ (within the ethnic group  Pathan cf. Barth, 1959b; 1969b). In 
post reform period (1970- to date) the dependent statuses of patron-client do not exist; 
and although, lately  ignored by anthropological inquiry (Barth, 1981; Lindholm, 1982) 
a discourse is currently shaping in Malakand that constitute a very basic question of 
ethnic identification i.e who is Pakhtun? The social categories of Khanan and Ghariban 
are emphasizing two different aspects of Pakhtunness to press for their claims of 
belonging to ethnic group Pakhtun. 
Evaluating an organized indigenous struggle of Awami-khel I seek to reflect on 
the understanding of social and political system by  the previous ‘patron-client’ 
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categories. I argue that the system perceived variously, is seen simultaneously as 
perverted for its failure to embody the values of equality, honor and autonomy, and 
representative of cultural norms.  96 Focusing on anti-system Ghariban category, I posit 
that the perception of the political and associated social system is of a construct of 
predominant internal (Khanan) and external (‘encapsulating system’) actors, which had 
left Ghariban deprived of their rights and created a situation of ‘beizzati’ (dishonor). In 
this manner they questioned the system for being deficient in Pakhtun ideals and Islam. 
They also disputed the definition of Pakhtun offered locally by the system.  
I will therefore, first explain the historical context  and the struggle of Awami-
khel organization to reflect on the nature of its attack on the administrative and political 
system of Malakand Agency. This will help  us in understanding post reforms period and 
to account for the change as Barth’s put it,“under changing conditions at present, with 
urbanization and new forms of administration, the total situation has changed so that 
one can expect a radical change both of Pathan culture and of the organizational 
relevance it is given” (1969b:133-134).
   I will also see how the literature on Pakhtun identity alludes to different 
aspects of Pakhtunness such as ascribed and performed (or achieved) and finally  explain 
how these aspects are emphasized variantly by the two categories to define Pakhtun. 
Varying emphasis also causes contest and initiate inclusion and exclusion.  
5.1: Indigenous struggle and ethnic identification
The question of identification in Malakand is consciously associated with the tribal area 
status of the region and the indigenous struggle for rights and identity. In following 
paragraphs I reflect on the nature of administration, the different interpretations of the 
system (implemented in 1895 and revoked in 1969) and the nature of opposition from 
an indigenous organization known as Awami-khel. This discussion provides background 
to the next section which focuses directly on the process of contested identification in 
Malakand.   
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96 Lindholm argues, “Equality means that each man in theory has an equal chance to subdue his fellows. 
Each man struggles to conquer and rise in the shallow hierarchies the system allows” (1982: 217-218). I 
have argued earlier that the desire among the Ghariban was not to rise in the hierarchies but to undo such 
hierarchies. Therefore, equality demanded by Awami-khel was the equality in political social and 
economic rights.
Tribal Agency: Perverted or autonomous system:
The incessant discourse since 1960s in Malakand is about the status of the system 
tailored through mutual consent between Colonial power (Britain) and the local chiefs 
(representing tribal people) in 1895. The debate, therefore, strikes at the very heart of 
the perception that Political and administrative system in Malakand and all other Tribal 
Areas of Pakistan represented colonial needs and tribal aspirations. The locus of the 
discourse is a question, was the political system, endorsing social statuses (of landlords 
and their clients) through recognition of Riwaj (local customs), based in the egalitarian 
ideals of Pakhtun value system. If it was a compromise, how well it represented the 
entire population and not just a fraction of the population. Lindholm and Barth’s 
argument that, the entire population followed a single value system may endorse the 
claim that the system was representative. Literature on Tribal Areas of Pakistan has 
debated emphatically on the working and flaws of the system inherent in the contrasting 
interests of the tribal people and the State. The puzzling feature was to govern the 
region through an arrangement that also satisfy local aspirations. The crisis of 
governability in Tribal Areas was shaped by  contest among policy makers of 
‘encapsulating system’97over the question of, ‘direct-indirect’, ‘discretionary-mediated’ 
form of rule (White, 2008b). However, a crisis of equal magnitude was shaped by a 
contest generated by unequal social statuses in Malakand (at least since 1960‘s). This 
crisis is largely ignored by the literature on Federal Areas of Pakistan. The indigenous 
struggle within Malakand since 1960s was to question the validity of the political and 
social configuration that was shaped through the collaboration of a minority of Khanan 
(landlords) and the Imperial power (British India) and later extended by the State of 
Pakistan. Views differ among the Pakhtuns of Malakand; Khanan justify it to be a 
representative of their Riwaj (traditions) in practice since their conquest of the region 
and Ghariban disapprove it to be an instrument in the hands of few who have even 
perverted the ideals of Pakhtun values such as equality and freedom for all.
     The British system of governance in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
was a consequence of treaties signed with Tribal Jirgas (Khan, 2005: 103-108), and later 
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97 Terms used by Ahmed (1980).
between the government of Pakistan and tribal  jirgas (Khan, 2005c: 27). The form of 
government introduced in these areas had following main constituents.
a. Political Agent: 
The most pivotal officer in the Tribal Areas representing State interests in FATA is 
known as Political Agent. Being ‘half administrator’ and ‘half  diplomate’ Political 
Agent had diverse roles to play. He was to administer on behalf of the government and 
also deal with the ‘co-signatories of the treaty’ (Khan, 2005a: 109). He kept a close eye 
on the tribes  and the flow of tribal opinion through ‘constant vigilance’ (Khan, 2005b: 
89). To do so he had a range of inducements. He could increase and decrease individual 
allowances and bribe informers from a secret and non audit-able fund. He issued export 
and import permits, contracts for public works, supply  of services, issue quotas for Gulf 
employment, etc. He could take a range of punitive measures in accordance of the 
treaties signed and Frontier Crimes Regulations to check criminal activities (Khan, 
2005a: 109-110). It was through his office that the State presence in Tribal Areas was 
demonstrated and for that matter his decisions or choosing sides would be perceived as 
the policy  of the State. On various occasion I was informed by Ghariban and Khanan 
that such and such Political Agent was either the supporter of Khanan or Ghariban.    
b. Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR): 
 Frontier Crimes Regulation were laws tailored by British in 1872 and extended 
to FATA after a major revision in 1901. Through these laws the powers of Political 
Agent were increased to facilitate him in governing Tribal Areas. These powers 
included collective punishment, arrest without the right to Habeas Corpus and reference 
of cases to a jirga (council) of tribal chiefs. Due to severity of punishment suggested 
and the extensive powers of the Political Agent these laws are often condemned for the 
worst violation of human rights in the name of governance and are thus referred to as 
‘Black Laws’. In fact they constituted a parallel judicial system in Pakistan (Ali and 
Rehman, 2001: 53).
It is based on the premise of suppression of crime by infliction of the severest 
possible punishment. The administration of justice is neither its aim nor 
purpose. The FCR denies the accused due process of law (Ali and Rehman, 
2001: 53). 
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Under FCR Political Agent appoints a jirga from the chiefs of the tribal area and ask it 
to adjudicate on an issue at hand. The jirga investigates, suggests punishment in 
accordance to Riwaj (customs) and reports back to the Political Agent. Final decision 
rests in Political Agent. Such jirga must  be differentiated from the traditional jirga of 
Pakhtuns for it is appointed by the Political Agent  and thus official in character (Ali and 
Rehman, 2001: 50-57). Besides this official function, Jirga provides a wide range of 
functions in Tribal Areas, from minor decisions on choice of the site for a mosque, to 
the settlement of blood feuds and to communicate with Political Agent on behalf of the 
people etc (Ali and Rehman, 2001: 51). Therefore, the officially appointed Jirga was 
performing a fraction of wider varieties of tasks. Moreover, its appointed status was not 
very popular among the tribal people of FATA. 
c. Maliki system:
Maliki system is a system of patronage, to appoint Maliks (chiefs) among the tribal 
clans and to use them in facilitating Political Agent. These Maliks were paid through 
three different  allowances; Maliki allowance, Lungis and Muwajib. Muwajib was a 
regular allowance to be distributed biannually, in the entire tribe through Maliks, Lungi 
was a personal allowance for individual services and Mailki was hereditary allowance 
paid to Malik subject to good conduct (Hussain, 2005: 7; Ali and Rehman, 2001: 48). 
With these allowances and inducements British and Pakistani governments produced a 
group of elite who were often resented by other members of the tribe.  
 Ahmed reports that although, unlike Swat, there were no khans in Mohmand 
Agency, there were Maliks (chiefs- also known as mashar in Mohmand Agency).98 
These Maliks were opposed by kashars (junior or young), who were ‘political have-
nots’ of various clans; and included young and old, rich and poor alike. Discontentment 
against the Maliks was for their corruption, selfishness and deviousness and therefore, 
kashars aspired to change the personnel and not the ‘leadership structure’ and ‘the 
system’; he argues,
“The kashar is a militant, not a revolutionary. He wishes to remove what he sees as the 
invidious British-created Maliki system and to return to the traditional ideal structure 
but not to create a new one” (1980: 143-145). 
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98 It is one of the Federally Administered Areas of Pakistan
In Malakand the discontented group  included the weaker Khanan and a larger group of 
people in ‘clients’ status. Also landlords in Malakand were challenged by the emerging 
group of businessmen who accumulated wealth through market business.  
d. Riwaj:
Riwaj is loosely collected set  of centuries-old usage and customs that  govern 
every  aspect  of the lives of the tribal people. It may vary somewhat in detail 
but in essence remains the same throughout FATA (Hussain, 2005: 5). 
Differentiating and relating Riwaj with Pukhtunwali, Iftikhar Hussain argues that 
Pakhtunwali is ‘code of life’, ‘code of ethics’ from which flows the ‘social norms’ or 
‘customs and usages’ known as Riwaj (2005: 5-6). Although this distinction is a thin 
one, it correctly  refers to the ideal, and structure referring to the ideal. Barth (1969b: 
1959: 1981) referred to social organization of Pakhtuns on the basic principles of 
Pakhtunwali under conditions which shaped such organization. In Malakand Riwaj or 
the social organization and usages/customs were condemned by  an emerging groups 
which found it perverted form, developed out of the need to control a larger population. 
They  presented it as an instrument of the usurpers to suppress, and appealed to the 
ideals of Pakhtunwali that discourages such exploitation. Next section will elaborate on 
an organized struggle against the perverted form and the representative system.  
Awami-khel’s struggle for ‘emancipation’ and honor:
 Post colonial political situation in Malakand is often explained with the 
reference to religious movements such as Tehrik Nifaz Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) 
(1989-to date) and the current Taliban movement (Marwat and Toru, 2005: Bahadur, 
1998: Ali and Rahman, 2001). These movements have originated in post reform era and 
therefore, reflect little on the issue of identification in the region. I intend to discuss an 
organization rarely referred to in the available literature on Malakand and see the issue 
of identification through its struggle against the political and administrative setup  in 
Malakand Agency before 1970. I do not evaluate its contribution to the change in form 
of successive reforms in the region, rather focus on the nature of its struggle and its 
consequences for the contested identification in Malakand.  
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 An immigrant and businessman from Aspanr (District Dir) Muhammad Khan 
launched an organization known as Awami-khel.99  He was soon joined by people of 
diverse background; kisanyan, immigrants and others including some Khanan. He 
raised concerns against the FCR, Riwaj and deprivation of the majority.100 Under FCR, 
the Riwaj was protected, Jirga membership limited to Khanan and citizenship  and 
landownership  rights denied to immigrants. The growing consciousness among the 
Ghariban was partly due to education, partly due to decreasing dependence on Khanan 
and the emergence of business class. Gradual realization that, “Judged by Pathan 
standards, clientship places a man among the despised failures, subordinates among 
independent commoners” (Barth, 1969b: 125) they  attempted to challenge Khanan. This 
realization was accompanied by a sense of degradation and overwhelming loss in 
cultural terms, which was soon translated into an organized effort.101 Although, Awami-
khel was joined by diverse categories, it drew its leadership and the majority of its 
support from immigrants making it  an organization of businessmen immigrants. 
Moreover, the fact that Awami-khel was much more vigorous in Batkhela than it was in 
any other part of Malakand confirmed it to be based among the immigrants. 
Awami-khel organized its struggle on following concerns.102
1. The political, administrative and social organization in Malakand was the 
product of colonial rule and local aristocracy. It  was concocted by the 
converging and not contrasting interests of Khanan and colonialists. Later 
Pakistan emulated colonialists.  
2. The system did not represent popular aspirations and even was against the 
principles of Islamic Law.  
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99 Awami-khel was inaugurated in 1967 but became fully functional in 1969. 
100  Riwaj were the usages and customs followed by Yousafzai since generations. Under FCR disputes 
were decided on the basis of Riwaj. Initially the Jirga members while investigating cases referred to 
Riwaj, relying solely on their memory, however, later (1964) these customs were compiled and published 
under the title “Riwaj Nama Malakand Agency” (Khan, 1964) by the Political Administration in 
Malakand. Riwaj Nama was considered by Awami-khel to be an instrument of oppression in the hands of 
Khanan (Awami-khel, 1969; Khan, undated; Awami-khel, undated).
101 The statements of Awami-khel representatives and the literature it produced consistently used the term 
beizzati (dishonor) to refer to the treatment of Ghariban at the hands of Khanan. 
102  All these points are based on the study of various pamphlets published by the Awami-khel 
Organization from time to time for public awareness; such as Dawat-i-Haq, Dawat-i-Insaf and Interview 
of Muhammad khan.
3. This composite system denied rights to the majority of the people, including the 
very basic right to call themselves ‘Pashtun’. 
4. Power configuration put Khanan in privileged situation and therefore, they 
committed atrocities, imposed taxes and demanded unpaid labor.   
5. The alternative system representing popular aspiration is Sharia. 
6. Pakistan’s ideology does not  allow the continuity  of Laws representing British 
legacy, which are inherently anti Islam and deprive a large population of their 
rights.
The concerns raised by  Awami-khel gives an impression that it imagined and 
particularized history  of the region and related it with the Pakhtun ideals. Their struggle 
in post-colonial period against the construction that was perceived to be colonial (but 
retained by the post colonial State) was unique. Its emphasis on Pakhtun identity  and its 
attributes such as autonomy, self-determination and egalitarianism make it a movement 
for seeking and restoring identity. Moreover, their pragmatic discourse on the 
relationship  between local power holders and the foreign imperial power highlights the 
class aspects of the movement, however, the undertones of such discourse was always 
judging the behavior of Khanan (landlords) on Pakhtun ideals. Khanan were believed to 
be abetting with foreign powers but also failing to perform Pakhtunness. They failed to 
protect their autonomy in face of foreign invasion and in fact betrayed the larger 
population by agreeing to receive allowances, establishing social inequality derogatory 
to Pakhtun and Islamic ideals of equality and egalitarianism. In contrast  the ‘common 
people’ or ‘Ghariban’ have fought with their lives against the foreign elements and have 
faced the atrocities emanating from the unequal distribution of power. In this way  they 
glorified both Pakhtun traditions to resist foreign intervention and Islam.103 Therefore, 
Ghariban deserve to call themselves Pakhtuns. 
 The second aspect of this polemics of Awami-khel is the Riwaj (customs and 
usages). It was emphasized by Awami-khel that Riwaj created statuses and a source of 
discrimination, inhuman treatment and baizzati (dishonor) of the Ghariban. The 
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103  Although the strict bifurcation between Khanan and Ghariban and the perception that only the later 
fought when the former were collaborating cannot be substantiated, historical accounts in vernacular refer 
to Khanan negotiating with British. Yousafi reports that in the 1895 campaign, the British did not face 
much resistance from the area, however, just two years later the people of Malakand dearly fought to 
throw the British out of the region (1960: 281). Surprisingly, there is an important distinction between 
these two campaigns the first one was lead by a khan from the neighboring Dir while the second one was 
led by a religious leader known as Mullah Mastan.
hierarchical statuses were believed to be the product of aristocratic mindset of the 
Khanan in congruence with the aristocratic and imperial characteristic of Colonial rule. 
Although, Awami-khel knew that  Riwaj was not the creation of British imperialism, 
they  found its continuity at the hands of colonial power an evidence of their mutual 
understanding. Moreover, the hierarchical caste system was constructed into a symbol 
of inequality, prejudice, inhuman conduct and atrocities. This may  be because the caste 
system had no more a social function of dependability  of clients over patrons. The 
forcefulness and consistency  of the above argument in the Awami-khel pamphlets 
convince the readers that Riwaj was the most consequential factor in the maintaining the 
system that generated inequalities and perhaps needs revisiting and alignment with 
Pakhtun ideals.  
 Awami-khel construction of Riwaj to be a deviant (or perversion) of two moral 
codes such as Pakhtunwali and Islam. Such an effort also refers to an attempt to bring 
congruity between Islam and Pakhtun traditions under an impression that, “Pathan 
customs are imagined by the actors to be consistent with, and complementary to, 
Islam” (Barth, 1969b: 120). Judged through this standard Riwaj Nama was supposed to 
be in line with Islamic Law, however, there are “boundaries and disjunctions” between 
Islam and Pakhtun traditions (Bartlotti, 2000: 76).104 Being mindful of such a situation, 
requires to see what exactly  in Riwaj was perceived by Awami-khel to contradict Islam 
and why they would relate Islam with Riwaj in the first  instance. I argue that Awami-
khel was alluding to the two ‘moral codes’ of Pakhtun society (cf. Edwards, 1996) and 
through them consistently attacked the inequalities produced by Riwaj. Therefore, they 
found Riwaj in clash with both Islam and Pakhtun values. 
 Awami-khel struggle appears to be to achieve a status that was socially and 
politically  denied to them i.e. Pakhtun citizenship. In their perception the primary 
hurdles were the hierarchal social organization, political and administrative 
configuration endorsing such organization and therefore, they sought to undo them. 
However, they did not discredit the system through an ideology  other than Pakhtun 
idealism. They related it with Pakhtun identity features and found it deviant from the 
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104 Under this impression some informant did reflect on the Islamic and un-Islamic nature of Riwaj Nama. 
For example Ibraheem Ustajee (2008) and Asmat ullah Khan (2008) told me during their interviews that 
Riwaj Nama was very much in line with Islam and the issue was perhaps just created.  My own analysis 
from the text of Riwaj Nama gave me an idea that there were clauses such as no consent needed from girl 
on her wedding and the restricted property possession were un-Islamic. 
standard. In this way they also reinterpreted the meaning of Pakhtunness. In contrast to 
the Khanan’ imagination of Pakhtunness in the possession of ‘land’, ‘lineage’, 
‘property’, ‘servants’, ‘houses’, ‘weapons’ and ‘Jirga membership’, their Pakhtunness 
was in ‘Love for Islam’, ‘honor’, ‘bravery’ and ‘Love for Jihad’ (Awami-khel, 1969: 
05). Also when Pakhtunness demands autonomy and when, “Each man strives to 
present himself as proudly self- reliant, for dependence is weakness and weakness is 
quickly produced upon by the strong” (Lindholm, 1981: 514) Awami-khel strived to 
change ‘life circumstances’ that will elevate them to such standards. 
 By implication Awami-khel also perceived that dignity, honor and equality are 
the hallmark of Pakhtun society. It is even believed in Batkhela that Awami-khel’s 
creation was the provocation of Muhammad Khan in an incident when he felt 
dishonored and insulted at the hands of Khanan. In a visit to the office of Political 
Agent, Muhammad Khan was introduced by Khanan as dokandar (shopkeeper) as if it 
was his primary identity. It was a shocking experience for him and since then he took 
the task to challenge the authority  of Khanan through a peaceful struggle. Humiliation 
at the hands of Khanan was a battle cry that organized Ghariban under Awami-khel and 
even attracted some Khanan to the organization. Countless stories demonstrating 
humiliating behavior of the Khanan are narrated by Ghariban when they recall the jirga 
time. Humiliation in Jirga time was tied up by Awami-khel with the denial of the 
Pakhtun status. Therefore, they claimed that their struggle was for the dignity  intrinsic 
in Pakhtun status. They  revealed that instead of Pakhtuns they were called with the most 
filthy and offending names like Khoshey (nameless or rootless), Laghar (wretched, 
loathed, filthy) and were treated as social outcaste (Awami-khel, 1969: 09).105 
Therefore, to get an honorable, dignified life and an egalitarian society the Awami-khel 
waged a ‘jihad’ against these elements (Awami-khel, 1969:11). 
 Interestingly, Awami-khel used Pakhto nomenclature, although just  
symbolically, as a strategy. The very name Awami-khel was invented, which 
dexterously combine two terms such as “Awami” (people’s) and “Khel” (clan). The 
former seems to be influenced from the Bhutto’s socialist rhetoric and the later inspired 
from Pakhtun tribal terminology. A peasant in Batkhela explained the logic behind the 
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105  Lindholm (1982: 109) also reports that khans in Swat used nick names such as ‘grasshoppers’, ‘blue 
eyed’, ‘dumb one’, etc and when angry ‘dogs’; dogs being ‘defiling’,  ‘living on human excrement and 
waste’ and ‘think only of food’. 
choice of this name in these words; “When Muhammad Khan heard others saying, ‘we 
are Ibrahim Khel’, ‘we are Madey khel’ etc he answered ‘we are Awami-khel’”. 
Muhammad Khan in an interview discussed the choice of the name and referred to 
transactional and oppositional character of his struggle reflected through the very name 
of the organization. 
I have invented this name because the group of usurpers, depriving 95% people 
in Malakand of their rights, has established dictatorship and integrated in 
kinship ties. They are in one or other clan and collectively they are known as 
Khankhel. In response I have gathered a scattered and dispersed quom 
(people), and made it Awami-khel so that one khel (clan) opposes the other 
(Khan, undated; 05).106   
 The name served two purposes; it  gave otherwise diverse people a single name 
to identify  with i.e Awami-khel and second, it attempted to shape Khanan-Ghariban 
struggle into a tribal rivalry between two equal clans (although it was not based in 
segmentary lineage tribal rivalry). Muhammad Khan adds, “through the constitution of 
this name alone I have attempted to develop kinship among the ordinary people so that 
they develop their relations by considering themselves members of a family” (Khan, 
undated: 05).107 
 Although, the scope of Awami-khel activity was limited geographically and 
operationally. It was more effective in Batkhela alone where Muhammad Khan was 
stationed and had little impact on other areas of Malakand Agency. It was also limited in 
its operating capacity as its activities were limited to distribution of printed literature, 
social network, approaching political figures out of the Agency  and publishing in print 
media. It could not articulate public opinion in political gatherings or protests as these 
activities were banned under FCR. Despite the limited scope of this organization it was 
a first  organized effort  of Ghariban to organize against Khanan.108 Awami-khel struggle 
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106 My translation, from the original Urdu text of the interview, published by the Awami-khel’s 
publication wing (Khan, undated).
107 My translation from the Urdu text of the interview.
108 Muhammad Khan, the leader of the organization claimed that it was the first ever organization of its 
nature in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Khan, u.d).
does not give an impression of an attempt to secure a place in the hierarchical system 
(cf. Barth, 1981; Lindholm, 1982) rather an organization which identified flaws in the 
system and sought to remove them. Some of its central demands included; Adult 
franchise in the Agency, renunciation of Riwaj, introduction of Sharia, ‘discontinuity of 
differences between Pashtun and non-Pashtun’, citizenship rights for all those who are 
settled in the Agency for at least three years and protection of rights for peasants, 
working class, labor, students etc (Awami-khel, undated). Awami-khel, thus, articulated 
public opinion and gave an early  platform to the poor, landless, unprivileged and 
aggrieved people of the Agency, when political activities were disallowed. Although 
most of its demands were accepted by the government when a series of reforms were 
introduced since 1970, we cannot calculate the extent of its influence on the decision of 
the government. Reforms in Malakand Agency were introduced after negotiation 
between Political Agent and  the jirga to which they had no access. However, the 
decisions of the government in their favor created a general impression among the 
Ghariban that Awami-khel succeeded in achieving ‘emancipation’ for the ‘deprived 
people’.109  Moreover, Khanan and their supporters resisted by writing letters to the 
governor and the president of Pakistan in vain. 
 Awami-khel was not the only organization of its kind in the region. A number of 
anti-Swat State organizations emerged in late 1960’s. These organizations were 
preceded by  individual efforts through writing letters to the press and the central 
government, publishing books and pamphlets to reveal the autocracy  of the Swat Wali 
(ruler) and demand merger of Swat State. (Rome, 2008: 275-286). Interestingly, like 
Awami-khel demands for Sharia were also raised by  some of these individuals (Rome, 
2008: 311). 
 Ahmed gave a passing reference to an organization Tehrik-e-Qabail (movement 
of the tribesmen). It was the organization of kashars (‘political have nots’) against the 
alliance of Maliks (chiefs) and the political administration in the Tribal Areas (1980: 
311-312). He did not elaborate on the particular nature of the organization, however, the 
nature of discontent mentioned earlier in his work implies it to be a struggle against  the 
system of privileges enjoyed by the Maliks (chiefs) in Tribal Areas. However, he 
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109  Khanan do not agree with the success of Awami-khel and argue that it was the government plan to 
change the status of the Agency. However,  it is also believed that some Political Agents were sympathetic 
towards Ghariban. Therefore, I argue that when the interests of Awami-khel and government converged 
reforms initiated. 
reported earlier at another place, that Kashars demanded adult franchise in FATA to 
reduce the influence of Maliks (1977: 49). 
 In this discussion on Awami-khel I have argued that the political, administrative 
and social structure in Malakand was challenged by a people who had experienced 
inequalities embedded in the system which also profoundly influenced their sense of 
belonging. The following section will elaborate on how such influences are reflected 
through a contest on the aspects of ethnic identity. 
5.2: Ascribed and Performing aspects of Pakhtunness
Pakhtunness is reported to carry  the ascribed and achieved aspects.110 Pakhtunness is in 
patrilineal descent, tribal lineage and in speaking and doing ‘Pakhto’. By doing Pakhto 
is the performing of Pakhtunwali the cultural code of Pakhtuns. The difference between 
the two may  not be very clear in the minds of social actors, as the one may make the 
other necessary. I also do not intend to draw a subtle distinction in order to produce a 
model rather postulate its analytical importance in explaining identification contest in 
Malakand. I argue that social actors in Malakand do refer to these two aspects of 
Pakhtunness when they emphasize one over the other to identify a Pakhtun. Ascribed 
being more embedded in the birth and blood ties represents the exclusivity  and 
performing or achieving aspect represents the inclusivity.   
 
Literature on Ascribed and Performed aspects of Pakhtunness
 By ascribed aspect of Pakhtun identity I mean claiming Pakhtun identity 
primarily  as birth right through patrilineal descent. Thus to claim, as in case of Pakhtuns 
in Malakand, that they  have birth right to Pakhtun status because they have been the 
descendants of Yousaf and their rights are endorsed by their landownership and lineage 
membership (both interconnected).111Such right is maintained no matter how mythical 
genealogies are. Therefore, I reckon three connected features of the ascribed aspect  of 
Pakhtunness i.e. Patrilineal descent established through a record of genealogy (even if 
mythical), landownership rights predicated on placement in genealogies and finally  the 
right to belong by birth. 
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110 Ascribed here means self ascription. See also Barth (1969b).  
111 Yousaf is the head of Yousafzai tribe of Pakhtuns.
 Barth (1969b) identified patrilineal descent being an important identity feature 
of Pakhtuns. He (1959b) argues that patrilineal descent holds greater emphasis among 
Pakhtuns and that “...patrilineal descent defines the only principle for the ascription of 
status or rights. But the organization of Pathan society is not exclusively, or even 
predominantly, based on that principle. Most statuses and rights are usually defined by 
contractual agreements between persons: that is to say they are achieved” (p.23).  
 Barth (1959b) has also delineated the association of landownership, genealogies 
and historical records. He argues that the entire population of Swat produces 
genealogies but with contrasting maturity. The non-landowning castes in Swat produced 
genealogies what Barth believes were ‘spurious pedigrees’. In contrast, the landowning 
‘Pukhtuns’ had well developed genealogies that establish their lineage organization, 
‘traditions of conquest’ and rights of landownership. However, through internalization 
process previously  non-landowning groups were accommodated into Pukhtun status and 
were given land rights but  excluded from the genealogies, which confirms the claim of 
Pakhtuns that, ‘genealogical assimilation is inconceivable’ (p. 24-28).
Patrilineal descent being an ascriptive aspect of Pakhtun identity is more forcefully 
recognized by Ahmed (1980). He asserts,
I shall define a Pukhtun, whether he is living in Pukhtun areas or not, speaking 
Pukhto or not, as one who can trace his lineage through the father’s line to one 
of the Pukhtun tribes, and in turn to the apical ancestor (Ahmed, 1980: 84). 
 
While commenting on the ascribed aspect, being a primary feature of Pakhtunness he 
argues that Patrilineal descent from Pukhtun ascendents is ‘the single most criterion for 
the definition of tribal Pukhtun’. He reports about the Mohmand Pakhtuns that, ‘nothing 
can strip him of his place on the tribal charter to which he is recruited by birth’, not 
even the loss of land (Ahmed, 1980: 85-86). 
 Rittenberg (1988) also takes a position close to Ahmed and argues that belief in 
common descent has been the most significant attribute associated with Pakhtun identity 
in Pakhtun perception (p. 6). A renowned Pakhtun intellectual Professor Nawaz Tair 
postulated that, it  is becoming extremely necessary  for the Pakhtuns to keep their 
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genealogical record as it may become more imperative to refer to it to establish one’s 
Pakhtun identity in future.112
 Through these evidences from the literature I will support my argument in the 
next section on how this ascribed aspect of Pakhtunness is emphasized by one category 
and de-emphasized by the other. This conscious endeavor may invite contention among 
Pakhtuns for there are numerous groups who do not hold the memory  of lineage and 
there are also those whose claim of placement in genealogies is challenged.  
 The most discussed aspect of Pakhtunness is the behavioral aspect or performing 
aspect. This aspect is enshrined in the behavioral code known as Pakhtunwali or Pukhto. 
Ahmed rightly asserts that,‘the code is the idiom through which the Pukhtun expresses 
his Pukhtunness’ (1980: 91). The saying among Pakhtuns, differentiates Pakhto 
language from the code,
‘He is Pathan who does Pashto, not (merely) the one who speaks Pashto’ (Barth, 1969b: 
119).
It is this ‘doing Pashto’ that centers the discussion of boundary maintenance in Barth’s 
celebrated study (1969b) and the core of ‘ideal Model’ of Pukhtuns, postulated by 
Ahmed (1980). The core values underlying this code are identified by Barth as ‘male 
autonomy and egality, self-expression and aggressiveness’ situated in the concept  of 
honor (1969b: 120). Ahmed argues that like other codes it is ‘part-fiction’ and ‘part-
reality’ (1980: 89). It may not reflect empirical facts and is conditioned on 
circumstances as it may be practiced only when it provides practical ‘self-image’ (Barth, 
1969b: 120). Barth argues that, the Pakhtun code and its inherent ‘values orientation’ 
are reflected in certain institutions such as Melmastia (hospitality) Jirga (council) and 
Purdah (seclusion of women). Ahmed (1980) on other hand adds Badal (revenge, feud, 
vendetta) and Nanawatee (suing of the enemy for peace) to the list but emphasizes that 
the most operative features of Pakhtunwali are Tarboorwali (agnatic rivalry) and Tor 
(black-meaning female chastity) and collectively they constitute the concept of honor. 
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112 Professor Tair (2008) is former director of the Pashto Academy in Peshawar University who hails from 
Thana. He has done a ground breaking study on Pakhto proverbs. These assertion were made in his 
interview with the author in Thana on 13 April 2008.
 These concepts and institutions socially organize Pakhtuns and provide a kind of 
behavioral charter to perform. As mentioned earlier that practicing such ‘ideal’ behavior 
may defer and vary from different ecological settings and conditions. The list of the 
constituting features of Pakhtunwali or ideal behavior may be inconclusive. 
 Parishan Khattak, a Pakhtun intellectual identifies following behavioral traits; 
masculinity, humanity, humbleness, no oppression and suppression, contentment, 
righteousness, tolerance, toil, animate, bravery, truthfulness, trustworthiness, beauty of 
women and manliness’ of young, Pardah (seclusion of women), true ideology, 
steadfastness, determination, tenacious on Islam, ego, hospitality, generosity, 
respectfulness, protection of others’ honor, protection of the weak and seeking 
knowledge (reported in Khattak, 2008; 9-12). Even the word ‘Pashtun’ or ‘Pakhtun’ 
describes the characteristics of Pakhtuns. Such as ‘P’ stands for ‘Path’ (honor-self 
respect), ‘Sh’ or ‘Kh’ stands for ‘Shegara’ or ‘Khegara’ (goodwill-support), ‘T’ stands 
for ‘Tora’ (sword-bravery), ‘U’ or ‘WO’ stands for ‘Ufa’ or ‘Wafa’ (loyalty) and finally 
‘N’ stands for ‘Nang’ (honor) (Khattak, 2008: 08).113 This long and inconclusive list of 
behavioral attributes adds to the sense of pride, Lindholm  (1982) argues, ‘It is assumed 
that Pukhtun are more intelligent, brave, more hospitable, more religious, and more of 
everything than any other people’ (p. 218).  
    Unlike Barth who argued that Pakhtuns emphasize more on ‘doing Pakhto’ and less 
on ‘speaking Pakhto’, Bartalotti argues that Pashto or Pakhto language in itself is an 
important attribute of Pakhtun identity  (2000: 70-74). In fact the values embedded in 
Pakhtunwali are alive through their unwritten expression in Pakhto language, therefore 
the loss of Pakhto language is a loss of these values (Khattak, 2008: 61).
 
Ascribed and Performed Pakhtunness in Malakand:
The question of ‘who is a Pakhtun’, when asked in the field gathered enormous 
response from the informants. Summarizing this response I suggest that Pakhtunness is 
contextualized and contested. Paradoxically, Pakhtunness is seen in both its ascriptive 
and performed or achieved aspects with varying emphasis. ‘Speaking Pukhhto’ and 
‘doing Pukhto’ are variantly stresses as is the patrilineal descent to identify a Pakhtun. 
Khanan and Ghariban categories stress different markers or attributes of identity and 
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113  This very description of Pakhtun characteristics was often cited by my informants in the field when 
they are asked the fundamental question of how a Pakhtun should look like (cf. Ahmed, 2006: 17).
indulge in contest over the definition of Pakhtun as they do on the meaning of 
categorical boundaries. This contest is shaped by multiple contexts in which the locus of 
discourse is the definition of Pakhtun. Contexts are situational i.e local and national and 
historical. Local contexts are defined by the social categorization, contested categorical 
boundary meaning and historical experience. Therefore, the contest on who is Pakhtun 
is highly  significant. When the situation is defined by  national context the discourse 
loses some of its contested form. Historical context draws from both local and national 
contexts and guides the discourse through historical claims deeply entrenched in the 
past experiences. In a sense history is repertoire, to draw from, in support of one’s claim 
in the contest. The national historical context is vague and gives both categories the 
opportunity to identify with Pakhtun heritage of conquest and victory and less chances 
to contest. 
Barth (1969b) has identified that  despite hierarchal stratification, the entire 
population, including non Pathan groups, ‘approached to a uniform Pathan style of life 
and speech’. 
Therefore, though the local version of the ethnic name (Pakhtun in the case of 
Swat and Peshawar) continues to indicate the dominant stratum internally, it  is 
increasingly  used collectively to designate the whole population in contrast to 
the population of other, non-Pashto-speaking areas. In this sense, then the 
internal boundary tends to lose some of its ethnic character (Barth, 1969b: 
128).
In these lines Barth, referred to the local and national context, when the 
reference to Pakhtun identity changes. However, Barth’s model and the above 
observation about the internal and external processes of identification fail to explain 
why the people in Malakand after the collapse of traditional edifice of authority and 
social organization (to which even Barth (1981) later referred), and the processes we 
discussed earlier (chapter 4) would sustain these identification. Moreover, he did not 
relate intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic dynamics of identification. Within the population or 
to say ethnic group social categories of Khanan and Ghariban are organized as such 
that they have lost their consensus (if there was such consensus at all) over calling each 
other with the titles such as ‘Pakhtun’ or ‘non-Pakhtun’. Khanan’s claims of calling 
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themselves Pashtuns or ‘Pakhtuns’ is challenged by  the Ghariban. In routine 
conversation and interaction Ghariban may use the title Khanan frequently but would 
avoid the title ‘Pakhtun’ for the Khanan, on other hand Khanan may frequently use the 
word Pakhtun for themselves. Moreover, we have already discussed that hierarchal 
patterns of patron-client relations have been discontinued and increasingly  the 
categorical boundary  convey contested meanings. In such a situation the discourse is 
shifted from social categorical identities to the ethnic identity and involve broader 
claims of ethnic identity. Inclusion and exclusion of each other in Pakhtun identity 
(ethnic identity) centers on varying emphasis on identity features. As mentioned earlier 
the context for such processes is both local and national. But in local context the contest 
is significant as statuses are blurred and meaning of categorical boundaries contested. 
Developments in Malakand suggest a contest rather a consensus, as Barth observation 
implies, on the definition of Pakhtun (or Barth’s term ‘Pathan’). There is substantial 
evidence referring to emerging contestation on social statuses and implied consequences 
for ethnic identification as demonstrated below.
Lindholm pointed out the resentment among the young ‘Pukhtuns’ (landlords) of 
a Swat village against  the achieved statuses. He argues that these younger ‘Pukhtuns’ 
against the belief of their elders increasingly  see Pukhtun status in blood due to ‘status 
insecurity’. However, he argues that generally the clients or the dependents of 
‘Pukhtun’ do not question the ‘value system’ even if they have amassed wealth and 
purchased land (Lindholm, 1982: 109-112). Barth in the same line argued that castes 
differences are decreasing but references to caste origins are also made.
Some consciousness and identity still adheres to caste origins: thus non-
Pakhtun members of the elite complain about the presumption of Pakthuns in 
assuming themselves to be naturally  more capable and fit to lead, take 
responsibility and dominate decisions (Barth, 1981: 157).  
Akbar Ahmed has insisted that Pakhtun of Mohmand Agency remains Mohmand 
Pukhtun even if he has lost his land and migrated from the Agency. He still retains his 
place on the tribal charter to which he is recruited by birth and not ‘sloughed off’ as 
Barth argued  about Swati ‘Pakhtuns’. Therefore, the defining attribute of the Pukhtun is 
his reference to tribal charter and Pukhtun ancestry (Ahmed, 1980:84).  
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One tend to question how the social values system will maintain itself when 
internal contestation is increasing. Also, as an implication, occur the blurring of 
‘Pakhtun’ as categorical identity (in post traditional system) and emergence of Pakhtun 
as an ethnic identity claimed and contested by all. Focusing on these processes the 
internal-external dynamics be comprehended. I argue that such dynamism is currently 
discernible in Malakand, where in post reform era the question of who is Pakhtun is 
related to previous system organized by  hierarchical and status structured system. 
Awami-khel perhaps grasped the centrality  of this dynamism asked prominently  in its 
pamphlets, Pashtun kon? (Who is Pakhtun?). 
David Edwards reported about  a group which identified itself as Ghilzai 
Pakhtuns in Peshawar refugee camps. Some of its members accumulated wealth through 
transportation business, while the others adopted the profession of transporting 
construction material through donkeys. However, they  were consistent in acting on 
Pakhtunwali features such as keeping Hujra and doing Purdah. This group was 
perceived by other groups to be kharkaran (donkey workers) for their ‘demeaning’ 
occupation and negated not only their tribal but Pukhtun status. Edwards adds,
The essential reason for this denial of identity is the perception of other 
Pukhtuns that in accepting low-status position of donkey  workers, they have 
abandoned their right to be called Pakhtuns. In becoming defined as an 
occupational group, they have foresworn their right to self-definition and, in 
the view of the Pakhtun, can no longer claim to fulfill the ethos of gheyrat, 
whatever other features of identity they uphold (Edwards, 1990: 78-79). 
The discourse about who is Pakhtun is held in a stratified society and is informed by 
historical experience (struggle between Awami-khel and Khanan) and meaning 
communicated across the categorical boundaries in social interaction. The discourse at 
times does not originate in isolation rather manifests in conversation about the land 
acquisition, population pressure, criminal activities in the region and electoral politics.
1. Ascribed Pakhtunness: 
 Most of the Khanan would claim Pakhtun identity on ascribed attributes such as 
patrilineal descent from Yousaf, historical evidence to support these claims and 
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landownership  based in ancestral land rights. These attributes are associated with birth 
right to be Yousafzai Pakhtun. Such Pakhtunness generates pride in the glorious past of 
ancestors when they conquered the area with ‘bravery’ and preserved their political 
autonomy. Genealogies are often contradictory  but useful source of reference to 
establish one’s place in the tribal charter. Landownership, although diminishing, is 
retained to refer to their ascribed status. They are still socially  organized into Khels 
(clan) despite the administrative and demographic compulsions. In the city of Batkhela 
one is still either the part of Madeykhel quarter, Umerkhel or Ibrahimkhel quarters. 
Despite the mixing up of migrants in these quarters, socially  and even administratively 
living quarters are associated with these khels.114 
 Referring to Ghariban, Khanan would raise doubts about their ancestry, tribal 
background and their migration to Malakand. Such references are always followed by 
assertion that  their Pakhtunness is in doubt. Doubts of this kind or failure on these 
criteria are always the primary reference of discredit to their claim of Pakhtunness, even 
if performing failure is also referred to. In local context for Khanan, a Pakhtun is 
therefore, a person who can trace his descent to epical ancestor through tribal 
genealogies and can uphold claims of landownership. 
 In non-local or national (inter ethnic) context, the definition may become very 
inclusive. Speaking and doing Pakhto becomes prominent markers. But such inclusivity 
is conditioned by the fact that these people might have lost their statuses for different 
reasons and have retained no memory of their lineage. Although this may be considered 
a failure too but something which can be ignored due to social distance. Similarly, 
descent which is claimed but not supported through evidence can still be accepted in the 
case of prominent political figures. Besides Pakhtun sovereigns ruling the length and 
breadth of India, they would proudly refer to contemporary  personalities such as Ayub 
Khan (President of Pakistan, 1958-1969) and Zakir Hussain (Indian President, 
1967-1969) etc in their narrations as great Pakhtuns.115 Referring to other ethnic groups 
of Pakistan they would identify the whole region a Pakhtun region. Similar conclusions 
were also made by Bartlotti by looking at the debate in provincial assembly of Khyber 
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114 Most of these quarters are in the old or Central Batkhela. Some of the clan members have migrated out 
of these quarters due to population pressure on land.
115  I was narrated a story by a Khan in Thana, of how the mother of Indian president lamented to a 
Pakhtun poet visiting her in Delhi,  that her son can no more speak the Pakhto language and therefore 
losing his Pakhtun identity.
Pakhtunkhwa about renaming the province. He found the nationalists using more 
inclusive markers of identity  to identify  Pakhtuns. Therefore, he argued that, ‘Pashtun 
identity is malleable, negotiable and contested, in certain interpersonal, local and 
national political contexts’ (Bartlotti, 2000: 83-84).  
The local historical context for Khanan would be dominated by  the working of 
Jirga, Riwaj, law and order, tranquility and the rise of anti-Riwaj forces such as Awami-
khel and kisanyan. They  would be considered devoid of Pakhtun values and 
embodiment of treachery. Condemnation of Awami-khel would be done for their role to 
create tension in the society and making Khanan-Ghariban differences a significant 
social and political issue. Riwaj is explained as their custom and usage since generations 
and the effectiveness of jirga system to deal with crime.116 Comparison made with the 
current system of justice and effectiveness of previous system confirmed.117 
To conclude Khanan identify  Pakhtuns through emphasis on ascribed aspects of 
the identity  such as patrilineal descent and landownership. They would however, shift 
emphasis from these two markers to other more inclusive markers like language or 
perhaps Pakhtunwali when the context is situationally and historically  located off 
Malakand. After losing most of their prerogatives the Khanan, with transformation of 
traditional system, would insist  on their ascribed identity vis-a vis Ghariban. Among 
them as discussed earlier the younger ones would find themselves more inclined to 
choose the ascribed aspects to identify Pakhtun.118 It  is significant because in changing 
statuses and disintegration of hierarchies in the new political and social dispensation, 
these claims refer to not just the changing nature of statuses (‘Pakhtun’ versus clients) 
but changing nature of ethnic identity  from achieved to ascribed one. Meaning that 
despite the transformation of previous statuses, the consolidation of these statuses is 
sought in shifting emphasis on the criterion of inclusion in ethnic identity from achieved 
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116 The document Riwaj Nama divided the population into Agriculturists and non Agriculturists. The 
Agriculturists included Pakhtuns (who own lands) and the religious classes of Mian, Pir, Syed (they are 
given land by Pakhtuns known as ‘Serai’); while non Agriculturists include everyone else (Khan, 1964)
117 Even the Ghariban would agree to an extent that jirga provided speedy justice but will also assert that 
it was growing corrupt later. Moreover, it was always considered biased for it did not include 
representatives of the Ghariban.
118 The assertion of young khan in Batkhela testifies this,  “if Pakhtun identity was a skin on sale in 
Batkhela market it would have been worth hundreds of thousand for Ghariban” (Yousaf Khan, interview, 
2008).
to ascribed. Implying that the enlargement of internal contest on statuses to broader 
contest ethnic identification. 
2. Performing Pakhtunness
Ghariban does not contextualize Pakhtunness to a greater extent. However, due 
to contextualization by the Khanan and their emphasis on ascribed aspects of 
Pakhtunness they emphasis on different markers of Pakhtun identity and therefore 
delineate the ascribed from achieved or performed aspects of Pakhtunness. Their 
diversity and historical experience impress them to perceive Pakhtun identity in more 
inclusive markers such as speaking or doing Pakhto. In local situational context they 
deny that (known) patrilineal descent and associated landownership are primary  criteria 
of Pakhtunness. They would rather insist that the primary  criteria is speaking and doing 
Pakhto. They also reinterpret some of doing Pakhto features in this process of emphasis. 
The performing aspect of Pakhtunness, is seen equally in Pakhtun values and 
Islam.   No matter how ‘ideal’ they represent consummated Pakhtun. Oddly, in contrast 
to ascribed aspect, the achieved aspect also takes some primordial color for it is the sum 
of traits that are practiced for generations and are perceived to be typical of Pakhtuns. 
An immigrant in Batkhela concluded that, “Pakhto cha na ze na” (Pakhto cannot be 
warded off-entailing it  cannot be snatched from Pakhtuns). He insisted that like a color 
Pakhto is carried for ever. Second, performing Pakhto is associated with Islam. These 
two aspects of performance, as reported earlier, in Awami-khel imagination and 
discussed in light of interviews I conducted from various Ghariban in the field. 
Pakhtunness is in “honoring others”, “respecting others”, bahadari (bravery- not 
just shown in the field but in challenging traditions), Ghairat (honor), Melmastiya 
(hospitality), dialogue, Jirga, “Khaloos” (compassion), “Imandari” (honesty), 
trustworthiness, Sadaaqat (truthfulness), Khegera (good will), etc. These features 
constitute the ever extending ideal charter. Often they are broader enough to evaluate 
those who may not claim Pakhtun identity. If a person, irrespective of ethnic 
background, demonstrates greater achievement or a moral wonder, a Pakhtun would 
remark “Sam Pakhtun de” (he is a true Pakhtun) or “Da Pukhtano/Pukhto Kar ye 
woko” (he performed like a Pakhtun). Such assertions are made for anyone without 
looking into his descent, language or phenotypical features. Anyone who performs in 
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this very way shall rightly be called a Pakhtun. Any failure with no matter how rich or 
well supported by record of descent would not be identified as Pakhtun.
Ghariban interpret Pakhtunwali features, like honor and bravery, through their 
own experiences. They may see honor and autonomy119  in businesses; and find it 
‘brave’ to challenge the traditional social believes such as ‘business is a non Pakhtun 
activity’.120Barth reported that in Swat and other western agrarian societies of ‘Pathans’ 
political autonomy is founded on land ownership (1969b:127). One would question why 
the immigrant businessmen would relocate autonomy to businesses. Socio-economic 
changes have certainly required relocation of autonomy. Moreover, the occupational 
groups may  get new meanings such as ‘Hunarmand’ (skilled people), who do manual 
work in contrast to the lazy Khanan. Awami-khel movement also described 
Pakhtunness. Attacking the descent and landownership or wealth as criteria of Pakhtun 
identity, they imagined Pakhtunness to be in ‘bravery’, ‘honor’, and ‘love for Islam’. 
They  appealed to historical accounts and the struggle of the Ghariban since the colonial 
time to fight oppression and dominance. 
 Ghariban also more emphatically  identified Pakhtunness with Muslimness. The 
Muslimness of Pakhtun is provoked most of the time to relate Pakhtun behavior with 
Islamic ideals. Islamic principles of equality  and justice are prominent themes of 
Awami-khel pamphlets. Ghariban see Khanan’ failure to be just and equitable failure on 
both Pakhtun and Islamic account. ‘Zulm’ (atrocities) beinsafi (injustice), landey katal 
(disrespect or looking down at others), beizzati (dishonor) etc were traits considered not 
only non-Pakhtun but also non-Islamic; and were identified in Khanan conduct. 
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119 Instead of landownership (Barth, 1969b), they related autonomy with independence from the clutches 
of usurpers and their system headed by Jirga. Pamphlets of Awami-khel are full of emphasis on the fact 
that land is the manipulating tool in the hands of khans who’s land rights were protected by British for 
their services to British government and so against the principle of ‘honor’ and ‘autonomy’. They also 
emphasized that all those who live in Malakand have the right to call themselves Pakhtuns and should 
have equal rights.
120  It is widely believed that business is a non Pakhtun activity. In Malakand Businesses and trade were 
previously run by Hindus known as “Banryas” (cf. Bellew, 1864). Later, this name was referred to all 
those Pakhtuns who attempted to start businesses. Initially very few Khanan dared to do businesses and 
fewer of them succeeded to flourish such as Shireen Khan. Such businesses later on created jalousies 
among the other Khanan and currently a number of them are entering businesses. However, those in 
businesses might not leave their lands and keep their source of identity. 
Therefore, Islamic idioms such as ‘Jihad’ against the usurpers (Khanan) and emphasis 
on Shari'ah were referred to in Awami-khel literature.121   
Overlapping between ascribed and performing Pakhtunness:
Although the above discussion posits an attempt from various categories in Malakand to 
delineate the ascribed and performed aspects of Pakhtunness through varying emphasis, 
there is no sharp distinction in the perception of the people in general. There is visible 
overlapping in these positions. Some of Ghariban would prefer to identify Pakhtun 
through ascribed markers and in evidence would produce the name of their ‘khel’ and 
the village their ancestors have migrated from. Such people would impress upon the 
Khanan that they were previously landowners but due to feuds related to badal 
(revenge) they have lost their lands to their rivals. In this way the identity is negotiated. 
Moreover, they would also emphasize performing features with Pakhtunness.  
 Khanan do emphasize Pakhtunwali and act prominently to further establish their 
claim to Pakhtun identity. They  even criticize ‘others’ for their failure to perform on 
Pakhtunwali such as Melmastiya (hospitality) and gham-khadi (sorrow and joy 
celebrations) Hujra keeping, etc (see chapter 4). Ghariban at the same time recognize 
the importance of ancestry and lineage but highlight  that these features are steadily lost 
by Pakhtun due to enormous changes in circumstance and conditions. They also 
discredit allegations for being failing on Performing Pakhto rather they find their acts 
closer to the ideal behavior of Pakhtun.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I focused on contest over ethnic identity of Pakhtuns. Through this 
discussion I expanded on previous discussion of internal social categorization in 
Malakand (chapter 4). The argument in this chapter is predicated on historical account 
of the struggle of Awami-khel against Riwaj and FCR, delineating aspects of 
Pakhtunness from the literature and reflecting on local struggle to contextualize and 
contest Pakhtunness. So far I demonstrated, how Pakhtuns in Malakand in time and 
space not just socially categorize, contest boundary  meanings (chapter 4) but also 
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121  I found a sense of achievement in Awami-khel officials despite partial success in terms of failure to 
bring in Sharia. They bragged to bring down the system but failed to answer why could not they replace 
the system with Sharia, as they demanded.  
evolve a discourse on ethnic identity. Such discourse has greater repercussions as it 
involves varying degree of emphasis on different aspects of Pakhtunness such as 
ascribed and achieved to include and exclude. 
 Elaborating on the struggle of an indigenous organization which questioned the 
political status of a tribal Agency and related the issues of inequality  and dishonor with 
identification, I have suggested importance of internal processes for change. This can be 
tied up with the debate of change being imposed by encapsulating system (c.f Ahmed, 
1980) or change being internally desired (as I showed here). Moreover, the contested 
and contextualized Pakhtunness as posited here would be an important addition to the 
literature that so far has not  problematized Pakhtun identity. This may also raise the 
question of how this discourse on Pakhtun identity excludes or includes other 
identification such as Pakistaniat  and Muslimness.122 It needs explanation whether such 
discernible identification processes in Malakand avoid bringing in other identities and 
kept the primacy of the ethnic identity or involves other identities at other levels.   
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122 These identities are included by Pakhtuns of Pakistan in their self identification. For tribal, ethnic and 
Pakistani identities constituting part of Pakhtun identification see Ahmed (1977: 16) and Edward (1996). 
For Muslimness as part of Pakhtunness see Barth (1969b), Bartlotti (2000), Ahmed (1980; 1976) etc.    
Chapter 6:
‘Pakistaniat’ of Pakhtuns
Pakhtun sense of belonging to Pakistan is complicated by  their own insistence on ethnic 
identification being a primary identity and State’s incessant focus on a Pakistani identity 
that is predicated on Islam and has shown varying degree of appreciation to ethnic or 
regional identities. In this chapter I will argue that ethnic identity remains the primary 
identity  for Pakhtuns in Malakand but it is also related to a multi ethnic Pakistani 
identity  to generate a sense of belonging to Pakistan. Pakhtun through their own 
discourses on sacrifice, inter ethnic power and violence relate their ethnic pride with 
national identity which formulate a dynamic sense of belonging to Pakistan. Moreover, 
the context for such process of identification with Pakistan is set by  growing integration 
of Pakhtuns and identifying space.123     
 The two conflicting views on Pakhtun integration into Pakistani State and nation 
have been less reflective of the complexity inherent in Pakhtun sense of belonging to 
Pakistan. I identify complexity in Pakhtun sense of belonging and with support of 
evidence from Malakand and the literature I suggest that, these intricacies are produced 
among Pakhtuns by a subjective sense of ethnic pride and belonging to Pakistan. Ethnic 
identity  remains primary, however, that does not translate into irredentist demand rather 
a desire to constitute a multi-ethnic society in Pakistan. The economic and political 
integration processes and transforming spacial identity reinforces believe in the multi-
ethnic Pakistan. Moreover, I have noticed that discourse on the Pakistani nation among 
the Pakhtuns does not in a pragmatic way constitute interpretation of and contest over 
imagination of Pakistan. Such thought processes are often limited to the inter-ethnic 
power dynamism and resource distribution. However, a Pakistani nation in Pakhtun 
imagination would always be multi-ethnic. Muslim nation based in the communal 
discourse does not constitute a dominant debate among Pakhtun despite the fact that 
they  identify with and assert their contribution to the wars with India. Similarly, I could 
not identify a sense of belonging to Afghanistan in the region which was very  recently a 
recruiting ground for religious organizations supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan.  
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123 Personification of space means identification of the space with their ethnicity. 
 In this chapter I will draw a precise sketch of the primacy of ethnic identity 
among Pakhtuns for I have given details earlier on how locally  the contest over 
Pakhtunness is significant in Malakand. I will then elucidate the Pakhtun integration in 
the State and reflect on their successive personification of the region where they 
constitute a majority. Focus afterwards shifts to discussion on Pakistani nationalism and 
different perspectives on it. I will then illustrate the discourse of inter ethnic power and 
violence which shapes the debate on national identity and sense of Pakhtun belonging. 
Finally, I will argue that Pakhtuns find it difficult to accommodate to a Pakistani 
identity  that is exclusively constituted of Islamic identity and would rather propound an 
identity that allows ethnic expression and Muslimness. 
6.1: Ethnic identity as a primary identity
Previous chapters emphasized that Pakhtuns in Malakand not only  categorize each other 
locally  but also contest their ethnic identity  contextually. These processes also endorse 
another significant argument that ethnic identity has primary importance in Malakand. 
People inhabiting Malakand emphatically identify themselves as Pakhtuns and shape 
their social relations according to cultural requirements of Pakhtun identity. Despite the 
contest on inclusion and exclusion in ethnic identity, locally the most meaningful, 
consequential and consistent identification process would involve Pakhtunness. Awami-
khel with all its rhetoric and struggle against the prevailing social and cultural 
dispensation would not opt to dissociate from Pakhtun identity. Rather the center of 
their attack would be to challenge the definition of Pakhtun they  thought was configured 
by khanan.  
 Ahmed (1977; 1984) and Shafqat  (2007) have drawn concentric circles of 
identification borne by  Pakistanis. Ahmed working among Mohmand Pakhtuns included 
circles constituting; subsection, clan, tribal, ethnic, religious (1984: 320) and national 
(1977: 16). Shafqat with State centric approach identified four circles: inner most is of 
Islamic values followed by regional-cultural-ethnic circle, Pakistani territoriality circle 
and the finally symbolic circle of Ummah (2007: xxiii). These circles manifest multiple 
identities Pakistanis carry in multiple situations and context. My emphasis in this 
chapter is generally  on national or Pakistani identity and particularly on Pakhtun sense 
of belonging to Pakistan. 
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Rough as the hillmen’s lives are physically, they in someways have it easier 
than the better-off plainsmen, who must struggle with when to be a Pathan and 
when to be a Pakistani, when to develop  his pushtu and when to work on Urdu 
or English to get a better job, and when to sacrifice tribal or provincial for 
national interests. Somehow or other, over almost half a century, the Pathans 
have managed to balance all these things (Spain, 1995:115). 
There is multitude of views on Pakhtun ethno nationalism and their future in Pakistan. 
Reading from the successive political and economic integration of Pakhtuns in Pakistan 
a group of scholars has been optimistic about their integration to an extent that they 
have predicted the ultimate demise of ethno-nationalism and irredentism of Pakhtuns 
(Khan. A, 2005a; Jalal, 1995a; Ahmed, 1985; Noman, 1990: Ahmed, 1996). Pakhtuns 
are reported to have ‘greater self confidence about their future in Pakistan’ (Jalal, 
1995a:194) as political and economic opportunities in Pakistan weaned them away from 
separatism (Ahmed, 1996: 185). The irredentist demand of ‘Pashtunistan’ or 
‘Pakhtunistan’ is exaggerated by the State (Noman, 1990; 198).124 Consequently, there 
is a decline in popular support for enthno-nationalist party  ANP (Awami National Party) 
which also indicated that nationalists have ‘completely integrated’ into the State (Khan, 
A: 2005a: 104). 
 However, the above view is differed by a number of scholars (Cohen, 2005; 
Jaffrelot, 2005; Waseem; 2006; Weiss, 1999; Behuria, 2005) who predict, though do not 
outrightly reject the integration, the re-emergence of irredentism or nationalist 
sentiments in the garb of religion.125  Behuria has pointed out that the Punjab’s 
dominance theory  has outlived and Pakhtuns are now leading ‘Islamic wave in 
Pakistan’ (2005; 70). Anita Weiss (1999) perhaps was a bit early  to come up with this 
view though the others must have been influenced by  the post 9/11 world. Weiss (1999), 
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124  Omar Noman (1990[1988]; 198) suggests that Pashtunistan means the joining of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, Pakhtuns areas of Balucistan with Afghanistan. This seems to me an irredentist category 
mentioned by Weiner (1992). However, the nationalists who have been demanded Pakhtunistan have not 
come clear on the definition of the term. Perhaps it was a bargaining card and was used symbolically 
during the earlier years of Pakistan. 
125  Harrison on other hand has been arguing that the break up of Pakistan is a possibility in an event of 
stepped up hostilities in Pakhtun regions (2009: 16). 
reading the rise of TNSM 126 in Malakand, suggested that Pakhtuns were no longer 
showing their irredentism through the Pakhtunistan issue rather by adding religion to 
their nationalism. Weiss’s suggestion is different from the others who shared her view of 
resurgence of religion in Pakhtun region but used the term Pakhtun nationalism rather 
then irredentism. Irredentism as explained by Myron Weiner (1992) is the demand of 
the minority in a State to join similar members of the group in neighbouring State. 
Cohen has also pointed out two eventualities of Pakhtunistan, one through MMA and 
the other through the sponsorship  of Afghanistan (2005: 219). Both of these currently 
look remote as Pakhtuns have rejected religious parties in recent  elections and 
Afghanistan is occupied more with State building, therefore irredentism seems remote 
possibility. 
 Despite this disagreement among the scholars on Pakhtun integration into 
Pakistan, I will emphasize that ethnicity  among Pakhtuns is neither a diminishing 
phenomenon, nor is it sufficiently assertive politically to have culminated into 
irredentist demands. Ethnicity  as understood through the processes of identification 
among Pakhtuns indicates complexity. Inherent in this complexity is the primacy of 
ethnic identity  vis-a-vis national identity but that does not preclude Pakistani identity. I 
argue that  Pakhtuns retain their ethnic identity as primary and still relate to Pakistani 
identity. In this way  I adopt an ethnographic approach to the dilemma of ethnicity in 
Pakistan. Pakhtuns, therefore, have been discursively relating to a national identity that 
appreciates ethnic diversity and Muslimness. Moreover, this illustrates the primacy  of 
ethnic identity  and does not establish it exclusivity. In a pragmatic way Pakhtuns are 
merging ethnic pride with national belonging. 
6.2: Integration of Pakhtuns in the State
It is widely  reported that unlike other minority ethnic groups such as Baluchis and 
Sindhis, Pakhtuns have been drawing benefits from the State of Pakistan and perhaps 
this has created greater ‘confidence’ in them about their integration in Pakistan (Jalal, 
1995a). Unlike other minority ethnic groups, Pakhtuns have all along remained masters 
of their land resources in Pakistan and their majority province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has 
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126 TNSM stands for Tehrik Nifaz Shariat Muhammadi, an armed struggle in Malakand region (in 1990s) 
to pressurize government to introduce Islamic Sharia in Malakand district. 
never been under stress from settlers of other ethnic groups.127 Furthermore, Pakhtuns 
have been buying lands in other provinces such as Punjab and Sindh (Ahmed: 1999: 
20). Likewise, cultural and religious alienation of Pakhtun which existed during colonial 
time has receded (Spain, 1977:22).    
Socio-economic integration of Pakhtuns:  
 Pakhtuns are the second most numerous ethnic group of Pakistan after Punjabis. 
Their demographic strength is consolidated by their access to power loci and relatively 
greater control over natural resources in their region. They also have industrial, and 
agrarian contribution to National GDP (although weaker) and more important through 
remittences sent by fairly  larger Pakhtun Diaspora in Middle East and Europe.128 
Although, small scale industry in Pakhtun region is growing (Zaidi, 1992:130), it still 
lags behind Punjab and urban Sindh in large scale industries (cf. Ahmed, 1999; Zaidi, 
1992).129 However, recent war on terror has seriously  hampered any industrial growth 
and has caused the closure of existing factories in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.130 However, 
Pakhtuns through out the country have shown greater interests in transportation, trade 
and construction businesses (Ahmed, 1999: 221-222; Jalal, 1995a: 194). Moreover, they 
still constitute a greater share of labor force particularly in the urban centers of Pakistan 
i.e Karachi and Lahore (Jalal, 1995a: 194). Pakhtuns have also accumulated wealth 
through remittances sent by family  members from abroad (Jalal, 1995a: 194). They 
have invested in real estate and landed property in other provinces and have retained the 
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127  The previous name of North West Frontier Province was replaced by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through 
the 18th constitutional amendment. This amendment was passed by both the houses through a consensus 
vote and was signed into law by the president of Pakistan on 19 April 2010 (The News, 20 April 2010). 
128  One estimate counts almost 0.3 million Pakhtuns in Middle East alone and are sending almost half a 
billion dollars each year (Jalal, 1995a: 194)
129  Moreover, dispute of royalty on hydroelectric power generation with the central government, 
negligence to the large scale industrial sector (NDCP, 10th March, 2007) growing unemployment, poor 
irrigation and above all recent unrest in the region have all contributed to its deplorable economic 
conditions. Shahid Kardar places Khyber Pakhtunkhwa third, on social sector development scale, after the 
provinces of Punjab and Sindh (cited in Zaidi, 1992: 121-123).
130 President of Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI) said recently that out of 2,254 
functioning industrial units in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa only, 540 were functional in 2010. For the 
deteriorating business and economic conditions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Saleem, 2010).  
ownership of their land resources in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Ahmed, 1999: 20).131 On the 
other hand their region (including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and parts of 
Baluchistan) has not been burdened by settlers from other provinces as in the case of 
Baluchistan and Sindh (Ahmed, 1999: 20). 
 The most discussed aspect of Pakhtun integration into the State is their share in 
the two most powerful institutions of the State i.e army and civil bureaucracy. Punjabis 
and Pakhtuns constitute the largest share in the officers and sepoy ranks of Pakistan 
army since the colonial times (Cohen, 1998: chapter 2). Therefore unlike Bengalis, 
Baluchis and Sindhis, Pakhtuns have not been deprived of their share in the most 
powerful institute in the country. Similarly, Pakhtun share in civilian bureaucracy of 
Pakistan is significant enough to have made them partners of dominant Punjabis and 
Mohajirs. However, integration of Pakhtuns has brought more dependency on Punjab 
and thus nationalist opportunity to focus on Punjab’s dominance (Harrison, 1992; 249). 
     
Personification of space:
 An important aspect of political integration of Pakhtuns in Pakistan is the 
evolving spacial identity. Although Pakhtuns have been claiming their association with 
the region historically, their administrative, political and economic control over the 
region particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa enables them to add spatial feature to their 
identity. The demographic majority, administrative and political representation, control 
over economic resources, social and cultural dominance and literary activism of 
Pakhtuns within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is conspicuous. Likewise, social interaction, 
dominant political and economic discourse and cultural expressions creates a 
Pakhtunized environment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Oddly  enough, such ambiance is 
preserved within the boundaries of the State that does not recognize political ethnicity. 
However, popular identification of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan as the abode of 
Pakhtun reinforces the Pakhtun sense of belonging to the region. 
 The language, Pakhto being an important marker of identity, is widely spoken 
and despite adoption of Urdu as formal language of communication, it is still the 
‘language of the household’ (Ahmed, 2002: 41). Pakhto also is extensively  used in 
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131  A high rate of migration to businesses centres of Pakistan such as Lahore and Karachi also indicate 
exploiting opportunities by Pakhtuns. During 1972 to 1979 almost 69 per cent of all Pakhtun migration 
was destined for Karachi alone (Zaidi, 1992: 110). 
informal official communication, universities and market  place alike which preserves 
the ambiance and identity 132. 
The Pashtuns want to be ‘recognized’ in their own right as a distinct 
collectivity. This makes Pashto symbolically significant  but, power being 
accessible through English and Urdu, the Pashtuns keep acquiring those 
languages (Rahman, 2002: 120).
 
Pakhtun presence in provincial bureaucracy, local and national business, trade, print and 
electronic media, educational institutions is substantial enough to make the ambience 
Pakhtun. The officers and businessmen familiar with and raised in the ambience often 
get nostalgic when posted out of the province.133  Therefore, Feroz Ahmed has rightly 
remarked that due to demographic and economic changes Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, ‘has 
become even more Pashtoonized” (2002, 38). 
Pashtuns were the primary  ethnic group in the province. They had monopolized 
land ownership. set cultural norms and directed traditional affairs over a large 
part of the Frontier for over four centuries since their original conquests in the 
region (Rittenberg, 1977: 79). 
 
Although the political and administrative autonomy of the province is still in 
rudimentary  stage for the central government  continues to hold power, symbolic 
autonomy of being free from the interference and control of other ethnic groups is 
broadly  constructed. This control is feared by other minority groups such as Baluchis 
and Sindhis in their respective provinces. Autonomy being a daring part of Pakhtun 
identity  (Barth, 1969b) is then linked with land; the land is an abode always dear to 
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132  Most of the people do not know how to write Pakhto; mainly because of State negligence in its 
promotion. Pakhto has been used by nationalists leaders in the past as identity marker and that invited 
State suspicions (Rahman, 1996). Moreover, it is consistently used as a popular medium of expressing 
ethno-nationalist sentiments and preservation of cultural norms. Urdu is comprehended by majority of 
Pakhtuns due to official patronage and associated power (see Rahman, 1996). It is also extensively used 
as a language of communication in interaction with diverse ethnic groups through out the State (Safi, 
2009). 
133 A number of bureaucrats and businesspersons in Peshawar and Batkhela told me that when they cross 
the Indus River and enter Khyber Pakhtunkhwa they get the sense of Pakhtun environment and feel 
enchanted.
Pakhtun heart and having sentimental value. “....a Pathan would rather give up his life 
than surrender his land or his wife. They are both sacred” (Khan, 1947[2007]:39). 
 
 Stephen Rittenberg argues that Pakhtuns appropriated most of North Western 
region of Pakistan by  conquest, ‘and with some exceptions make the land their exclusive 
possession’. They  also ‘came to identify a certain area as being collectively their own. 
They called it Pakhtunkhwa. Its boundaries were ill defined, but the concept did provide 
a territorial expression to their ethnocentrism’ (1977:69). The effort of Pakhtun 
nationalists to rename the province of NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa is considered a symbolic 
claim of recognition (Rahman, 2002: 120) within the State of Pakistan. These efforts 
exhibited negotiation of their space within the State of Pakistan. Spain rightly 
commented, “it is no great wonder that the benign, non-separatist Pushtoonkhwa has 
replaced the old aggressive, secessionist Pushtoonistan” (1995:117).
 The issue was highly politicized when the constitutional amendment draft 
presented by the current government proposed renaming NWFP as Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa after a compromise on the name between Awami National Party  (ANP) 
and Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N). Finally  the coalition government of Pakistan 
People’s Party  and ANP succeeded in renaming the province through 18th Amendment 
to the constitution of Pakistan in April, 2010.134 The leader of ANP after the change of 
name related it with the recognition of Pakhtun identity in Pakistan (News, 11 April 
2010). Not only  he termed it a historical moment but a reflection of the recognition, 
‘that they are part of the country’ (Awami National Party, 2010). 
6.3: Sense of belonging to Pakistan: The Pakistaniat of Pakhtuns
One of the most difficult and complex aspect of identification among Pakhtuns is their 
belonging to Pakistan as a nation State. I argue that Pakhtuns have been successively 
integrating in the State, enjoying greater social, economic and administrative control on 
a territory  they consistently  recognize as their homeland within Pakistan and therefore, a 
nurturing sense of belonging to Pakistan. However, before discussing this sense of 
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134  The constitutional amendment bill was passed unanimously by National Assembly on 8th April 
(Dawn, 2010a) and by Senate on 15th April (Dawn, 2010b). It was signed into law by the President of 
Pakistan on 19 April, 2010 (The News, 20 April, 2010). During this period violent protests were 
witnessed in the Hindko (language) speaking region of Hazara in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Protesters 
condemned the renaming of the province and demanded a separate province of Hazara (Daily Times, 
2010). 
belonging we need to be aware of the context in which such belonging to Pakistan is 
expressed. The context is well explored by various schools of thoughts that identify  the 
contestation in the realm of nation formation and identification in Pakistan. These 
schools provide different perspectives which gives useful insights to this study. 
Pakistani Nationalism:
Following are the two most prominent perspectives on Pakistani nationalism. Debates 
delineating these positions provides enormous insights into the complexity of 
nationalism in Pakistan.
Rational Choice and elite manipulation:
 The most influential school of thought on Muslim nationalism in India and 
ethnic politics in Pakistan has been of scholars (Alavi, 1989; Brass, 1974; Samad, 2007; 
Jalal, 1985; 1995b) who emphasize elite interests and rational choice as explanation of 
the ethnic and national problem of Pakistan. They postulate that  the history of Pakistan 
is the history of elite dominance and manipulation. Hamza Alavi found Muslim 
Salariat, the middle class urban, professional, educated elite, driving the movement for 
Pakistan (1989). These elite emphasized differences between the Hindus and Muslims 
and manipulated symbols in the process (Brass, 1974).  Therefore, Muslim and Hindu 
elites “constructed essentialized communities around faith” by “reinterpreting the 
past” (Samad, 2007: 75-77). Jinnah being the central figure in this struggle was also 
strategizing and without any ideational or ideological concerns (Jalal, 1985: 1995b). 
 Post independence period Pakistan continues to be dominated by  consistent elite 
interests. Scholars of this group illustrate that the alliance of diverse Muslim elite (from 
different regions and ethnicities of India) soon collapsed after partition, causing internal 
scramble for power and privileges (Alavi, 1989: Samad, 1995a; 1995b; 2007; Qureshi, 
1993). It can be concluded that, where this rational choice or elite manipulation group is 
criticized for negating the role of normative and ideational concerns it  is also found 
devoid of appreciating the role of religion i.e Islam in the creation of Pakistan (Shaikh, 
2009). However, this school of thought has its contribution in highlighting the 
dominance of elite and shift of power from the elite of one ethnic group  to another. In 
this way it also identified factors leading to suppression of regional and ethnic diversity.  
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The discursive production of nationalism: 
In contrast to rational choice, the discursive school of thought on Muslim nationalism 
and nation formation in Pakistan is critical of the argument that the demand and 
articulation of Muslim separatist sentiments are the product of elite interest and 
manipulation. It emphasizes the normative concerns of Muslims and the discourse on 
nation, religion and power, a major contributing factor in guiding Muslim for political 
action. However, this school of thought is not entirely oblivious of the role of elite for 
elite representing one form of religion often against  the other (regional, traditional 
Islam) forms and traditions of Islam (Verkaaik, 2004; 2007; Shaikh, 2009). 
 They  argue that the ideas and norms embedded in Islamic traditions significant 
and overwhelming enough to have frustrated elite manipulation (Shaikh, 1989). 
Emphasizing the discursive production of nationhood and ‘religious nationalism’, they 
argue that that nationalism is a discourse that transforms preexisting forms of culture 
and therefore nationalism produces national culture by  transforming the pre existing 
forms of it (Van Der Veer, 1994: 195-197). Moreover, such discursive processes can be 
related to the ethnic processes in post independence period (in Pakistan), where ethnic 
groups are, “discursively produced categories of governance and contentious 
politics” (Verkaaik, 2004: 21-22: 2007). Ethnic categories in Pakistan are ‘inextricably 
linked to the nation and as a consequence to Islam and have therefore also become 
confused with various interpretations of Islam’ (2004: 21-22). Islam, thus, not  just 
acquires a role of unifying force, as was largely  projected by Pakistani State and 
essentialist literature on national identity in Pakistan, but also a divisive one (Shaikh, 
1989; 2009; Verkaaik, 2007).135
 Islamic identity being central to Pakistan’s national identity is marred by  a 
contest between rival discourse i.e communal and Islamist discourse (Shaikh, 2009). 
The former, being espoused by  the ruling elite, is embedded in Muslim separatist 
discourse and the later, promoted by religious parties, is grounded in ‘radical reading of 
Islam’ (2009: 10-11). This can be differentiated from the argument that success of 
Pakistani identity based in Islam is evident in the ‘ethnicization of Islam’ in Pakistan 
(Verkaaik, 2007; Shafqat, 2007). 
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135 Essentialist literature refers to the work of scholars (Qurashi, 1969; Malik, 1963) who argue that there 
were objective and essential differences between Hindus and Muslims that culminated into a demand 
from Muslims for a separate State. Projecting official discourse on nationalism they insist on nation 
predicated on Islam.  
 It is imperative to mention that where the discursive argument and literature 
rightly emphasize the role of normative concerns, it  fairly squarely focus on religion. 
From there it  see a contested religious traditions that  of State and ethnic groups. I would 
rather identify that the literature on discursive production of ethnicity  and nation has 
overlooked the significance of linguistic and cultural repertoire, ethnic groups posses 
and cherish. Ethic groups like Pakhtuns have demonstrated enormous pride in their 
cultural linguistic and historical constituents of their identity. By this I do not intend to 
reify  and essentialize Pakhtun identity  and find primordial constituents of identity  static, 
fixed and unchanging. Rather I find greater contest among Pakhtuns on what constituent 
elements of identity defines Pakhtun and also the cultural stuff evolving and changing. 
Moreover, I will also argue that currently a discourse among Pakhtun intellectuals and 
elite, excessively sensitive to the unrest in their region has been critical of the media 
presentation of the relationship  between culture and Islam. Referring to Verkaaik’s 
argument that  ethnicity  and religion are amalgamated in Pakistan, I find the relation of 
ethnicity with Islam problematic in a different way. I will show how Pakhtuns have 
currently discursively found disjunctions between Islam and Pakhtunwali and have 
retained distance from Taliban’s Sharia and Jihad.  
Nation formation in Pakistan:    
It is imperative to understand the historical context of nation formation in Pakistan 
before, we take up the question of Pakhtun’s articulation of national identity. I have 
been emphasizing that we need to understand nation formation as a process where elite 
manipulation and discursive shifts have been prominent constituent features. Pakhtun 
sense of belonging is tied to such process of nation making in Pakistan. In fact Pakhtuns 
have been shaping their Pakistaniat in relation to State driven process of nation 
formation. Therefore, it is significant to have a succinct view of the various perspectives 
of the historical development of nationalism in Pakistan.  
 The elite focused group (Alavi, 1989; Samad, 2007; Qureshi, 1993, Jalal, 1995b) 
argue that although the regional and religious divisions and factions within the Muslim 
elite and masses were temporarily  put on hold, they reemerged soon after independence 
(1947). Samad (2007) has argued that the power configuration of earlier decades gave 
dominant role to Punjabis and Mohajirs and simultaneously Bengalis and other 
linguistic groups were kept out of power corridors. Samad (2007) insists that  Urdu 
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language and associated culture was projected and regional cultures discouraged. 
Therefore, Punjabi Salariat adopted Urdu language and its culture to consolidate their 
position. A gradual decline in the powers of Mohajirs and increase in the power of 
Punjabis since 1971 changed the dynamics of alliance between Punjabi and Mohajirs. It 
was also a shift from communal (minority  rights) discourse to majoritarian discourse 
and ‘the mantra of one religion, one language and one state becomes the norm’ (2007: 
105). In this process Punjabi salariat re-imagined Islamic identity  and perceived 
Jinnah’s intentions to be of making a religious State (2007: 106). Being distrustful of 
ethnic and regional interests, Salariat built a centralized State in the image of colonial 
India. Samad terms these processes the Punjabization of Pakistan to establish the 
hegemony of single ethnic group (2007: 105-107). Samad (2007) posits that the 
dominance of Punjabi salariat is an incessant phenomenon and with the parallel rise of 
Pakhtun elite at the cost  of Mohajirs’s marginalization. Moreover, the policy  of the 
ruling elite towards ethnic diversity  ‘has been cynically to co-opt or coerce groups that 
have not been accommodative’ which has made center and ethnic groups relations 
problematic (Samad, 2007: 127).  
 Alavi (1986) also discusses the relation of ethnic dominance of Punjabis and the 
Islamic ideology  or identity. He argues that in earlier decade secular traditions of Jinnah 
were maintained but soon after the rise of protests against Punjabi dominance, ‘the 
ideological tune changed’ (1986: 43-44). 
Suddenly Islam and the notion of Islamic brotherhood became the order of the 
day. It  was unpatriotic on the part of Bengalis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis to 
make demands in terms of their regional ethnic identities because all Pakistanis 
were brothers in Islam (Alavi, 1986: 44)  
Jalal (1995b) in her work on history text books has found how through official 
imagination of nation, India as well as ethno-nationalists and secularists are perceived 
‘others’.  
The discursive school of thought has focused more on the evolving and shifting 
discourse on national identity  and ethnic diversity. It refers to historical context of the 
discourse of nation formation (Metcalf, 2004; Verkaaik, 2004; 2001; Van Der Veer, 
162
1994; Shaikh, 2009). In the early  State of Pakistan’s history (1947-1970) the emphasis 
was more on the communal discourse of Pakistani nationalism. The period was 
characterized by  a context of ‘opposition to and distinction from India’ (Metcalf, 2004: 
219). The State adopted Muslim ‘homeland’ discourse identified Pakistan as the 
homeland of the Muslims of India. It also adopted modernist  interpretation of Islam that 
was close to scriptural Islam and opposed to traditional, rural, customary Islam 
(considered to be influenced by Hindu).136 These interpretations were accompanied by 
emphasis on the culture expressed in Urdu language, poetry and dance. It  was to 
discredit regional cultures and languages and to adopt the central symbols that were 
associated with the Muslims from the North (Metcalf, 2004: 226-227). Being associated 
with elite Muslim class known as ‘Ashraf’ (‘well-born’ cf. Shaikh, 1989: 04) Urdu 
language and the education was meant to ‘Ashrafization’ of ethnic groups such as 
Sindhi, Baluchis and Pakhtuns (cf.Verkaaik, 2004: 44-45).  
 Soon after the succession of East Pakistan (1971) when the ideal of Muslim 
Nationalism or communalism laid ‘scattered’ an alternative territorial national identity 
was postulated by  various intellectuals. It emphasized on cultural and political unity in 
the territorial boundaries of Pakistan since the Indus civilization.137Such influences 
enabled Z.A.Bhutto’s government to add a regional and ethnic element to national 
identity. Verkaaik argues that a Pakistani had double identities of millat and ummah. The 
former referred to his national identity  but the later referred to universal Muslim 
brotherhood. Bhutto added a third community  i.e. qaum which referred to ethnic-
territorial units such as Sindhis, Baluchis, Punjabis and Pakhtuns (2004: 40). Through 
this interpretation of national identity  Muhajirs became ‘flawed and in-between 
category’ (Verkaaik, 2004: 41). In response Muhajirs tailored an ethnic identity  to 
redefine themselves as Pakistani in a new situation (Shaikh, 2009: 55; Verkaaik, 2004). 
 During the 1980s the territorial national aspect of identity  was replaced with 
‘supra-territorial dimension of Pakistani identity’ and through Islamization process and 
consolidating links with Middle East, a ‘de nationalized’ Muslim identity was 
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136  See Metcalf, 2004: chapter 9 and 10, Van Der Veer, 1994: 63-64, Verkaaik, 2001; 2004 and Shaikh, 
2009: chapter 2 and 3. 
137 The proponents of these ideas were Aitzan Ahsan (1996) and A. H. Dani  (1981 cited in Shaikh, 2009: 
57). For discussion of these two perspectives see, Shaikh, (2009:56-57), Metcalf (2004: 231),  Verkaaik 
(2004, 39-40). 
encouraged by the State (Shaikh, 2009: 56).138 Such effort exposed another aspect of the 
relationship  between national identity  and Islam. Lack of any consensus on the 
definition of Islam ensued a discourse on ‘the proper way to be a Muslim in order to 
qualify as a real Pakistani’ (Shaikh, 2009: 57). Shaikh argues that since the 1990s the 
struggle has returned to contest between ‘sons of the soil’ and the migrants or 
‘outsiders’; however, as the case of Balochistan demonstrates the ‘outsider’ is defined to 
be one from within the State (2009: 56).139  Metcalf argues that despite these shifts in 
identity, Muslim identity  is central and consistent to Pakistan’s self image. Moreover, 
she posits that, ‘nationalist symbols have not evolved autonomously’ in Pakistan and the 
most incessant and central symbol for most of the Pakistanis is their Muslim identity 
(2004: 232-233).  
The tension between regional and Islamic expressions of Pakistani identity has 
remained unresolved (Shaikh, 2009: 56). 
 
With this historical process of nation formation in Pakistan we can argue that although 
the State has been guiding the course of such process, there has been shifting discourses 
of ethnicity, nation, power and religion. Such shifting discourses reflect lack of 
consensus on national identity and the on going contestation on Pakistani nationalism. 
This is in the context where Islam being central to the identity, itself is ridden with 
contestation. Below I discuss Pakhtuns’ discourses of power and sacrifice and their 
articulating sense of belonging to a multi ethnic Pakistani nation. 
Interethnic discourse of power and violence: The collision Path.
 In Malakand the question of identification with Pakistani nation would invite 
response that is expressed in interethnic idiom and loaded with aristocratic hubris 
informed by historical references to Pakhtun rulers of India. The discourse may get 
extremely lively  and emotional when post independence situation is approached. In 
focus group discussion in Thana participants being highly  articulate, elaborated on the 
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138  The dilemma that has been so consist with official imagination of Pakistan is in geographical 
limitedness and ideological limitlessness (Jalal, 1995b; Jalibi, 1996:10). 
139 Non native ethnic groups in other provinces such as Punjabis in Balochistan,  Punjabis and Pakhtuns in 
Sindh etc.   
economic deprivation as well as denial of recognition of Pakhtun sacrifices and the 
intention on the part  of ruling elite to trivialize their contribution to Pakistan. In this 
way the State is seen, both, as an entity  to which they belong and which is controlled 
and maneuvered by other ethnic groups, particularly  Punjabis. Verkaaik argues that 
Muhajirs feel that they have lost the State to Punjabis (1994: 38; 2007). Similarly, the 
discourse among Pakhtuns is centered around power dynamics and the control of a State 
by a particular group. Therefore, the argument is not a rejectionist one which seek to 
disown the State but to demonstrate the disadvantageous position they hold in such a 
State. It  is hard to imply from this discourse that the grievances would pile up to shape 
an irredentist struggle, as the inherent nature of the discourse is accommodative and 
pragmatically builds up on the sacrifices and services to the State in an apparent effort 
to impress upon its own value and utility. Moreover, I could not  find any  conspicuous 
sense of belonging to Afghanistan, although there were symbolic reference to Pakhtun 
migration and glorious victories initiated from the region currently constituting 
Afghanistan.140 
 Although I agree with suggestion that Pakhtun integration has created greater 
confidence among Pakhtun for their future with Pakistan (Jalal, 1995a), it has also 
brought more dependency on Punjab and thus nationalist opportunity  to focus on 
Punjab’s dominance (Harrison, 1992; 249). Like all other ethnic minorities in Pakistan 
Pakhtuns have been critical of Punjab’s dominance. Verkaaik reports about such 
tendencies in Pakistan;
In Pakistan, ethnicity is a discourse of opposition, a discourse of dominated 
people. Punjabis dominate both in numbers and power, have never bothered 
much about their Punjabiness, and as long as Mohajirs shared the dominant 
role they were strongly against ethnic solidarity too (Verkaaik, 1994:50).
Among the Pakhtuns of Malakand the use of inter-ethnic idioms is not limited to power 
configuration and economic deprivation, but these idioms have been expressed more 
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140  Afghanistan as a State has not been the part of people’s experience for so long. Pakhtuns in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa have not seen a consolidated Afghanistan since 1979. Even the refugees having been born 
in Pakistan have more of an experience of Pakistan than Afghanistan. Therefore, the question of Pakhtuns 
joining Afghanistan is a remote possibility. 
forcefully in the discourse of violence. The most widespread perception of the State in 
Malakand and broader population in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been of an actor that has 
stakes in the current unrest. The most popular complaint would be the disadvantage of 
this unrest for Pakhtuns. The State would be considered a major player in this unrest by 
either supporting subversive elements, ignoring them or fighting them. Moreover, the 
current discourse of violence associated with Pakhtuns in the media or otherwise has 
been seen skeptically to be part of the strategy. These activities of the State are then 
related with persistent sacrifices of Pakhtuns for the State. 
 The extent and degree of dominance of one or other ethnic group in the State is 
debated by the literature (Binder, 1986; Talbot, 2003; Samad, 1995b). Punjab is largely 
believed to be primary beneficiary of this dominance (Samad, 1995b) although its own 
cohesiveness as a pressure group is far from reality (Talbot, 2003). Moreover, the share 
of Pakhtuns and Muhajirs in State bureaucracy and military along with Punjabis is also 
substantial and leads others to conclude that  they have been benefiting at the cost of 
Baluchis and Sindhis. Some (Binder, 1986; Zaidi, 1992; Khan. A, 2005a; Ahmed, 1999) 
refer to the interplay of elite politics and ethnicity. They believe that the Punjabi feudal 
class, entrepreneurs and bureaucracy are in alliance with Muhajir and Pakhtun 
entrepreneurs and bureaucracy to share the benefits of development in Pakistan. The 
interests of the Pakhtun elite are associated with the status quo and perhaps that of the 
larger Pakhtun population, which is deprived of any benefits, with a change in the 
power equation. Whatever is the reported status of the dominance and benefits of ethnic 
groups, local perceptions varies in Pakistani provinces. 
 Veerkaik has reported that Muhajirs in Hyderabad believe that State is taken 
over by Sindhis and Punjabis (2004; 178-179). Similar sentiments were expressed by 
my informants in Malakand. They were articulate of Punjabi influence on the State and 
the extent of the power they hold to dominate others. This resentment is reflected 
through a range of printed magazines, journals and websites distributed in vernacular by 
the Pakhtuns in Pakistan and those living as Diaspora in Europe and Americas. The elite 
interests perspective informs us about the dominance of the Punjabi and Mohajir elite 
(Alavi, 1989; Samad, 2007). Nevertheless the discourse in Malakand seldom relate 
manipulation of Khanan to usurpation with Punjabis. In the very strong sense the 
dominant ethnic group (Punjabis) are associated with usurpation in inter-ethnic 
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discourse. Like Muhajirs in Sindh (Verkaaik, 1994: 37), despite a substantial share in 
the the army, Pakhtuns in Malakand considered e army to be a Punjabi army.
 Recently  the most striking phenomenon in which the inter ethnic idiom is 
expressed is the current unrest in the region. Local perception of this unrest in Malakand 
and the general Pakhtun intellectuals is of ‘othering’ of the Pakhtuns. Such process they 
believe comprehensively  involve the region, they increasingly personify, to be a 
periphery of the State and association of violence with their ethnic group through a 
discourse in media.     
 If the Pakhtun intellectuals, journalists and nationalist think-tank was assertive 
of a hidden hand within the State institutions, particularly  the military, in being 
consciously  oblivious to the growing influence of Taliban in the region, popular 
perception in Malakand is shrouded in doubts about the  subversive elements.141 Even 
though the literary circles in Malakand were articulate of the State’s designs and foreign 
policy enacted through its support to subversive elements in the region, the popular 
expressions were of doubts and suspicion. The military  is broadly perceived to be an 
institution dominated by Punjabis and therefore, the threat of the current unrest  would 
be ignored unless it threatens Punjab. This perception can be related to the military’s 
strategic thinking which considers Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and other minority provinces 
as ‘invasion routes’ and Punjab as the ‘core area’ for its population, economic strength, 
political authority etc (Cohen, 1998:45). Moreover, the leadership of the major political 
party  from Punjab PML (N), is accused of an ambiguous stand on the issue of dealing 
with Taliban. The leadership only  went public in support of action against the Taliban 
when they came very close to Punjab and Islamabad. The English daily Dawn, in an 
editorial with the meaningful title “Too Little, Too Late” reported the leader of PML (N) 
Mian Nawaz Sharif as saying, “Taliban are now threatening to get out of Swat...so we 
have to avoid the situation” (Dawn, 2009). Reinforcing this behavior a senior police 
officer in Punjab was reported in The New York Times (Tavernise et all, 2009) as 
saying, “If you want to destabilize Pakistan, destabilize Punjab”.  
 Another potential areas of collision between Pakhtuns and other ethnic groups is 
the current discourse on violence. It is this discourse that has generated response from 
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141  Questions are being raised from Pakhtun forums like Pakhtun Peace Forum Canada and in Pakhto 
magazines such as Leekwaal and Pakhtun, that State has been in the hand of elite from Punjab which is 
having ‘imperial’ intensions
Pakhtun intellectuals and nationalist  leaders alike to defend their position. However, in 
Malakand I also observed this discourse being the most expressive, charged and shaping 
the national argument. It was this discourse that provided the context for explaining the 
belonging of Pakhtun to Pakistani State, their grievances against State and pride in their 
own cultural and historical myths.   
 Recently  the discourse in national and international media construct the image of 
Pakhtun in the image of the Taliban or vice versa. Locating the trouble in the North west 
of the country consolidates impressions and perception of people in general that 
terrorism, violence or militancy  is the exclusive domain of Pakhtuns.142A single violent 
incident in the country can trigger a debate about the appearances of the perpetrator and 
their probable Pakhtun credentials.143 Similarly  in a featured article ‘A Pathan runs into 
a building...’ in the English Daily  Dawn, Huma Yusuf disclosed the fear associated with 
Pakhtuns in Karachi. She narrated a story  of people’s ordeal in a local market when a 
Pakhtun tailor from a nearby building ran into a market to hide after small quarrel was 
taken as a suicide bomber. She asked her friend for the reason of panic and was replied 
that, “I don’t know, I imagine a Pathan running into a building would scare a lot of 
people nowadays” (Yusuf, 2009). These kinds of perceptions are part of shocking 
experience for Pakhtuns  who have to cope with the situation. A Pakhtun based in 
London described his ordeal after visiting Pakistan recently. He found out that in non 
Pakhtun region of Pakistan the image of Pakhtun was of a “trigger happy terrorist” 
who knows nothing but violence. Some even suggested him that Pakhtuns must join 
Afghanistan because they have nothing common with the rest of the people (Khan, 
2008).144 
 Interestingly  where historical myths and symbols shape Pakhtun pride, the 
discourse attacks those myths and symbols in ‘otherization’ process. Pakhtuns are 
stereotyped by revisiting Colonial accounts, such as Winston Churchill (1898), and 
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142  This argument is based on my interviews with academic staff at the Department of Political science, 
University of Peshawar, Pakistan.  
143  Marriam Abu Zahab (2009) recently in a conference expressed her surprise on the report in media 
about the appearances of the bomber. I also witnessed the same kind of analysis on a private news 
channels commenting on the armed attack on Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore that the attackers were 
wearing shalwar Qami. The traditional dress wore generally in Pakistan but particularly in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. Later it was discovered that the attack was planned and executed by a so called 
“Punjabi Taliban” (cf. Hussain, 2008; Tavernise et all, 2009)
144 My own discussion with Punjabi colleagues in York endorsed the same sort of impression of Pakhtuns 
in Punjab.
construct Pakhtuns as ‘savage’ and ‘uncivilized’ and crazy  enough to attack the 
civilized. 
Tribes of the Afghan border consider killing and destruction fun. They have 
their own traditions and morals. They justify  cruelty  and violence through 
revenge... If one does the psychoanalysis of these people one will find that 
barbarity and violence is in their genes... Unlimited poverty, unlimited 
ignorance and above that violent mind. Through arms they want to harm the 
honour and wealth of the men and women of Punjab (keep in mind suicide 
bombs) and then go on to conquer (in the name of Islam) the sub continent and 
wherever they can reach (Naqvi, 2009).145  
  
Although the bravery and toughness of Pakhtuns is often praised by Muhajirs (Verkaaik, 
2004: 178) and Punjabis (Ahmed, 2004), their favorable image has utility  to serve other 
ethnic groups.146  Nevertheless, this may be broadly disagreed as the discourse also 
identifies Pakhtuns with Taliban and Deobandi sect of Islam.147 Such identification and 
their threat to challenge the very existence of State makes Pakhtuns ‘them’. Often the 
discourse may  be expressed in comparative terms. It  postulates that  Punjab is largely 
Barelvi and ‘moderate’ in its religious expression and that the influence of Deobandism 
is spreading in Punjab through the charisma of Pakhtuns.
Afghan war changed the Punjabi character. It happened through the charisma 
of the Pakhtun warrior and the spread of the spiritual side of the Pakhtuns; the 
Deobandi faith (Ahmed, 2004: 266).148 
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145 My translation from originally Urdu text.
146  A Pakhtun lecturer based in Islamabad told me in Peshawar that his daughter was once told by her 
teacher that Pakhtuns are very brave because they save ‘us’ from Taliban. 
147 Deobandi and Barelvi sects are 19th century reform movements in South Asia. The ideologues of these 
two sects are often in contest over the definitions and interpretation of Islam. Moreover, Deobandi sect is 
often associated with militant Islam. 
148 The writer saw the influence of Pakhtuns in shaping them. First he identifies ‘them’ and then reports 
their influence on ‘us’. He also believes that this has resulted in Pakhtunization of Punjab.
 Stereotyping and labeling is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan.149 However, currently, 
the religious violence in the Pakistan and Afghanistan has focused attention on Pakhtun 
culture and relation to Islam (see chapter 8). The Pakhtun nationalists intellectuals, 
politicians and activists have responded to these stereotyping by  asserting the non 
violent traditions of Pakhtun society and the primacy of culture over religion (see 
chapter 8). There is also an enormous efforts going on globally  to understand the region 
and Pakhtuns.
 However, taking insights from Samad (2007) and Jalal (1995b) I argue that  the 
current discourse of violence manifest ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorization. The official 
perspective may be different but the broader spectrum of this categorization process 
may engulf the entire ethnic groups. Perhaps that could be a paramount development if 
taken its full course as it may lead to ethnic polarization in Pakistan. However, such 
outcome is far from happening as Mullick and Hraba (2001) demonstrated that Punjabi 
students (the majority group) have shown greater willingness to share their social space 
with Pakhtuns than with any other ethnic group. Although the study is useful to 
demonstrate ethnic attitudes of the students in Punjab, the study uses data collected in 
1996 when Pakhtuns were not highlighted by the Islamic insurgency in their region. My 
own observation in Malakand in particular and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in general was of 
increasing concern among Pakhtuns over their ‘otherization’ by other ethnic groups 
particularly Punjabis and Muhajirs. Moreover, it has influenced the discourse on sense 
of belonging to Pakistan. My interviewee in Thana, Kamran Asif (2008) emotionally 
argued that the advertisement of Literacy programme of the Punjab government known 
as Parha Likha Punjab (Educated Punjab) has ‘seriously hurt every educated 
Pashtun’.150Instead of creating awareness, it symbolized that education is the exclusive 
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149  The provincial information minister from nationalist ANP Sardar Hussain Babrak raised the issue of 
stereotyping and images being constructed through official TV channels with the interior ministry. “The 
PTV dramas represent Pashtuns as uneducated and uncultured domestic servants speaking Urdu in a 
distorted way. Pashtuns consider this type of stereotyping an insult to them” (Daily Times, 2008).
150  Parha Likha Punjab, officially called the Punjab Education Sector Reforms Programme (PESRP) was 
a literacy programme of the government of Punjab. Launched in 2003 it was partially funded by the 
World Bank. It spent Rs 150 million from the total budget of Rs 7 billion on advertisement awareness 
campaign (Khan, 2007). This programme was scrapped by the new Punjab government in April,  2008 
(The News 07 April, 2008) and its efficacy exposed (Hanif, 2008). 
domain of Punjabis. He asserted, Why will your son get education, when mine is 
deprived. You have made terrorist out of me.151 
      
Another interviewee in Thana, Fida Anwar (2008), seconded Kamran Asif (2008) by 
asserting, 
We are peaceful people; but we are always deceived in the name of Islam. I 
ask, why are we targeted? What is our sin? Is our Muslimness a cause of our 
miseries? I remind you we have done greater things for Pakistan and for the 
world at large. 
The discourse of sacrifice:
It is fair to say that nationalism is often conceptualized as a form of sacrifice in 
Pakistan (Verkaaik, 2004: 50). 
Verkaaik has explained how Muhajirs in Sindh has been imagining nation in migration 
and ‘homeland’. He argues that the nationalism discourse among Muhajirs includes 
reference to their migration and the graves of ancestors. Migration itself is related to 
Islamic event of Hijra.152Muhajirs have been emphasizing their sacrifices and would 
insist that they sacrificed for Pakistan not the Sindhis (Verkaaik, 2004: chapter 1). In 
response to Muhajirs, Punjabis have also developed their own discourse of sacrifice in 
the migration and have put forth claims that almost 5 million (out of total 7-9 million 
refugees) people from East Punjab sacrificed their lives for Pakistan (Shaikh, 2009: 
50-51). They also emphatically find loss of Punjabi identity to adopt Pakistani identity 
an aspect of their sacrifice for the State (Jalal, 1995b:84).  
 Jalal finds a counter narration to State narration in regional expression of 
sacrifices and argues that such counter narration has its own ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
categorization. She refers to the nationalist leader of Pakhtuns Wali Khan’s assertions 
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151  Such rhetoric is not uncommon. Asfandyar Wali Khan the leader of ANP (nationalist party of 
Pakhtuns) in his speech on the floor of the parliament requested the newly elected prime minister ( in 
2008) in these words, ‘for God’s sake, do not give my child a gun, give him a pen, do not give him bullets, 
give him books; and I request you (with my hands folded) Do not give him a suicide jacket give him 
school uniform’ (Khan, 2010).  
152 The migration of Prophet Muhammad from his home town Makkah to the city of Madina in 622 AD
that Khudai Khidmatgar (Pakhtun nationalists) sacrificed in colonial India and that 
Muslim League deceived those who in real sense sacrificed for Muslim cause i.e 
Muslims in North India (1995b: 84-85).153 
 Farzana Shaikh terms it struggle for political belonging and to establish ‘alpha 
citizen’ of the country. Shaikh (2009) and Verkaaik (2004) argues that  there is struggle 
on the part of the those who identify themselves with the geographical region that 
constitutes Pakistan i.e the ‘sons of soil’ and those, being termed ‘rootless 
phenomenon’, identify with the idea of Muslim nation.154 
 However, like Muhajirs and Punjabis Pakhtuns have begun to construct a 
powerful argument predicated on sacrifice for the State and nation. In this argument 
these sacrifices endorses their ethnic pride and seek to impress the State that their 
contribution must be recognized. Rittenberg builds a case of Pakhtun ethnic pride on the 
following grounds. Pakhtuns have been the conquerors who have exclusive possession 
of lands in the region they inhabit. They  have their own linguistic and literary traditions 
and characteristics customs. Moreover, they consider themselves ‘heirs to a unique 
historical past, one in which they were often pitted against the rest of India’. Therefore 
Rittenburg concluded that all these elements combine to give Pakhtuns a distinctive 
identity, with a strong sense of pride. He adds, ‘hand in hand with this has gone an 
ethnic chauvinism reflected to their feelings of cultural superiority and their prejudices 
against non-Pakhtuns’ (Rittenberg, 1977: 69). 
 History has been constructed in Pakistan to satisfy the ideological needs of the 
State (Jalal, 1995b: 77). Pakhtuns see in the official historiography a missing reference 
not only to past  Muslim rulers but to their Pakhtunness. In this manner unlike the 
construction of rulers by the official text as Muslims with a dominant heritage, Pakhtuns 
perceive them in ethnic terms no matter how mythical the ethnic affiliation of these 
rulers are.155This subjective sense of glorious history no matter how mythical it be, is 
overwhelming and often in narrations constitute a dominant theme of discourse on the 
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153 For Wali Khan’s perspective on colonial India and creation of Pakistan see Khan (2006). 
154The term ‘rootless phenomenon’ was used by Benazir Bhutto (the former Prime Minister of Pakistan) 
for the Muhajirs (Verkaaik, 2004: 41).
155  Concerning some Turko-Afghan dynasties ruling India since 12th century, a respondent,  when asked 
how one can establish the ethnic credentials of these dynasties,  responded that,  ‘if these rulers came from 
Afghanistan they must have been Pakhtuns’ (Khatir, interview, 2008). However,  due to extensive 
references to Mughals and Pakhtun encounters in classic Pakhto literature (16th century), Mughal are 
always considered non-Pakhtun.  
politics of South Asia and Pakistan. Moreover, the post independence sacrifices of 
Pakhtuns are on various occasions alluded in order to stress their contribution to the 
making of State. Such discourse of sacrifice is not to delineate but to claim political 
belonging to Pakistan. 
 On numerous occasions respondents alluded to the Kashmir war of 1948 and the 
bravery  demonstrated in wars with India.156  Moreover, the martyrs of the war were 
praised for having sacrificed their lives for the sake of Muslims and Pakistan. Therefore, 
the previous historical pride in being pitted against India (Rittenberg, 1977: 69) is 
further transformed into and related with current pride in sacrifice for Pakistan in 
Kashmir and elsewhere. Similarly, reference is made to the current violence in the 
region and the killing of innocent people for the sake of a war that is too dubious to 
interpret. However, the educated being aware of the situation through media have been 
critical of the State for having participated in the violence. 
 Pakhtun through the discourse of sacrifice not only express their belonging to 
Pakistan but also rework the ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorization. They see Punjabis as 
usurpers who have been exaggerating their sacrifices and ignoring their sacrifices of 
Pakhtuns. Moreover, Pakhtun sacrifices for Pakistan perceived to be consistent  and not 
time bounded. Through such discourse Pakhtuns in Malakand build a dynamic sense of 
belonging to Pakistan. The sense of belonging is set in the discourse of sacrifice that 
includes ethnic pride as well as emphasis on belonging to the State of Pakistan. 
Therefore the proud and vainglorious Pakhtun in Malakand maneuver multiple 
identities by coalescing Pakhtunness and Pakistaniat.    
‘Pakistan has yet to become a nation’: Diversity in belonging
 The persistent ‘conundrum of consensus’ embedded in argument that ‘Pakistan 
meant different things to different people’ (Shaikh, 2009) refers to a deep  rooted and 
long lasting dilemma that is consequential for the future of Pakistan. Shafqat (2007) and 
Verkaaik (2007) on other hand postulated a productive process of nation formation in 
Pakistan that has not yet culminated. Earlier, Jalibi (1996) casted doubts on the nation 
formation process by arguing, “here in Pakistan complaints are not against individuals, 
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156  Ahmed has stated that often in tribal jirgas in Mohmand Agency loyalty to Pakistan is expressed by 
referring to Jihad in Kashmir (1984: 314). 
classes or systems of ideas, but against Pakistan itself, which means that Pakistan has 
yet to become part of our spiritual experience” (Jalibi, 1996: 53).157
Jalibi suggested a nation makig predicated on national culture, which continues to be 
inconspicuous in Pakistan. Such national culture should allow regional cultures and 
languages but  remain dominant. National culture, being shaped by glorious Islamic 
heritage and values peculiar to subcontinent, should also reflect regional cultures 
(1996:8-70). Saeed Shafqat argues on the same grounds when he draws on ‘concentric 
circles’ constituting Pakistani national identity, the inner core being the Islamic values 
(2007:xxiii).
 I take insights from Shafqat’s recent work (2007) on Pakistani nationalism, 
which he calls Pakistaniat. He finds it an incessant process, that is informed by Muslim 
history and heritage and embedded in territorial or geographical realities. He suggests 
that there currently  exists a synergy in Islam, ethnicity  and territoriality, which was 
previously  characterized by ambiguity in prioritization of one over the other. However, 
through this interplay and the process of emerging national identity, multiplicity of 
identities and diversity is accommodated within the Pakistani nationhood. Corollary of 
the process is shaping of ‘multilayered’ and ‘multifaceted’ national identity. Therefore, 
national identity  includes the core identity  of Islamic values, followed by ethnic or folk 
cultural identity and finally  by territoriality, common heritage and national history. 
There is also a symbolic fourth layer of identity that is Ummah or Muslim brotherhood 
(Shafqat, 2007).  
Clearly multiple identities are a part of the larger Pakistani nationhood; they 
operate, struggle and grow within its bonds. Cogent Pakistaniat is in the 
process of evolving and Pakistanis are learning to respect and celebrate 
diversity (Shafqat, 2007: xxiii). 
 
In Malakand people would identify  with the State of Pakistan. The influence of State 
presence in the region on the lives of the people is increasing. Political reforms 
introduced in the 1970s generated a political process that increases the State’s presence 
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157  Currently in essentialist tone Javid Iqbal argued that Pakistani nationality is founded on Islam and 
‘common spiritual aspiration’ rather than commonness of race, language and territory (2003: 5). 
which was weak previously. No matter how great people’s complaints about the 
inefficiency of the State institutions, State has been increasingly intruding in people’s 
lives. Political activities such as voting, protesting or supporting State activities and 
joining government  services are considered part  of recognizing the State and shaping 
sense of belonging to the State. Perhaps that was the reason I could not compile 
substantial information on irredentist sentiments among the people despite the fact that 
complaints about the State are substantial. Moreover, I will argue below that Pakhtuns 
have not yet reconciled with the idea that the Pakistani nation exists in objective form. 
Rather pragmatically they assert that Pakistan is yet to become a nation. 
  What I conceded here is that there is a generation of Pakistanis which is raised 
by the very experience of Pakistan. Such experience imagines this country 
geographically limited, politically sovereign, ethnically diverse and ideologically 
Islamic. Moreover, the experience is post independence and is bounded by time and 
space where ethnic realities are glaring; pre independence exploitation by  ‘Hindus’ or 
‘Indians’ does not constitute a significant part of popular memories. More significantly 
Punjabi dominance is prominent in this experience and perhaps integration with the 
national sphere has created these conditions. However, it is always accompanied by the 
perceived reality  that  Pakistan is not yet a nation. The nation making project is believed 
to be unfinished and contribution is most sought. Contribution in terms of struggle for 
recognition of diversity. In my fieldwork I received a reply which is self explanatory. 
Kamran Asif (2008) referring to elite dominating the State said, ‘you accept me first, sit 
with me to discuss what i want’, Fida Anwar (2008) added, ‘we have accepted Pakistan 
but we are not accepted as Pakistanis’. Therefore I argue that informed by the 
experience, a peculiar understanding of Pakistan is evolving among Pakhtuns which 
shapes a context in which the identification as Pakistani can be explained.158 
  Oddly enough, for Pakhtuns assimilation in the larger ‘us’ is conditioned by 
their understanding of Pakistan as a diverse nation in making. Assimilation means 
destruction of their personality and such personality is well preserved in their own 
province where there is minimum threat from any other ethnic group. Within this 
invulnerability, a sense of confidence (cf. Jalal, 1995a) is boosted which feeds into their 
understanding of Pakistan. 
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158  Pakhtun understanding may be limited by diverse experiences in the different Pakhtun regions.  The 
understanding is widespread in settled as well as Tribal Areas.
 My analysis in this chapter and the next would discredit  the assumption that 
Pakhtuns have been insisting on peculiar form of religion and conflate it  with ethno-
nationalism (Weiss, 1999; Behuria, 2005; Harrison, 1992). Also, I disagree with the 
argument that Pakhtun like other ethnic groups demonstrate shifting of contest from 
ethnic to religious domain and thus enact ‘ethnicization of Islam’ (Verkaaik, 2007). 
Moreover, I do not attempt to evaluate the success of State efforts to carve national 
identity  based in Islam. I rather argue that evidence from Malakand demonstrate that 
Pakhtuns continue to see their ethnic identity  as a primary identity but relate it with a 
sense of Pakistaniat that appreciates ethnic diversity and Muslimness simultaneously. 
 The literature on Pakistani nationalism has demonstrated that the dominant elite 
of the State has adopted assimilation approach to nationalism in which no regional self 
could be accommodated and a nation based in communal discourse of Muslims of 
former India being one nation against  the Hindus being other (Jalal, 1995b, Samad, 
2007, Shaikh, 2009). Although Shafqat (2007) insists on the evolving sense of 
Pakistaniat, he does not elaborate on whether such process is supported by elites 
controlling the State. However, I argue that Pakhtuns may not appreciate any discourse 
that downplay ethnic diversity and recognize nation based in Islam alone. 
 Islam is often seen in Pakistan as integrating force transcending differences 
rather than a fragmenting one (Verkaaik, 2004:3). However, Verkaaik argues that 
ethnicity and religions intermingled and that ethnic boundaries coincide with varying 
religious traditions practiced by ethnic groups in Pakistan (2004: 3). I disagree with the 
argument to an extent that such intermingling discredit ethnic identification predicated 
on cultural and linguistic differences. Although Islam is a constituent part of ethnic 
identity  borne by  Pakhtuns, the arena of contest based in the meaning of Islam has been 
unwarranted in Malakand.  
 I concede Shaikh’s argument that lack of consensus on the meaning of Islam is 
central to Pakistan’s identity dilemma and that less depends on achieving consensus and 
more on the nature of such consensus accommodating regional and ethnic expressions 
(2009: 13). Pakhtun reluctance to indulge in any kind of contestation on Islam and 
nationalism, as opposed to the argument of Verkaaik (2007), endorse my  argument that 
Pakhtuns would insist on diversity in ethnic domain and see Muslimness as an attached 
identity. However, I could not observe problematizing Muslimness in Malakand. For 
Muslimness remains embedded in the non sectarian belief and rituals (see chapter 8). 
176
Moreover, the argument of Islamism being adopted and projected through identification 
by Pakhtuns is refuted below (chapter 8).  
Conclusion 
I illustrated that Pakistan is a nation in making, and the dilemma for Pakhtuns is to 
balance their own ethnic pride with that of Pakistani identity. To have a national identity 
that accommodates ethnic expressions is at the center of the Pakhtun paradox of 
belonging to Pakistan. Reiterating  Pakhtun identity brings Pakhtuns in direct clash with 
those (ruling elites) who are inclined to define Pakistan as only an Islamic nation carved 
out of the Muslims of South Asia. Pakhtun intimacy with Pakhtun culture and identity 
require them to adjust with the national identity that  has yet to be agreed upon. Elite 
emphasis on non ethnic Islamic identity  would maximize the dilemma for Pakhtuns, for 
it would exasperate the paradox and force them to make a hard choice between their 
pride in ethnic affiliation and assimilation in nation predicated on Islam alone. 
 I demonstrated that Pakhtunness retains primary significance for Pakhtuns in 
Malakand, despite internal contest on the definition of Pakhtun. However, that does not 
make identification an exclusive domain of ethnic identity, rather in a pragmatic way 
Pakhtuns relate their ethnic and national (Pakistani) identities, which generates multiple 
senses of belonging. Through successive integration in the State of Pakistan and 
attachment to personification of the region that is located within the boundaries of 
Pakistan, Pakhtuns facilitate their belonging to Pakistan. Moreover, they discursively 
demonstrate their relation with a multi ethnic Islamic Pakistan. The Islamic aspect of 
Pakistani identity is neither contested nor seen as primary to belonging to the State.  
 Pakhtun’s relation with the Muslimness aspect of Pakistani identity  cannot be 
denied despite the fact that currently  a discourse is shaping among the nationalist 
intellectuals and political elite to delineate Pakhtun culture from Islam (chapter 8). 
However, conspicuously Pakhtun cannot accommodate the idea of belonging to nation 
that recognizes Islamic or Muslimness of Pakistanis and frustrates ethnic as sense of 
belonging. For them Pakistaniat is necessarily in the ethnic diversity and Muslimness. 
Therefore, what I seek to establish in the central argument of the thesis is that, for 
Pakhtuns these three senses of belonging have to coalesce. I have illustrated how 
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despite contest over Pakhtunness, ethnic identity remains primary and also related to the 
discourse on Pakistaniat. In the next chapter I will argue about the Muslimness of 
Pakhtuns and suggest how transformation in religious rituals have not translated into 




Religion is central to ethnic and national identification in Pakistan. It is also a 
significant aspect of Pakhtun identity and continues to be so despite religious change. In 
a peculiar understanding of religion as an institution concerned with performance of 
rituals, Pakhtuns see religious change as non sectarian and manifested in changing 
performance of certain rituals. The relationship between the central constituents of 
Pakhtun identity  such as Islam and Pakhtunwali is brought into question by a recent 
discourse. The discourse, being the product of current radicalized environment in the 
region, highlights two opposing positions of Islamists and ethno-nationalists. Moreover, 
the militant religious elements (such as Taliban) are perceived exclusive to ‘us’ 
category, despite the constructed concomitance and inclusivity  of Pakhtuns and Islamic 
militants and the consequent stereotyping in Pakistan.159  Contested State nationalism 
has repercussion for Pakhtuns, which is reflected in the growing crisis in the region and 
makes a dominant theme for ethno-nationalist discourse.
  Centrality of religion to Pakhtun identity is well explored in the literature 
(Barth, 1959b; 1969, Ahmed, 1980; Shah, 1999; Rittenberg, 1988; White, 2008a) and 
their association with particular sect of Islam is although alluded to but less vigorously 
investigated. The need to do so is currently signified by studies which refer to complex 
relationship  between ethnicity and Islam in Pakistan (Verkaaik, 2004: 2007: Shaikh, 
2009). I take up  this very theme and reflect on how, currently, Pakhtun identify with 
Islam or a particular sect of Islam. Most of the discussions and conclusions in this 
chapter are based on external interpretation of Pakhtuns’ religious identity and Pakhtuns 
comprehension of their religious life in response to such interpretation. Therefore, the 
analysis of the nature of religious change or reformation is limited to such discussion. 
Such a limited assessment is partly caused by the people’s silences in time of political 
unrest and partly my own limitation in observing people as active participants in those 
difficult times.
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159 ‘us’ category means Pakhtun including Khanan and Ghariban. 
 Looking into some of the literature raising concerns about Pakhtuns, being part 
of religious contestation and leading sectarian change in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2004), I 
posit that Pakhtuns don’t identify with any sectarian movement or their ideology, 
despite being influenced by such movements. Rituals and beliefs propagated by such 
movements are internalized but sectarian rhetoric and ideology  are rejected, as for them 
religion is the experience of spirituality through performance of rituals. The contest over 
religious text or interpretation of the text is meaningless for intellectual debate is not 
central to their religious experience160. Such contestation may  remain limited to 
religious elite and has been less relevant to general masses. Religious obligation of 
correcting others’ practices and spreading a universal sectarian ideology is superfluous 
as the comprehension of sect is limited and the belief in ‘simple’ Islam is deep rooted. 
Therefore, association with and pride in sectarian mission and drawing power from the 
repertoire of sectarian symbols is unwarranted in Malakand. 
 Boundaries are drawn between ‘us’ and other ethnic communities in the country. 
However, such boundaries are not sectarian in their character. Pakhtuns differentiate 
between the Muslimness of Pakhtuns and the Muslimness of Punjabi or Sindhi. Such 
boundaries are based in performance of religious rituals rather then on sectarian beliefs. 
They  perceive others to be poor Muslims because they do not practice religion the way 
they  do. Moreover, they would hardly identify  themselves as Deobandis or Barelvis but 
would most certainly and vividly  identify themselves as Sunni Muslims.  Although my 
focus remains on the Pakhtun identification I also provide a Pakhtuns’ perspective on 
the current religious stir in the region and the external interpretation in the literature. 
The first section of the chapter reflects on the Islamic contestation in Pakistan. The 
second section elaborates on the interplay of State nationalism and Islam. It also 
illustrates the interplay of Pakhtun ethnicity  and Islam in the context of State 
nationalism. In the next  section I will focus on the convergence and divergence of Islam 
and Pakhtunwali. Finally I will elaborate on the religious identification in Malakand. 
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160 a recent study on the Chatrali community in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reveals that intellectual debate and 
reflection on being Muslim are part of village life (Marsden, 2005).  
7.1: Islamic contestations in Pakistan
Islam is a contested domain in Pakistan. By  contestation I mean the ‘debates and 
multiple dialogues with Islamic text and symbols undertaken by  individuals or groups’ 
among Muslim (Metcalf, 2004: 3). Such contestation as presented here are reflected 
through various schools of thought and their transformation with time. The focus in this 
section is on Sunni Islam in Pakistan and analysis presented here based on the literature 
produced on (Sunni) religious traditions in South Asia.  
Religious traditions in South Asia:  
 Pakhtuns are often identified with Deobandi school of thought (Ahmed, 2004: 
Jalal, 2009).161  Deobandis are the adherents of reformist  movements of India (1867) 
named after Deoband, a religious academy near Delhi. The academy or Madrasa itself 
was an innovation for its was the first non governmental and formally  organized 
religious institution in South Asia (Metcalf, 2004: 51). Deobandis distinguished 
themselves for “diffusion of scripturalist practices and the cultivation of an inner 
spiritual life” (Metcalf, 2004: 51). Their ideological opponents, Barelvis are the 
traditionalists who venerate saints and the Prophet. Barelvis emerged in 1880 in 
response to Deobandi school and “have developed a more popular Islam” (Zahab and 
Roy, 2004: 21) that was ‘open to customary practices’ (Metcalf, 2004: 210). Therefore, 
viewed by other sectarian groups such as Wahabis, “as having deviated from the true 
faith” (Zahab and Roy, 2004: 21). However, Deobandi and Barelvis are united in 
following the traditions of Islamic Jurist  Imam Abu Hanifa, but strongly oppose each 
other on some theological issues including the issue of saint worship.162 
 Wahabis are the reformists emerging in Arabian peninsula in 18th century under 
the leadership of Wahab Najdi and have strongly opposed Shiasm and Sufism. Ahl-i-
Hadith are a 19th century reformists who distinguished themselves from Deobandis by 
its “refusal to accept theological and philosophical thinking which has accrued in the 
course of Muslim history” (Zahab and Roy, 2004: 20). They insist  that Quran and 
181
161 A Taliban “ambassador at large” is reported in Barbara Metcalf claiming that, “ every Afghan is a 
Deobandi” (2004: 265).
162  Imam Abu Hanifa was the founder of the Sunni Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. The others 
schools of thought in Sunni Islam are Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi.
Hadiths (the traditions of the prophet) should be consulted directly by the learned 
instead of following the rulings and commentaries of various schools of jurisprudence 
(Metaclf, 2004: 58). Therefore they  are not theologically adherents of Hanafi tradition 
to which Deobandi and Barelvi adhere. Ahl-i- Hadith are often categorized by their 
opponents as Wahabis (Zahab and Roy, 2004: 19-21) for their criticism of popular Islam 
in South Asia. However, Ahli Hadith distance themselves from Wahabis due to Wahabi 
adherence to Hanbali school of law and their violent methods (Metcalf, 2004: 59). The 
Wahabi and Ahl -i-hadith ideology in Pakistan is promoted through the organization of 
Dawaa wal Irshad and its radical wing Lashkar-i- Taiba. The Dawa wal Irshad has 
opened a number of schools (rather than madrasa) in Pakistan where English and Arabic 
are taught in addition to Quran and Hadith to promote Wahabi Islam as distinct to 
“popular Pakistani Islam”(Zahab, 2004: 32-33). These labels of Debondi, Barelvi and 
Ahl-i-Hadith define sectarian division among the Sunni Muslims of South Asia and 
Ulema, Madaris, Mosques and a number of political and religious movements have 
labeled with these names (Metcalf, 2004: 270).  
 In Malakand a little known local brand of Deobandism known informally as 
Panjpiri sect  has been significantly active. Punjpir sect was actually  a reform movement 
launched by Maulana Tahir (1918-1987), who was a Yousafzai Pakhtun from a village 
of Panjpir in District Swabi (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). This movement is formally  known 
as Jama’at Ishaat-ut-Tauheed Wa-Sunnah and was founded in 1939. Maulana Tahir was 
educated from a number of Madaris (in India and Saudi Arabia) including the great 
seminary of Deoband. The movement, ironically, focuses on local mullas and ulema 
instead of people; and through them traditional rituals and rites which they termed bida 
(innovation). It censure the rituals of birth and funeral locally (customarily) practiced 
and have also severely  condemned rituals associated with Saint and shrine worship. 
Being the admirers of the Imam Ibni Tamiya and Wahhab Najdi, the Punjpiri thus 
estranged from mainstream Deobandis. However claiming to be the adherents of 
Deobandi tradition they can be assumed to occupy the middle ground between the 
Deobandis and the Wahabis.163 (Jama’at Ishaat-ut-Tauheed Wa-Sunnah, n.d).
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163Although they claim to be “right kind of Deoandis” (Maulana, interview, 2008),  they are also more 
sever than Deobandis on rituals that are associated with saints. Teachers and students at Deoband shared 
sufi bonds and cherished stories about Sufis, however, Deobandis deplored “a range of customary 
celebrations and practices, including what they regarded as excesses at saint’s tombs,  elaborate life cycle 
celebrations, and practices attributed to the influence of Shi’a” (Metcalf, 2004: 270)
 Activities of Panjpiri mullas in Nuristan (Afghanistan) have been much strict 
and overwhelming to the extent that it condemned “every kind of deviation in folklore 
or otherwise” sport activities and cultural expressions such as dancing and music which 
created tension in Nuristan villages (Klimburg, 2001: 383-384). Roy has argued that 
Punjpiri, although has been a branch of Deobandi school of thought, are perceived in 
Afghanistan as Wahabis for their strict, anti Sufi and saint preaching and is a parallel 
organization to JUI inspired organizations. However, they  have joined Taliban recently 
(Roy, n.d). In Malakand, Swat and Bajaur they have considerable influence through 
their madaris. TNSM leader in Batkhela also confirmed his affiliation with this school 
of thought. Most  of the Taliban in Swat and Bajaur are associated with this school of 
thought (Franco, 2009). Besides these religious traditions a religious party with the 
name Jamat Islam was founded by Abul ala Mawdudi in 1941. Jamat Islami has 
emphasized on creation of an Islamic State in Pakistan and, “is perhaps the first 
movement of its kind to develop systematically an Islamic ideology, a modern 
revolutionary  reading of Islam, and an agenda for social action to materialize its 
vision” (Nasr, 2001: 93-94).164  Therefore, the protagonists of this party are termed 
Islamists by Roy (1994). 
 Through a different perspective Olivier Roy (1994) differentiated between 
Islamists, traditionalists and neo-fundamentalists. Metcalf following Olivier Roy’s 
argument differentiated between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘Islamists’. While, ‘Islamists’, 
have built “systematic ideological system and systematically built  models for distinctive 
polities”, “traditionalists” have sought “implementation of the sharia in matters of ritual, 
dress and behavior” and without adhering to the “global political agenda” (2004: 
266-267). Traditionalists (JUI, Tablighis, Taliban and Deobandis in India) lack a 
theoretical stance to political life; they therefore, demonstrated “political adaptability” 
to their environment and have responded to political expediency by either embracing 
the existing political culture or withdraw from it completely  (Metcalf, 2004: 278-279). 
They  have not, necessarily, focussed on an external “other” (West) but on internal foe 
(Metcalf, 2004: 278-279).
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164 Also see Nasr (1994).  
Deobandi Islam and its transformation: 
 The increasing influence of Deobandi Islam in Pakistan can be studied through 
its madaris and its offshoot movements such as Tabligh and Taliban.  Metcalf in her 
pioneering study of Islamic activists groups of Deoband, Tablighis and Taliban, call 
them “Deobandis” and “traditionalists”, which share ‘an overriding emphasis on 
encouraging a range of ritual and personal behavioral practices linked to worship, 
dress, and everyday behavior’ (2004: 266). Such Deobandi institutions and movements 
not only brought religious transformation but also played crucial role in the current 
unrest in the country. Moreover, they  are not only  the cause of the religious change but 
they themselves have changed by the political developments in the region. 
 Taliban are the students of Deobandi madaris established, mostly, in the North 
West of Pakistan since Afghan war (1979).165 They  emerged in 1994 in Afghanistan and 
soon captured most of the country. Zahab and Roy argue that Taliban in Afghanistan 
were at least initially a nationalist force that sought to impose Sharia (only) in the State; 
and had no political revolutionary  anti-imperialist agenda (unlike Iran or Al-Qaida). 
Although it did not share jihadist ideology of Osama bin laden, it grew more anti 
Western and radicalized due to the pressure of events and its increasing association with 
Al-Qaida (Zahab and Roy, 2004: 52-71).166  Their definition of Sharia, was influenced 
by their extremist religious learning, the perversion of Pakhtun code, and its sever 
implementation unprecedented in Afghan culture and tradition (Rashid, 2008: 14). 
Therefore, their support  among the Afghans decreased partly  because of intensely 
ideological nature of both their language and practices, including detribalization and 
attack on customary  law (Zahab and Roy, 2004: 52-71). Moreover, the dialectics 
between Pakhtun identity and ‘neo-fundamentalism’ worked both way by facilitating 
Taliban rise and fall in 2001 (Zahab and Roy, 2004: 70).
 The Tablighi movement, unlike the Taliban, is apolitical and most widespread in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Metcalf, 2004: 280). It is distinct in a sense because it  brought in 
the lay men into the mission, without involving madris167 and its Ulema, of spreading 
‘correct practice” and shaping individual lives (Metcalf 2004:272; Van Dar Veer, 1994: 
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165  Taliban is the plural of Talib which means ‘student’. For the detail account of the rise of Taliban in 
Afghanistan see Rashid (2010).
166 Taliban were in fact not driven by any ideology (Metcalf, 2004: 277).  
167 Of which Taliban are the product. 
129). Moreover, the simplicity  of its message, such as to perform duties what a Muslims 
already know and have to do (Van Der Veer, 1994: 129) and equality in its ranks is 
appealing to Pakhtuns. Tablighi activity has faced enormous criticism for its 
methodology and practices from Barelvis, Ahl-i-Hadith, Jamaat Islami and even from 
some quarters within Deobandi school (Sikand, 2007). However, Barelvis are the most 
ardent critics of the movement for its preaching against rituals at  saints’ shrines (Sikand, 
2007). Tablighi movement not only seek to ‘correcting’ individual religious practice in 
Malakand but also attract diverse range of people. These participants not only vary 
across class and professional lines but also across ideological and sectarian divisions. 
Most of the informants from Jamaat Islami had spent some time in Tabligh and look at it 
favorably, despite Jamaat Islami formal criticism of the movement (Sikand, 2007). 
Therefore it has also blurred some of the boundaries between “traditionalist”/”neo-
fundamentalist” and “Islamists”.  
 The radicalization of Deobandis, Barelvis and Ahl-i-Hadith is a recent 
development (1980s). It was in Afghan war (1979) and Zia’s Islamization (1979-1987) 
that Deobandi, Ahle Hadith, and to some extent  Barlvis, radicalized politically. Zahab 
and Roy call these new radical tendencies “neo-fundamentalism” different from 
“Islamist” fundamentalism carried out by Jamaat Islami in Pakistan (Zahab and Roy, 
2004). The transformation of the madaris as institutions and mullah as agency was the 
crucial part of this radicalization. During Zia’s reign (1979-1987) the quality of 
education in Madaris deteriorated due to the addition of more prominent ideological 
elements necessary for the continuation of Jihad industry, which engendered change in 
the very  shape of the Deobandism in North West of Pakistan (White, 2008a). The 
education system changed from the model centered around a learned alim (scholar) to a 
more “freelance” or “franchise model” which facilitated the proliferation of madaris and 
their radical ideologies (White, 2008a: 31). 
 The role and character of the mulla also changed during this process. While, 
Islamization of Zia benefited high ranking Ulema, the lower level mullas were 
dissatisfied with the Islamization and thus revolted (Nasr, 2000: 150). Being the product 
of theologically “shallow madaris” these mullas had no employment outside of the 
jihadi line of work (White, 2008a: 31-32) and were attracted to militant organizations 
(Nasr, 2000: 150). They had mosques and minbar (pulpit) at their disposal, allowing 
them to use sectarian rhetoric to mobilize people and gain power, status and wealth 
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independent of high ranking learned Ulema (Nasr, 2000: 150). Well versed in rhetoric of 
Afghan war than theology they were more political and jihadist in their outlook and had 
a role model in Afghan Taliban (Nasr, 2000: 151) Madaris also became political 
institutions rather then intellectual institutions of learning (Nasr, 2000: 152). 
 Joshua argues that through the radicalization of Islamic movements in Pakistan, 
Deobandism in Pakistan has been “Pashtunized”. Taliban in Afghanistan are an example 
of such change. They were mostly  from ‘poorly educated, ideological hardened, 
disenfranchised ulema’, and aimed at the ‘spread of conservative Pashtun values than 
with any grand Islamic vision. The Deobandi experience in the frontier had produced 
over time a syncretic form of Sunni Islam, and one in which as a practical matter, 
Pashtunwali trumped traditional Hanafi interpretations” (White, 2008a: 35). 
 Although I agree with some of the above arguments in the literature, particularly 
the argument that these movements are localizing, I hardly find any syncretism between 
Pakhtunwali and any sect or ideology  of Islam. In fact I suggest relevant tension in the 
Pakhtunwali and Islam due to current radicalization. Such tension is the product of 
discourse, at least among the elites, on the compatibility of the two. Syncretism would 
be hard to achieve when the disjunctions and boundaries are sharpened by the discourse. 
Moreover, such debate is at  the base of discrepancies between popular expectation from 
religious reforms and the objectives and aims of the radicalized reform movements. I 
illustrate in details on these themes in the section on Pakhtunwali and Islam. 
 Joshua T. White (2008a) elaborates a new movement known as “neo-Taliban” 
emerging in Frontier region of Pakistan. This new movement has little coherence and 
homogeneity  but share some characteristics. These include, political rejectionist 
(rejection of State) Takfiri (Jihad against fellow Muslims), links with criminal networks, 
co-opting the State at local level, tension with Pakhtun norms (p.85-87). Interestingly, 
differentiation between TNSM and Taliban (particularly those in neighboring Swat) is 
discernible. So much so that the popular leader of TNSM dissociated himself from the 
Taliban. He targeted particularly the Takfiri tendency in neo-Taliban. “How can I fight 
my brother who is a Muslim and not a Hindu or English or any other non Muslim. 
Sharia does not allow us to kill a fellow Muslim” (Maulana, interview, 2008). 
Therefore, we need to see the nature of support to various Deobandi movements in 
Malakand and the contest in which such support is articulated. 
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 The above section elaborated on the Islamic contestations in Pakistan and 
religious radicalization in response to State’s strategies as reported in the exiting 
literature. The following sections comment on the influence of above processes, local 
responses and the shape of religious change in Malakand. 
Support for Sharia and Deobandi movements in Malakand:
  Although the popular support for Sharia in Malakand is significant, its demand is 
put in a context that is determined by ambiguous legal system, weak institutions of the 
State and the compatibility  of cultural and religious laws. Therefore, when Sharia is 
perceived as an alternative to State’s legal and political systems, it is fancied. However, 
when Sharia is seen in the methods and practices of Taliban it is least satisfactory on the 
account of Takfiri methods and non accommodation to Pakhtun values. The political 
rhetoric of the religious movements such as TNSM or Taliban dwell primarily on the 
local dissatisfaction from State institutions and establishment of egalitarian society. This 
kind of support  and the context in which such support is articulated is often ignored in 
constructing stereotypes of Pakhtuns in Pakistan. It is assumed that Sharia or the radical 
religious struggle represents Pakhtun passion which provides an impulse to establish 
Islamic system, in all parts of Pakistan. 
 However, the peculiar understanding of religion among Malakand Pakhtuns 
rarely involves an intellectual effort at popular level to comprehend the working and 
details of Sharia. Nevertheless, the respondents demonstrated a generic understanding 
that distinguished the Sharia of Taliban and the Sharia envisioned as an alternative to 
the weak administrative system. The demand for Islamic law is less for its ideological 
appetite to construct and glorify  an overwhelming Islamic system (as generally 
portrayed in the literature), rather it is a tool that is locally perceived to suggest solution 
to local problems emerging from the weakness of the State.168At least in response to my 
enquiry  about the Taliban style Sharia, Pakhtuns in Malakand contested their Sharia. It 
is also important to mention that they have not lived the Taliban style Sharia as 
Pakhtuns in Swat and other Tribal Areas have, but their response was informed by  their 
interaction with the people of those regions, reports in media and occasional Taliban 
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168 In Bajaur Taliban did exploit inefficiency in the administrative and political setup to articulate popular 
support (Franco, 2009: 6).  
attacks on the private property  and person in Batkhela and Thana.169 To conclude from 
popular response in Malakand, the intensity  of actions and imperviousness to cultural 
values in Taliban methods create resentment and an impression that  Sharia does not 
guarantee the desired good governance (also see White, 2008a: 136).  
 Although the scope of this study is limited and it does not seek to encompass the 
entire dynamic of the popular support or censure of the political movements such as 
TNSM  or Taliban, it attempts (through popular reaction in Malakand) to disapprove a 
simplistic view of the popular support in the literature and in media. Analysis here 
allude to religious reformation in the region but suggest that a comprehension of such a 
change would require further studies considering the entire gamut of religious change in 
Pakhtun region. Only then the complexity and dynamics of religious transformation and 
popular view of the current religious radicalism be grasped.  
 The political situation, media stereotypes and general distress would at times 
make people selective in their responses. However, the general response of the people is 
a mix one that ranges from complete oblivion to open censure. Taliban in Malakand are 
perceived as a discrete force which is detached from the society and use violent means 
to bring in reforms in society. Their activities are limited to correct, not the rituals but, 
social morality. Popular targets, during my stay in Malakand, were shops selling drugs 
and alcohol, gambling and to a less degree adultery. The effect of their activities was 
less felt on reforming social morality, but more on generating a debate about the validity 
of the methods and legitimacy  to alternate State institutions. I could see division of 
opinion in these debates. However, when Taliban are located in larger picture, serious 
doubts are raised about their leadership, their method of imposing Sharia and their 
excesses in form of overstepping tribal customs and killing innocent civilians. In a 
Hujra meeting a group  of elders while exchanging news report of the killing of a 
Taliban commander in Tribal Areas, condemned them by asserting that  he was not the 
commander of Taliban but the commander of Shitanan (meaning ‘Devil’ but rhymes 
with the word Taliban). Similarly, they cursed and censured their way of imposing 
religion and killing Muslims.
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169  There is also an economic reason for this lack of enthusiasm in Batkhela. Local entrepreneurs are 
particularly worried of any unrest in the region.  Strangely some informants revealed that TNSM during 
their blockage of road in 1994 was supported due to hospitality and the risk to market in Batkhela.
 Most of the respondents in Batkhela and Thana agreed that these groups are 
constructed and are easy instruments in the hands of hidden forces170. The excesses of 
the Taliban are not just seen through the word of media but also through the experience 
of violence in the locality. Saif ullah (2008) was shocked and expressed his abhorrence 
for Taliban by seeing the mutilated body of a local resident, killed by Taliban. Such 
local experience is supported by media images of killings in suicide attacks through out 
the region. Therefore, an emerging consensus in Malakand indicates the exclusivity of 
the Taliban.  
Non saliency of sectarian boundaries in Malakand:
 The reformist movements in South Asia sought to reform the social and religious 
life of the Indian Muslims (see above). An important element of reformist movements 
such as Deobandi movement was to reform the performance of certain rituals such as 
visiting and worshiping at  the saints’ shrines, rituals at the occasions of death and birth 
(cf. Metcalf, 2004) and even the performance of religious duties such as daily prayers in 
distinct interpretation (Hanafi-see above) of the primary sources (Quran and the 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) of Islamic Law. Deobandi or Panjpiri movements 
found some of these rituals customary and thus strived to reform them. It is imperative 
to mention here that Islamic duties that are incumbent upon Muslims such as prayers, 
Hajj (pilgrimage to the holy  shrines in S. Arabia), Zakat (alms giving or poor tax), 
Fasting in Ramadan etc are universal and thus unchangeable. It is through the 
performance of these duties that Muslims around the world connect with the larger 
community  or Muslim Ummah. However, the details of performing these duties vary 
due to diverse interpretation of the primary sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Deobandis 
seek to ‘correct’ the performing pattern of these duties among the general public. 
Moreover, there are also rituals that are malleable as they are influenced by  local 
customs and therefore can be subjected to change such as worship at saints’ tombs and 
rituals at the occasions of birth and death.    
 People’s perception of sectarian schools of thought is of reform movements 
seeking change in religious practices and performance of rituals. This perception stems 
from popular believe that religious reforms are about changing the religious practices 
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170 These hidden forces were identified as Pakistani, American or Indian secret agencies. 
rather than propagating ideology or system of believes that encompasses every aspect  of 
life including cultural and social. Such perception is consolidated by  a persistent and 
dominant perception that there is (broader) cultural and social harmony  in Islam and 
Pakhtunwali. Only the religious practices may require reforms because they were less 
rooted in culture and more in the teachings of religious class. The previous religious 
category, has been replaced by the new one which is more learned and has greater 
economic and social autonomy in post hierarchical society.   
 Mullas are locally  believed as the guides of religious practice. They  were 
responsible for any lapses in or ‘correctness’ of religious rituals. Reform movements 
such as Panjpiri movement is recognized through the change of mullas. Mullas, 
formerly, performed rituals without demonstrating ilm (religious knowledge) and were 
associated as clients with clans and Khanan for economic and social reasons. Ahmed 
(1984) reported that Mohmand Pakhtun is also aware of the illiteracy of a mulla, which 
makes him question, “What does he know of Islam? Why should he intercede between 
us and God?”. Moreover, he urged that Pakhtun Islam is ‘uncomplicated’, surface 
reaction to ‘an inherited tradition that is suspicious of dogmas, debates and formalized 
priesthood’ (1984: 326). 
 However, currently mullas in Malakand hail from madrasa, where they  are 
educated in the teaching of a particular sect. In Batkhela, most of the them follow the 
Punjpiri stream of Deobandi sect. Previously mullas are differentiated from the current 
mullas, by  asserting that zare Muliyan neshta (earlier Mullas are gone). Under the 
Panjpiri influence, which particularly targets mullas associated with rituals which they 
consider deviation from true Islam, current mullas (including TNSM leader) are sever 
critics of the previous mullas. The old guards are considered ignorant, greedy, less pious 
and had less autonomy to serve religion and be spiritual guide to the masses. 
 There was, at  least, in earlier stages of reforms, a conflict between the new and 
the old mullas, but the new prevailed for their religious knowledge. Therefore, 
knowledge can rightly  be called the source of autonomy for religious elite. The new 
mullas demonstrate their ilm in mosques. Preaching in the mosques, particularly  before 
Friday prayers, sectarian message is passed on to masses; however, interest in such 
message is limited to demonstration of ilm in manifesting the correctness of rituals 
through the armory of Quran, Hadith and Fiqah (Islamic jurisprudence). Therefore, 
Punjpiri or Deobandi standard of rituals are internalized exclusive of sectarian message. 
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Also it is this internalization that makes them say with utmost clarity that they were 
wrong in doing ‘Pirparasti’ (devotion or worship of religious figures associated with 
shrines such as Pirs), ‘Babaparasti’ (devotion or worship of Sufis and Saints). 
People don’t listen much to mulla in the mosque, they are not interested in his 
sectarian message. They only  attend mosques to pray  (Khalid Khan, interview, 
2008).
 The fact  that there was rarely any sectarian violence in Malakand during my field work 
endorsed the above assertion. Sectarian harmony prevailed despite Deobandi (Punjpiri) 
influences. Activities at a shrine close to the market in Batkhela was referred to with an 
assertion that they keep distance from such activities. Number of visitors to this shrine 
have decreased, however, it  still attracts devotees from different regions including 
Punjab. Mullas in Malakand, unlike other parts of the North West, such as Kurram 
Valley (Nasr, 2000: 151) could not mobilize people on sectarian lines.
 Sectarian boundaries in Malakand are not salient. Most of the informants would 
identify themselves as Sunnis but will not associate with any sub sect of Sunni Islam. 
“People here are genuine (pure) Sunnis” is an expression I heard from different 
sources. They don’t categorize each other as Deobandis or Barelvis. The changing 
religious practices do not imply that one particular sect has dominated through the 
proliferation of its rituals rather the argument refers to insignificant sectarian activity in 
the region for identification is seldom expressed in the sectarian idioms. Moreover, 
religious or sectarian markers does not draw boundaries or consolidate the existing 
boundaries between Khanan and Ghariban. Although, Ghariban do refer to the 
historical attachment of Khanan and their mullas with Sufism, it  does not constitute a 
meaningful boundary. It  is so because Ghariban do refer to their own ancestors being 
attached to Sufi practices and the same allusion is made by  Khanan to their illiterate 
past which they accept with a guilt that they did not know (Ne pwe Du). 
 The argument I am making here contradicts what other researchers have 
reported. Barfield (2005) has pointed out how Afghans, being secured in their religion, 
would hardly take influences from foreign Wahabi elements (p.234). Verkaaik (2007) 
has explained how Sindhi movement formulated a traditional Islam based in mysticism 
and Sufi traditions; and rejected Islamic reforms and Jamaat Islami, for propagating 
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Islam which is foreign to them (p. 91-92). At another place he referred to Ahl hadith 
mosque and associated influence being termed ‘foreign’, ‘Wahbi’, ‘fundamentalist’ and 
‘Taliban’ by the local population in Hyderabad and Karachi171  (2004: 48). However, I 
found Pakhtun of Malakand assertive of religious change in form of change in office of 
mulla and rituals they taught.  
 Ahmed, in his study  of Mohmand Pakhtuns referred to absence of any saint 
worship  or mysticism because, “Islam of the Mohmand is puritanical, not syncretic or 
eclectic” (1984: 318-319). Barfeild on other hand argues that, “the very importance of 
Islam as part of people’s everyday identity paradoxically reduces the power of the 
ulema because most Afghans reject their claim of having a monopoly on defining 
religious orthodoxy to rest of society” (2005: 237). However, the recognition of 
changing religious rituals, knowledge and autonomy of mulla and teaching of religious 
elite through personal example (the case of Maulana) discredit  Barfield’s argument. I 
have argued above that religious influences from reformist movements (Deobandi or 
Panjpiri) are received and absorbed locally through changing the ways they perform 
rituals and religious duties. Religious change is described through the change in the 
agency of Mullah and teaching of religious elite through personal example (the case of 
Maulana), etc. 
  The reason of the religious change are locally perceived, to be numerous; 
growing literacy, growing Panjpiri and Tablighi activity  and Saudi influences. They 
reflect on their own transformation in their conversations and tend to be less historical 
in explaining the causes of the broader religious change. Informants argued that an 
important reason of change was education (both religious and non religious). It was 
through education that they  came to know that their old practices were the rituals of 
‘ignorance’. The common expression in Malakand is, Khalaq wos pwe sho meaning 
“people now know or people have realized”. Hajj or returnees from Middle Eastern 
were also instrumental in transmitting Wahabi rituals and influences. Mir Khan’s (2008) 
return from Hajj made him assert, ‘Asli Mazhab Da Arabo De’ meaning “genuine 
religion is that of Arabs”. Identification with Sunni Islam convey meaning of 
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171 However, reformists, particularly associated with Dawa wal Irshad (associated with Wahabi/Ahl 
Hadith Islamists), active in rural Sindh have been little explored (Zahab and Roy, 2004: 33-34). 
universalism, as Sunni Islam is perceived to be centered in present day Saudi Arabia 
where Pakhtuns perform ritual of life time i.e Hajj.
 Moreover, the penetration of Tablighi influences in people of diverse ages, 
classes and religiosity gives it the upper hand in making the minds of people. Tabligh is 
generally  perceived to be apolitical and eschews sectarian contestations. However, it is 
also perceived to prepare ground for the political support of religious parties such as 
Jamaat Islami (Jameel, interview, 2008). It  is widely believed that Tabligh has been 
influential in reforming individual performance of certain rituals and practices. 
Interesting pattern of religious practice and religious activity is of blurring boundaries 
between ‘neo-fundamentalists’ and Islamists (as proposed by Roy, 1994). Tabligh being 
among the ‘neo-fundamentalist’ category or ‘traditionalist’ category as opposed to 
Jamaat Islami in Islamist category (Metcalf, 2004) can be found across such division. 
Many stanch supporters of Jamaat Islami in Batkhela were Tablighi as well. 
 However, there is broader historical context of this change. Van Der Veer (1994) 
argues that such influences were the part of religious reform movements of 19th and 
20th century South Asia. He explains how Sufi religious practices in South Asia and 
even around the world declined in 19th and 20th century, when the debate about who is 
Muslim was influenced by the reformist movements, who tend to establish orthodox 
Islam in opposition to Sufi worship of tomb and saints. He challenges the assertion that 
such a change brought decline in the social relevance of Sufism due to urbanization, 
education, and emergence of middle class. He argues that although ‘Sufism no more 
define Muslim way of life’, its social relevance did not dissipate. Its decline was due to 
colonial processes of modern communication, which facilitated the spread of reformist 
message and also because in colonial India the debate about religion was linked with the 
debate about religious community. Reformists condemned some of Sufi practices which 
were interpreted in the context of creating Hindu and Muslim communities (p. 58-62). 
Reformist activism in the entire Pakhtun region since 19th century  is recently 
documented (Haroon, 2007). Perhaps that was the reason in Malakand some identified 
education as the reason of less inclination towards sectarianism. People in Malakand 
have been influenced by these reformist activism, as the Jihadi ulema in the region were 
well connected with Deobandi network (Haroon, 2007). I am least concerned with 
tracing these influences and rely more on the popular perception of this change. 
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7.2: State Nationalism, Islam and Pakhtun identity
I have reported above (chapter 7) that the contest on the meaning of Islam and the 
consequent uncertainty in national identity (‘Pakistan meant different things to different 
people’) characterized Pakistan (Shaikh, 2009). Pakistan’s ruling elite has been 
promoting national ideology  based in modernist interpretation of Islam, but at the same 
time in their political interests, have occasionally appealed to the shrines and Sufis 
(Veer, 1994: 63; Shaikh, 2009; Verkaaik, 2004). Such modernist interpretation rejected 
certain practices being considered ‘traditional’, ‘backward’, ‘un-Islamic’ and reminder 
of Hindu or colonial influences, these include, Sufism, Feudalism, and exclusive 
solidarity (caste, ethnic, etc). Sufism and saint worship were considered backward 
mentality or Hindu perversion, feudalism was in contradiction to Islamic ideal of social 
equality  (musawat) and exclusivist solidarity being divisive tendencies and against the 
unity of Muslim community (Verkaaik, 2001). 
 Due to contestation on the meaning and role of Islam, there are two rival 
discourses of Islam in Pakistan such as ‘communal’ and ‘Islamist’; both have been 
engaged in gaining ascendency  in defining Pakistan’s national identity  (Shaikh, 2009). 
The former is of Muslim separatist discourse of power, imagining Pakistan to be a 
shelter for the Muslims of South Asia, and the later is more rooted in radical and 
religious reading of Islam. Where communal discourse is vigorously projected by ruling 
elite in collaboration with military, the Islamist discourse is tailored by religious 
political parties. In Pakistan the earlier government of Ayub Khan had the modernist 
interpretation of Islam  under communal discourse. It  perceived State as a ‘benevolent 
parent’ having responsibility  to discipline and enlighten people through formal 
education and purifying popular Islamic practices which were perceived as ‘Hindu 
perversions’ and ‘innovations’ (Verkaaik, 2004: 24; Shaikh, 2009).  However, under the 
pressure from Islamists Jamaat Islami he had to fall back to traditional Pirs and Sufis for 
their support to counter Islamist influences (Shaikh, 2009: 91). In 1960’s a counter 
discourse, consistent in Muslim nationalism, added regional and ethnic identity to 
Pakistani nationalism. It also emphasized popular and regional Islam based in the 
traditions of Sufism and away  from sharia or modernist version promoted by  the urban 
elite. The discourse emerged within Sindhi nationalist movement (Verkaaik, 2007) and 
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was further endorsed by  Z A Bhutto’s government. “...ethnic or regional identities were 
promoted as intrinsically part of the complex identity of a Pakistani citizen. Whereas a 
Pakistan identity had always had a national and religious component, an ethnic one 
was now added to it” (Verkaaik, 2001: 352). Therefore, the modernist Islamist opposed 
to Sufi and popular Islam created Sindhi ethno nationalist category which identified 
with mystic, Sufi Islam in opposition to modernist reformist Islam of the State. Bhutto’s 
identification with such Islam and the consequent change in State nationalism was in 
context of such processes in Sindh (Verkaaik, 2004). 
  However, Bhutto’s reevaluation of State nationalism has consequences for Urdu 
speaking emigrant population of Sindh who previously identified with State’s modernist 
Islam. They in new circumstances reinvented their ethnicity  and interpretation of Islam 
(Verkaaik, 2004: 2007). MQM  (Mohajir Qaumi Movement), ethno-nationalist  party  of 
these mohajirs, dissociated itself with reformist Islamist ideology  to strategically 
maneuver the diverse forms of Islam in Sindh. During political maneuvering it at times 
associate with Islamist to condemn syncretic, traditionalist tendencies of Sindhis and 
may recognize Sufi and mystic expressions when allied to Sindhis and discredit 
reformists (Verkaaik, 2007: 93-94). 
  The 1980s Islamization of the State and society  is often associated with a ‘new’ 
Islamic ideology of the State (Shaikh, 2009: 101). In the later half of 1980‘s 
‘Islamization’ was replaced by  ‘Shariatization’ of the State (Shaikh, 2009). Zia also 
switched from Islamist Jamat Islami to ‘traditionalist’ Deobandi ulema. These ulema 
were already radicalized and politicized by Afghan Jihad. Therefore, a process of 
Shariatization initiated, during his tenure, which aimed ‘both to question the validity of 
the state and to influence the debate on national identity by redefining Pakistani 
nationalism primarily in terms of its relation to an imagined extra territorial 
‘community of believers’” (Shaikh, 2009: 109). The ulema. under this Shariatization 
process, wanted the imposition of Sharia and ideologically  regarded State as an 
‘artificial construct whose physical boundaries were judged to be transient and 
subversive of presumed universal community of believers (umma)’ (Shaikh, 2009: 
107-109).  
 Moreover, the transformation of Madaris into radicalized, politicized 
autonomous institutions  ‘would radically challenge the state’s right to control policy 
making, interpret Islam, and define the parameters of Pakistani nationalism’ (Shaikh, 
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2009: 112-113). It was certainly, the most challenging and perennial development for 
nationalism in Pakistan. After discussing the evolution of Pakistani nationalism, 
entrenched in Islam, I will focus on the impact of such processes on Pakhtuns in 
following paragraphs. I will seek to relate nation formation with Islam and Pakhtun 
sense of Muslimness. 
 The spiritual or ethical aspect of religious concepts such as Jihad (Jalal, 2008), 
the non political character of Deobandism (Metcalf, 2004) and modernist Islamic 
interpretation of Pakistani nationalism (Shaikh, 2009), have all receded since 1980’s. 
The reasons are multiple but radicalization and politicization of religious institutions 
and religion itself are described as the most  prominent. However, such developments 
are mostly construed as the product of State policy  and international politics, but 
occasionally emphasized to be located in a region that  is seen as the bastion of religion 
i.e. North West of Pakistan172. The logical sequence of such emphasis, even if involves 
stereotypical analysis (Ahmed, 2004), has consequences for the Muslimness of 
Pakhtuns. 
 Zia’s tenure in office (1979-1987) was a break with the past. His consistent 
search for legitimacy in Islam, his involvement in Afghan war and his patronage of 
religious institutions connected with Afghan Jihad had consequences for the Pakhtuns 
with lasting effects. Since then, the religious ‘warrior’, ‘intolerant’ Deobandi (Ahmed, 
2004) image of Pakhtun and his ‘spartan puritanism’ emphasized (Ahmed, 2004).173 
Such stereotypical character sketch is then constructed as a cause of transformation of 
identity, which now includes Jihad along Pakhtunwali as constituent elements 
(Verkaaik, 2007: 98). Moreover, it is also recently reported that such transformation 
could not be limited to Zia’s era, as transnationalism and radical tendencies could be 
traced back to colonial time when the tradition of Jihad was kept  alive in the North West 
of India and transnational Tablighi activity has been significant in the region (Shaikh, 
2009: 110). Such radical tendencies are informed by global Islamism (Verkaaik, 2007) 
or Islamic transnationalism (Shaikh, 2009). Khalid Ahmed (2004) has gone one step 
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172  Recently Sana Haroon’s (2007) book title is, ‘The Frontier of Faith’.  Ayesha Jalal’s would have 
objected to the title as it reads ‘faith’,  which she believes is currently lost in the non ethical, worldly 
endeavor of Jihad in these areas (2008).  
173  Raza and Marufkhail (2009) reported a Pakistani security official saying that ‘with Arab money, the 
Punjabi strategy and the Pashtun muscle, an Islamic caliphate will be revived Inshallah’ (p.59). 
further and has proposed that the Pakhtun intolerance, “cult of disagreement”174, and the 
charisma of ‘Pakhtunized Deobandi warrior’ has powerful influence not only on ‘Arab 
Mujahideen’ but also on ‘tolerant Punjabi’. He argues that sectarianism in ‘traditionally 
tolerant Punjab’ is the consequence of Pakhtun influence (Ahmed, 2004: 266-268). 
Nevertheless, Nasr (2002) and Zahab (2002) have demonstrated how State and regional 
politics of 1980’s was a crucial factor in growing sectarianism in Pakistan. Reading 
from such arguments I find Ahmed (2004) stereotypical analysis too simplistic and thus 
less useful in explaining sectarian radicalism in Pakistan. 
Pakhtun ethnicity and Islam in national context:  
The complexity of the interplay of religion and ethnicity in Pakistan is recently 
investigated by Oscar Verkaaik (2001; 2004; 2007). Earlier, Nasr in his analysis of 
sectarianism in Pakistan has argued that politicization of sectarian division and 
mobilization of communal identities, under the influence of regional politics and State 
intervention, facilitated interface between the two discourses of power i.e Islamism and 
ethnic politics (2002: 86, 109). Verkaaik, arguing on those lines postulated that, 
discursively most evocative and emotionally more sensitive boundaries between ethnic 
groups do not lie in kinship, culture or language rather in ‘the ethnicized tradition of 
Islam’ (2004: 22). He suggests that ethnic groups identify with different forms of Islam, 
Sindh with Sufism (mystic and syncretic Islam), Mohajirs with modernity and Pakhtuns 
with global Islamism and Jihad (Verkaaik, 2007). Also, in Pakistan ethno-political 
movements and political parties (within democratic tradition) have used both ethnicity 
and Islam to mobilize people and have therefore, ethnicized Islam (Verkaaik, 2007: 
88-89). Khalid Ahmed (2004) on the other hand stressed on the religious confluence of 
Punjabi and Pakhtuns under the leadership of Pakhtuns. 
 Elaborating on Pakhtun case Verkaaik, suggests that Pakhtuns are under the 
influence of global Islamic revivalist tendencies to the extent that  they have revisited 
their cultural code and its relation with Islam (2007: 96). He adds that they have 
redefined it with the Islamic principle of Jihad. Jihad has been revived as Pakhtun 
tradition of fighting against foreign infidels (Verkaaik, 2007: 96). Arguing that 
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174 Khalid Ahmed argues that Pakhtuns have a strong sense of individuality which is inherent in this cult 
of disagreement. ‘Disagreeing is an assertion of individuality and to agree is the submergence of 
individuality’ (2004: 268)
traditional tribal leadership has lost its power at the hands of more dispersed and little 
qualified religious leaders who have benefited from socio-economic and political 
changes in Pakhtun regions, particularly  associated with rural-urban migration and 
entrance of State, missionary organizations and educational institutions as agents of 
change (2007: 96-98).  Therefore, he argues that, ‘these cultural ideas and forms have 
become popularized and are no longer primarily shaped by the landowning aristocracy 
and religious specialists’ (Verkaaik, 2007: 98).   
 On similar lines reading from Afghanistan unrest and Taliban insurgency, David 
kilcullen (2009) in his pioneering study, has argued that the reasons of Pakhtun fighting 
along Taliban would not be political but include, “honor, adventure and love of the 
fight” (p. 77). Kilcullen in general and Verkaaik analysis in particular instigate the 
reader to think of coalescing Jihad and Pakhtunwali. Informed by historical evidences or 
armed conflict against the invading foreigners (British, Sikh etc) in the region through 
out 19th and early 20th century. I doubt whether the recent conflict in the region is 
perceived locally  as Jihad and would suggest that, we must be careful in using the term 
Jihad as it has been changing its meanings through historical manipulation in South 
Asia (Jalal, 2008). We need rigorous research studies to elaborate how locally this 
unrest is perceived. Although such enquiry  is out of the scope of this study  I have 
observed general resentment in people about  the current actions of TNSM and Taliban 
in Pakistan. This may have in long run consequences for the definition of Jihad and the 
religious movements using the term jihad.   
 We are also timely informed by an important study of Ayesha Jalal (2008) on the 
contested meaning of Jihad in South Asia and the State’s use of its political meaning in 
Pakistan. She suggests that the concept of Jihad has not only been defined differently in 
South Asia but it was closely linked with pre colonial revivalism, anti-colonial 
nationalism and State territorialism. The meaning being historically contested are 
transformed from ethical (struggle ‘to be human’) to political (armed struggle against 
the West or faithless within) overtime. Pakhtuns have certainly been influenced by  such 
developments.175  
 The literature on political history  of the region suggest that Pakhtun’s desire of 
preserving autonomy and religious fervor associated with millenarian Jihadi endeavors, 
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175  For pre-colonial revivalism of Syyaid Ahmed see Jalal (2008) and for anti-colonial nationalism  of 
Deobandi religious leaders see Haroon (2007).  
an important factor has been others perception and images of Pakhtun (cf. Haroon, 
2007). Colonial religious leaders involved in the interpretation of Jihad constructed 
images of Pakhtun accordingly. The ‘traditionalist’ Deobandi imagined tribal region as, 
‘free’ (azad), distinct from the rest of the India, always being engaged in Jihad, 
inhabited by  ‘strong willed’ and ‘brave’ people, and perceived them as best recruits in 
anti-colonial Jihad of 19th century (Haroon, 2007: 93-95). On the other side the 
modernist interpreters of Jihad condemning armed struggle against colonial government 
in India, find them on the wrong side of the divide.
It was just that, ‘fanatics’ having heard about jihad, sought to ‘gratify sensual 
desires or led by delusion perpetrate bloody deeds’. This was especially true of 
Pathans, who having absorbed incorrect ideas about their faith from local 
mullas, consider killing members of another religious community an act of 
virtue (Mirza Gulam Ahmed reported by Jalal, 2008: 165-166).176
Between the contrasting images of Pakhtun Jalal see unsteady support of Pakhtuns to 
the Jihad in colonial era. 
Just as the uncertain allegiance of the Pathan tribesmen had wrecked Sayyid 
Ahmed Barelvi’s Jihad, the fickleness of the Afghan ruling elite hampered 
Sindhi’s efforts at mounting a transnational anti-colonial Jihad-a sobering 
reminder of the ever-elusive nature of Muslim unity (Jalal, 2008: 310-311).
Sana Haroon’s (2007) perspective is more geographical as she argues that, autonomous 
space in Tribal Areas provided by various governments (in Pakistan and earlier) enabled 
religious leaders to establish their authority: and to preserve that authority they  have 
fought to keep the autonomy of the region intact. Within contradictory Jihads in support 
of “Pakhtun ethnicism, anti-colonial nationalism, Pakistani territorialism, religious 
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176  Mirza Gulam Ahmed (1835-1908) the spiritual leader of the religious group known as Ahmedis, 
Mirzais or Qadianis; who define themselves Muslims but denied the right to call themselves Muslims by 
the State of Pakistan through a legislation in 1974.  See Saeed (2008) for details. For different opinion on 
Pakhtun tolerance to other religious communities see Ahmed (1984: 313) and Banerjee (2000). In 
Batkhela I was shown places which were previously Hindu quarters and was told that Pakhtuns lived in 
harmony with Hindus.
revivalism and anti Americanism”, and fluctuating political allegiances what remains 
constant is the claim to autonomy, and within it the functioning role of religious leaders 
(Haroon, 2007: 03). Therefore, one can conclude from the above accounts that the 
images of Pakhtuns in the subcontinent and their geographical placement  were 
compelling reasons of bringing in Jihad to their threshold.
 It is imperative to explore post independence construction of Pakhtun images 
and the political usage of Jihad in Pakistan. This gives us a fair idea of how State has 
been an important factor in manipulating the meaning of Jihad for its strategic interests. 
Jalal argues that, in post colonial South Asia, Jihad has been taken in political sense and 
therefore lost its ethical meaning. Its history highlights the relationship between ulema 
and modern State (Jalal, 2008). These ulema were allowed by  the State to interpret 
Jihad. The projection of its political meaning (armed struggle) and the reluctance to 
project its ethical meaning at the hands of the State was due to strategic reasons (Jalal, 
2008: 18-19). 
Jihad today is a pliable instrument in the hands of few who are more politically 
motivated than ethically grounded (Jalal, 2008: 19).    
The anti colonial Jihad movement (19th and early  20th centuries) and the transmission 
of the ideas of armed struggle through the Piri-Muridi pedigree of ulema network, 
which was well connected with the Indian reformist  movements (Haroon, 2007), gives 
an impression that the idea and the struggle was maneuvered from outside. Similarly 
Jihad in post  1980s had been significantly influenced by  State’s strategic interests and 
the transformation within the Deobandi movement. Moreover, the general impression 
from the field is that, Pakhtuns being informed by the current unrest find themselves 
recipients and at times victims of foreign intervention even the ideas and struggle that 
are very much local in their scope. I find the expression, ‘we are always deceived in the 
name of Islam’ (Fida Anwar, interview, 2008) quite meaningful in this context. The 
deception in this statement also refers to reciprocal sincerity and sentimental attachment 
with Islam and Muslim Ummah. Others’ (including State) manipulation of such 
attachment is a source of resentment that need rigorous investigation. 
 State being involved in Islamic modernization and strategic usage of religious 
radicalism (politicalization of madrasa) has not been identified with any particular 
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tradition of Islam in Malakand. This is of particular significance because the state is 
more vividly perceived to be dominated by Punjabis. However, I will argue below that 
Punjabis are perceived as poor performers in religious duties and not as an ethnic group 
identifying and promoting a particular sect or tradition of religion. Therefore, unlike 
Sindhis and Mohajirs (Verkaaik, 2007) I could not observe development of a counter 
religious narrative among Pakhtuns, but found them critical of State’s national identity 
entrenched in Islam exclusively. However, Pakhtun Islam is currently  seen (in Pakistan) 
as distinctive, Islamist rather than communal (cf. Shaikh, 2009) and directed against the 
State. This invites reaction from Pakhtun elite, who are successively seeing Islam as 
either secondary  to culture or dominant enough to comply with Pakistan’s Islamist 
discourse (see above). However, at popular level such polarized positions have been 
overshadowed by the perception that, religion, being simple and ritualistic or ‘laic’ and 
‘uncomplicated’ (Ahmed, 1984), continues to be constituent part of identity.
He is unburdened by religious dialectics and polemics, that he says 
disparagingly, is for the religious men, the mullas and Mians (Ahmed, 1984: 
313). 
In Malakand such exclusivity of the religious category is maintained and rather 
consolidated by their autonomy; also, Sharia intricacies and sectarian ideologies are set 
aside.  
   
7.3: Islam and Pakhtunwali: Convergence and Divergence
Islam and Pakhtunwali are major constituents of Pakhtun identity. I have discussed 
(chapter 1) how the scholars are divided on whether Islam and Pakhtunwali coalesce or 
they  coexist in juxtaposition. In this section I will elaborate how the boundaries and 
disjunction between the two are sharpened by a discourse set in the context of political 
unrest in the region. This discourse is significant despite the general agreement that 
Islam is central to Pakhtun identity. Such discourse is also partly  in response to current 
stereotyping of Pakhtuns.
 While arguing about the role of religion and Pukhtunwali in particular in 
Pakhtun society  I do not seek to essentialize the constituent components of identity 
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rather I see transformation with in these spheres through historical process. Pakhtunwali 
code has not been practised to the standard of ideal in Malakand region (cf. Barth,
1959b; 1969b and Ahmed, 1976); and religious transformation has been taking place 
through historical influences from Deobandi thought and practice. More than thought it 
is actually influenced by Deobandi practices. Therefore there are no static, stagnant 
cultural and religious norms which bind Pakhtuns to themselves, as current stereotypes 
may suggest (Ahmed, 2004). Moreover, I also see the role of religious and non-religious 
elite who have been involved in instrumentalizing these spheres of identity i.e religion 
and Pakhtun code. 
 The synthesis of Islam and Pakhtun customs is not limited to living Islam but is 
well used in political and social reform movements177. Arguing about the Khudai 
Khidmatgar (KK) movement, Banerjee asserts; “One of the reasons for the KK’s great 
success was the extent to which its ideology was grounded in both Islam and 
Pukhtunwali” (2000: 160). Moreover, Islam has been an effective tool in the hands of 
religious leaders to unite Pakhtuns in times of crisis (Rittenberg, 1988) and equally 
efficient in regular times (cf. Haroon, 2007). Similarly  Awami-khel in Malakand 
illustrated this relationship through their rhetoric of equality.   
 Anthropologically observed, Pakhtun behaviour is always judged by  the society  
through the standards of Pukhtunwali and Islam. However, at some places Pukhtunwali 
attributes are practised by Pakhtuns though conscious of the fact that they  are against 
the teachings of Islam (Ahmed, 1980: 106). At times they may choose one over the 
other (Khattak, 2007). Therefore, an important dimension of this relationship  between 
Islam and Pakhtunwali can be elaborated through questioning; are there ‘boundaries and 
disjunction between them’? (Bartlotti, 2000: 76) Barfield found them 
‘inseparable’ (2005:215) and Ahmed argues that, they are within each other (1980:107). 
For Bartlotti Pakhtuns draw boundaries between the two and also construct ‘symbolic’ 
and ‘situational’ Muslimness (2000).   
 Currently a Pakhtun historian and intellectual (Khattak, 2007) recognised 
intimacy of Islam and Pakhtunwali but emphasised harmony  between the two. He 
elaborates, “the relationship between Islam and Pashtunwali is perennial and 
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177  To see how this synthesis was attempted in religious movements since colonial times see Haroon 
(2007) and to locate the same process in non religious nationalist movement of Khudai Khidmatgar see 
Banerjee (2000). My own reading of Awami-khel struggle alludes to such fusion.  
indestructible. One is a spiritual guide while the other is temporal”178. Mutual respect 
of boundaries leads to mutual growth and progress. Such harmony  has been the 
Pakhtuns’ characteristic and in comparison to other Muslims make them better Muslims 
(Khattak, 2007: 16-19). However, below I will explain the growing disjunction between 
Islam and Pakhtunwali from the example of the TNSM  leader and the emerging 
discourse that highlights this discontinuity.  
 TNSM  leader (Maulana, interview, 2008) narrating his story of migration to 
Malakand reflected on these themes. While in village he had to either observe the 
customs of the land or observe his religious duties. He had to make a choice of moving 
from his village to an isolated place in Batkhela. If he stayed in his village he would 
have lost his faith (“Da emaan na khlase del wo”). Such narration show the perceived 
disjunctions between the local traditions and Islam and for that  matter limitations in 
observing religion. 
 The location of TNSM leader on an isolated hilltop close to Batkhela, is a 
symbolic act of distancing from the social and cultural system. Such isolation or 
physical boundary refers to growing distrust  and exclusivity from the cultural system 
functional in the society. Pakhtunwali relations with Islam is thus perceived in this very 
behavior. Mulana (interview, 2008) by severing his relations with his clan and kin in his 
village and keeping his isolation in Batkhela refer to the fact that cultural requirements 
are different from the religious requirements. It may also indicate the desperate effort to 
keep  his economic and social autonomy, which will ensure continuity to attack social 
and cultural disjunctions. Nevertheless, such physical location does not mean religious 
exclusivity. Maulana connects himself with sectarian TNSM and madaris.  
 Maulana behavior not only alludes to the importance of space to reformation but 
also to the growing dilemma faced by  reformists to operate in Pakhtun society. They 
know the cultural code has features which contradict Islam and partly that is what they 
would like to reform. But they  also know the potential of the cultural code to mobilize 
support in favor of reforms. This duality is currently effective as charged by the 
environment in which contradictions between Islam and Pakhtunwali is highlighted. 
 Edwards (1990) in an important study in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan has 
observed the tension between the religious class and the tribal Pakhtuns. He reported 
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178 My translation from original Pakhto text. 
that mullas prevented music and dancing in the camp which was resisted by the tribal 
Pakhtuns. The encounter between the two in the argument of Edwards refers to 
attempting boundaries between cultural performance (tribal identity) and religious 
identity  by social actors. Therefore, the power wielded by religious authorities disturbed 
the “traditional balance of religion and tribe and has created a disjuncture between 
fundamental aspects of their identity” (1990: 95-96).  
 I also follow the argument of David Edwards (1990) on the question of Taliban 
and their relationship with Pakhtun society. He describes Taliban as, “having spent 
months and years in the quasi-monistic communities of the madrasas, the potential 
recruits were relatively limited in their understanding of the world and relatively alien 
to tribal, regional, ethnic and party loyalties...” (Edwards, 1998: 725).
 In my account of the Maulana this tension between the cultural values and 
teachings received at madrasa explains the distance between these two entities. 
Although, I have not interviewed madrasa students but my account of Maulana (being a 
product of madrasa) and Edwards observation indicate towards the tension in religious 
elements and the Pakhtun society. This also signifies the need of more rigorous research 
work on madaris in Pakhtun region to elaborate on these themes. Within the limited 
scope of this study  I have indicated the tension and allude to important aspect of this 
tension manifested in the discourse.  
 In the background of Afghan Jihad, radicalisation of religious schools of thought 
(Nasr, 2000) and the emergence of “neo-Taliban” (White, 2008a), has not only created 
two hardened positions held by Pakhtun nationalists and religious radicals, but also 
generated discourse about the relationship between Pakhtunwali and Islam.179 Through 
these hardened positions the relationship between Pakhtunwali and Islam is interpreted 
in essentialized way. Moreover, electoral swing from religious parties to nationalist 
party has been under the influence of this discourse. 
 Islamists have deeper inroads into the State and society through their educational 
institutions, their recognized role of being the guardians of public morality, their 
regional influence and their stakes in State’s nationalist discourse. Ethno-nationalists 
have been less recognized and appreciated by the State, but their recent electoral victory 
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179 A Pakhtun peace Jirga was held in Peshawar in November 2006, where these positions were openly 
demonstrated by the nationalist leaders of ANP and Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awami party and the religious 
parties such as JUI . See Rashid (2006a) and (2006b). 
and increasing public disappointment in face of unrest in the region at the hands of 
Islamist strengthen their position. Pakhtun nationalists, both Awami National Party, 
Pakhtun Mili Awami Party  and Pakhtun nationalist intellegencia have been 
overemphasising on non religious credentials of Pakhtun culture and relegate secondary 
role to religion. Such thinking is reflected through their argument that religious 
sentiments and association of Pakhtun have long been exploited by the State of Pakistan 
to gain strategic victories in Afghanistan and promote its assimilation efforts. They 
often refer to the secular and non violent credentials of Khudai Khidmatgar movement 
of Ghafar Khan.180
 The discourse is not just limited to political elite, but the educated and 
intellectual Pakhtuns (in Pakistan and the diasporas) are more actively involved. 
Numerous organizations, peace forums, literary circles, websites are dedicated to 
contribute to this discourse. Such discourse has informed and engulfed lay  man to an 
educated Diaspora. Due to widespread access to media and other information sources. 
People in Malakand have been informed by the discourse, shared their concerns about 
the growing tension in the region and raised questions about the foreignness of the idea 
and method if not the membership of militant organizations. Most of the concerns were 
raised by the younger and educated Pakhtuns in Malakand. They  also endorsed the 
nationalists elite criticism of the State’s contribution to the unrest. State’s involvement 
cannot be entirely discredited as reports about secret agencies (ISI) plan to establish a 
“Talibanized belt” in FATA to pressure Afghan government (at least till 2004) is 
documented (Rashid, 2008: 269-270). 
 Religious elite has been very diverse. They include members from religious 
political parties such as JUI and Jamaat Islami and militant elements such as Taliban 
and TNSM.  They  have been alluding to the centrality and pervasiveness of Islam in 
Pakhtun society. They have even interpreted Pakhtun cultural elements such as 
‘honour’ by  giving it religious connotations.181 They have also appealed to the traditions 
of religious millenarian movements of colonial era. The effort of the protagonists of 
these positions is to establish the dominance of one over the other. Consequently, they 
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180 Ironically KK leadership did appeal  Islam and Pakhtunwali (Banerjee, 2000) . 
181 TNSM leader in Batkhela defined honor to be struggle in the way of Allah and Islam. This could be a 
very narrow interpretation of the term, if one look at the understanding of the term by anthropologists 
such as Ahmed (1980) and Barth (1969b).
are creating two polarised positions and a space that highlights the disjunction between 
Islam and Pakhtunwali. 
 This nationalist discourse about the place of religion and the extent of its 
influence in Pakhtun culture and society is often ignored in the literature that see the 
intermeshing of Jihad and Pakhtunwali (Verkaaik, 2007). This discourse appears to be a 
discourse of resistance, which challenges the interpretation of Pakhtun code in religious 
terms. In fact it refers to the destruction of the Pakhtun culture and values at  the hands 
of the Taliban. Even voices within the national press (Rahman, 2009) recognize that 
Taliban are blamed for destroying Pakhto poetry, music, arts, culture, dress code and 
even language. 
If neo Taliban had their way the Pashtuns’ ethno-cultural identity could be as 
much under threat of extinction as the other ethno-cultural identities within the 
Pakistan family (Rahman, 2009). 
The discourse also emphasize the need to discard some of the stereotypes of Pakhtuns, 
as they conceive Pakhtuns wrongly  implicated and find religious radicalism, the product 
of State policy.
 The above discussed discourse is also manifested in the electoral trends in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The electoral victory  of the Pakhtun nationalists (2008) is an 
important event as was the victory  of Islamic parties (MMA). It  happened in such 
succession that it will not be inappropriate to see it  as a possible consequence of each 
other. On the one hand it signified the presence of two very different electoral forces in 
the province on the other it referred to a trend (probably positive) that people’s choice is 
not always based in clientelistic considerations.182Most importantly, the vote negated 
some of the assumptions that radical elements represent popular sentiments of the 
region. I tend to avoid explaining popular support swing but insist that  the pattern 
signifies the discourse which reevaluates the relationship between the constituent 
elements of Pakhtun identity, which in time may redefine Pakhtun identity. The 
dialectics of the discourse are in the positions taken by  religious groups and ethno-
nationalists. 
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182 see Wilder (1999) for voting behavior in Pakistan. 
7.4: Islam and Pakhtun Identity
Islam is central to Pakhtun identity and society  (Barth, 1969b; Ahmed, 1980; Glatzer, 
1998; Shah, 1999; Banerjee, 2000; Rittenberg, 1988, Spain, 1996). A Pakhtun is by 
religion an “orthodox Muslim” (Barth, 1969b: 119) and Muslimness is acquired by 
birth, “his place in society as a Pukhtun and a Muslim is thus secured and defined from 
the moment of birth” (Ahmed, 1980: 107). Consequently for Pakhtuns, “...Islam was 
one of the principal constituents of their self definition, with a Muslim way of life and 
Pathan tradition being taken as complementary  attributes of their identity” (Shah, 1999: 
34) Therefore, this sense of belonging gives Pakhtuns “confidence” and “makes their 
religion universal and tolerant” (Ahmed, 1980:107; also see Banerjee, 2000). 
 South Asian Islam has been influenced by the religious revivalist  movements of 
(19th and 20th century) which later became religious styles through the authoritative 
Fatawa (scholarly  opinion) of Ulema (Metcalf, 2004) and spread to remote areas of 
India. I argue that religion being practiced and the form adopted for this practice is 
undergoing a change. Therefore, the binding nature of religion in Pakhtun society is 
perhaps intact, but the change in performance of rituals and practices created a social 
change which is related to the processes of identification and boundaries making. Such 
change is facilitated by the proliferation of Madaris and growing interaction with 
Middle East through the ritual of Hajj and experience of living and earning. I also posit 
that religion is made the exclusive domain of Pakhtun practice. Interestingly, 
extenuating the importance of religion or opting for secular has never been an option in 
Malakand, despite the current stigmatization of Pakhtuns in Pakistan and endeavors of 
ethno nationalist elite to emphasize its secondary role or choosing non religious options. 
Religion has been pervasive and all-encompassing way of life.183 
Exclusivity in observing Islam: 
 Identification with Islam makes performance of religion, the exclusive domain 
of Pakhtuns and source of pride. Local discourse is also comparative and draw 
boundaries between those who practice and those who don’t. They locate themselves in 
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the former and somehow internalize Islam as if it is being owned. The later includes all 
non Pakhtun ethnic groups in Pakistan. 
We are Pakhtuns and Pakhtuns are devout Muslims (Hafeez ullah, interview, 
2008). Islam is exclusively in Pakhtuns. Fasting, Prayers, Zakat and Pardah are 
only observed strictly by Pakhtuns (Arshid, interview, 2008).
Geographical boundaries are related to religious boundaries and religiosity across the 
boundary is doubted.
 
From Attock onwards there is no Islam’ (Hamid, interview, 2008).184 If there 
was no Pakhto (or Pakhtunwali) there would have been no Islam. You can 
weaken Islam anywhere but you cannot do it in Pakhtun regions (Arshid, 
interview, 2008). 
The conviction that Islam belongs to them is so deep that it  endorses a responsibility to 
do well in observing religion. Such observation inversely consolidates the conviction. 
Above made expressions allude to religion being owned and practiced in a way that it 
becomes not  only  a part of spiritual experience but also the exclusive sphere of 
collective pride. Justification comes equally from the religious elite when they endorse, 
if not the exclusivity, the sheer commitment and observance of religion in local 
population. I was told by the top leader of TNSM 185 that Pakhtuns are the better 
performers of individual religious practices (rituals) than other ethnic groups in 
Pakistan. “This is the natural to Pakhtuns. God gave them this temperament” (Maulana, 
interview, 2008). Also the younger generation has greater jazba (passion) to reform 
society on the lines of Sharia. Such thoughts were long held by Deobandi religious 
scholars about the Pakhtuns of Tribal Areas (Haroon, 2007: 93-98). Religious elite in 
Malakand even see bravery  and ghariat (honor) as characteristics of Pakhtuns, but 
interpret it differently; “Pakhtun must be a good Muslim, Pashto (Pashtunwali) means 
ghairat (honor) and ghairat must be for Islam” (Maulana, 2008). Local interpretation 
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184 Attock marks the boundary between the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. No Islam was 
explained as poor performance of religious rituals.
185 Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e- Muhammadi, a religious movement active in Malakand. 
and practice may differ but the religious elite interpretation demonstrate the extent of 
interpreting local cultural code religiously. The exclusivity  in observing Islam and the 
pride demonstrated through such performance is not oblivious to the sense of belonging 
to Ummah. In fact through claims of better observance (of religious practices) and thus 
being better Muslims, Pakhtun project the sense of belonging to Ummah. 
Piety and austerity:  
 Piety  and austerity are the utmost requirements from the religious categories.186 
However, a religious leader must also demonstrate knowledge along with piety and 
austerity. Therefore, more than charisma, which is divinely  ordained, piety and 
knowledge are required of religious leader. Ahmed (1976) has reported charisma in the 
leadership  of the millenarian movements in colonial India of 19th century.
 However, charisma, as coined by Max Weber would mean the characteristic of 
an individual by virtue of which he is considered “extraordinary and treated as endowed 
with supernatural superhuman or at  least specifically exceptional powers or 
qualities” (1978: 241-245). Such qualities must be divine in origin and be legitimized 
by the followers with absolute trust in the possessor of such charisma; and the 
leadership itself must ideally have no economic consideration and call his activity  a 
“mission” or “spiritual duty” (Weber, 1978: 241-245). I concede Edwards assertion that 
such charisma is missing in the leadership of current religious movements that seek 
Sharia rather than challenging foreign intervention (1998: 726). 
 Therefore, austerity, piety and non temporal spiritual attitude of the religious 
elite is valued. Such qualities in the leadership of the movement can provide legitimacy 
to the cause. Maulana (TNSM leader) when learned about the rise of Sufi Muhammad 
started his inquiry  to know whether Sufi Muhammad was honest and sincere in his call 
for Sharia. He stayed with Sufi Muhammad for some time and ultimately  satisfied with 
the piety  and asceticism of Sufi Muhammad he joined the movement. Maulana’s story 
was also of trial and tribulation in the cause of Islam. He narrated how he was refuted 
by his family when he decided to leave his village and started a very  simple and devoted 
life in Batkhela. His religious service to the people of Batkhela and his involvement in 
the “right cause” (TNSM movement) adds to his contentment. 
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186 These include mulla, Mian, Syed, Qazi and saints. 
I have no greed and don’t expect  favors from others. I once told my rich cousin 
that my  hut is better than his bungalow because I am more contended and 
satisfied in it then he is in his bungalow (Maulana, interview, 2008).187 
Ostentatious living and display  of wealth is socially  disapproved for the religious 
category.188  Therefore, not poverty  but austerity  is symbolically associated with 
righteousness and religiosity through a narrative by  the religious elite which are 
believed to be recognized socially. Maulana also narrated how he impressed a local 
khan with his behavior, who then provided land for the mosque he was running. The 
khan came to him along with his secretary  but the TNSM leader was more respectful to 
khan’s secretary than to the khan. It struck the khan for he expected more respect  due to 
his wealth and social status. The khan constructed the actions of the TNSM  leader 
unworldly and pious, and in recognition of the TNSM  leader’s piety  and righteousness 
he provided his son to be taught by the TNSM leader.     
When I am in league with Sufi Muhammad, it  is the friendship of huger and 
thirst (demanding and full of tribulations) (Maulana, inteview, 2008).  
 
Qazian, Mians or any other religious category doing businesses and demonstrating 
worldly success, when they were expected to demonstrate austerity, piety and learning, 
were subjected to public diatribe.189  Claim to previously  religious statuses require 
demonstration of qualities and performance expected from those statuses. Religious 
domain and the non religious domain are demarcated in a sense that  any profane 
achievement such as excellence in business for the religious elite would invite 
opposition and social disapproval. Religious elite must excel in their own domain of 
religiosity and knowledge. 
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187 Hut symbolizes poverty and bungalow richness. 
188 It is interesting to report that the founders of Deobandi Madrasa in India also believed in the spiritual 
advantage of poverty in fostering unity, particularly in fund seeking (Metcalf, 2004: 33). Uncertainty of 
means of income was deemed desirable (Farouqi, 1962: 26). Such examples could be the cause of 
inspiration for Deobandi elite in Pakhtun region.
189 Qazian were the Islamist jurists who adjudicated disputes according to Sharia during Jirga time. 
 The stated position of how poverty compels people to join religious extremism is 
not refuted here. Even TNSM leader acknowledged that mostly poor are attracted to 
madrasa and struggle of sharia. Instead we may argue that poverty  situations are 
consolidated through recognition of austerity  and asceticism demonstrated through 
simple living and refusal to accept favors. Such consolidation may happen through the 
examples of leaders and through social recognition. Most of those who have joined 
madrasa or religious organizations would already be poor but their new situations 
consolidate their previous status and would not be an attempt to achieve richness or 
wealth. Probably, by attempting to achieve richness they would loose respect and 
recognition in the society. This local perspective can be seen considering contradictory 
arguments made in literature that mullas have been seeking power, wealth and social 
status (Nasr, 2000; White, 2008a). I argue that locally people disapprove of such 
behavior and would follow religious leaders only if they demonstrate piety and 
austerity. Much of this argument explains local disdain of “neo-Taliban” activities in the 
region. I therefore, may conclude that the expectations of austerity and piety  are from 
religious category in general and are not specific to Saints (Barth, 1959b).  
Religious categories: 
 Criticizing Barth for taking Saints and Sufis as single orthodox religious 
category, Ahmed distinguished orthodox from non orthodox (1976: 55). However, he 
clearly  identified these categories in his later work (1997). He postulated that there are 
those with religious and legal learning, such as Ulema, Mufti, Qazi, Mualana and 
Maulvi, those which are defined by esoteric and unorthodox practices for example 
Sufis, and finally those defined by religious genealogy and descent “ and thus claiming 
superior status” such as Sayyad, Sharif or Mian (1997:85). Religion and categorization 
interplay  in Malakand through categorical status changes, growing religiosity, and 
religious political affiliations. 
 Qazian of Malakand present a paradox of categorical placement. They have to 
renegotiate their categorical status in the situation where Khanan and Ghariban 
categories are consolidating. Qazian being jurists in jirga period have lost that function 
and have mostly  adopted business as a profession. Despite loss of their previous role 
Qazians have been claiming their previous status. Although, they  were and continue to 
be inclined towards Khanan and Jirga period which also guaranteed their privileges, had 
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to face diatribe from Khanan. We also know that many  from previous castes have 
discarded their profession but  Qazians were the only category  who were increasingly 
questioned for their claim to previous status, perhaps for their continuous claim to 
previous status category.190   
 Changing statuses by adopting new titles would often invite stir in society. This 
applies to individuals ascending to higher category  within the religious group. Claims to 
higher religious status would surely require re-negotiation, despite the rearranging of 
previous categories. In oblivion to such renegotiations provoke diatribe. Interestingly 
such diatribe would involve reference to God’s authority  and cursing of the individual 
for claiming higher religious status.191  Such attempt of claiming higher statuses get 
sever diatribe if the claimant is a public figure.  
 Where religiosity and religious functions are combined with tribal lineage pride 
is more overwhelming. The case of Asghar Khan (2008) demonstrates that  religious 
affiliation generates satisfaction and spiritual uplift it also creates vulnerabilities, in face 
of ridicule from lineage members to have acquired a religious role. Asghar khan (2008) 
comments, ‘A pious man cannot survive these days; all praise to Allah, Who gave me 
good family (referring to his lineage) which protects me from harm’. However, 
vulnerabilities are commensurate with retaining position within the lineage and 
constantly affirming categorical status. This also endorses my earlier argument that 
taking up new roles may not affect one’s categorical status. 
 Piety  and austerity are if the common requirements of religious category, 
performance of religious rituals is required of the entire society. Moreover, through the 
influence of Tabligh and the agency of Mullah more and more people are performing 
religious duties. This change cannot only be observed (by an outsider) but can also be 
grasped from the local narrations of religious change, which emphatically recognize that 
the observance of religious duties has grown and become more universal. Previously the 
categorical differences reflected differences in religiosity. Khanan in Batkhela told me 
that they were good observers of religious practices than lower castes such as Nai 
(hairdressers) and peasants. However, currently, such differences are narrowed down by 
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190 Unlike what their status represent i.e legal knowledge of Islam, under pressure from Khanan they have 
developed their own genealogies which demonstrate Arab ancestry; tracing back to the companions of the 
prophets. 
191 Fareed Khan(2008) snubbed his sibling for calling one such individual ‘Sahib’ (Sir). 
reformist movements such as Tabligh, which made religious performance universal. The 
young generation of Nai and peasant castes have learned Islamic rituals, greetings and 
are becoming Hafiz.192
 Oddly, categorical boundaries, to some extent, coincide with political affiliation 
in Malakand. Politically, most of the Ghariban businessmen are either Jamat-i-Islami 
supporters or active members. Powerful business families193  and even, the leader of 
Awami-khel was a staunch follower of Maududi.  Similarly, the first  influential anti 
Swat State activist Sirajuddin Khan was influenced by  Maududi thought (Rome, 2008: 
275). Sufi Muhammad the leader of TNSM movement was also local councilor of 
Jamaat Islami. However, despite these affiliation with Jamaat I found most of business 
families are not Jamat ideologues and are at the same time associated with Tabligh. 
They  also have a strong sense of Pakhtun identity against non Pakhtun identity. As 
argued above political parties are perceived locally on categorical terms. Moreover, the 
affiliation of businessmen from Ghariban with Jamat Islami refer to religious 
inclination as well as to a fact that Jamat provides a niche to Ghariban with business 
background to accumulate power. 
Conclusion 
Through these analysis I was able to comment on the dynamic of religious change in 
Malakand. Although I realize that the entire scale and range of the change would be too 
ambitious to attempt in this modest research work, I have identified various aspects of 
the change. These aspects include how literature describe the change in Pakhtun regions 
and Pakhtun sense of Muslimness, and how people in the region perceive religious 
change. Also I have reported that political unrest and uncertainty  has influenced 
people’s understanding of religion or at least their reporting of such understanding. 
Central to this discussion was my own position as insider and outsider and associated 
advantage and limitations. Through these positions I was able to discern that  Islam 
continues to be a significant  part  of Pakhtun identity  and that religion itself is perceived 
to be practicing rituals rather than adopting a particular sectarian ideology with political 
connotations. 
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192 An honorary title for those who learn Quran by heart. It is a social status that enjoys wider reverence 
and praise. 
193 Such as Arshid (2008), Ab Zar (2008), Hafeez ullah (2008), Hamid (2008) etc. 
 I have argued that currently a discourse among the elite is revisiting the 
relationship  between Islam and Pakhtunwali (cultural code) by looking into their 
convergence and divergence. Despite the influence of religious reformist movements, 
the process of internalizing any sectarian or ideological (Jihadi) globalism into ethnic 
identity  is unwarranted in Malakand. Part of it is also explained by people’s 
disassociation form TNSM and Taliban methods and actions. Therefore, through the 
case study of Malakand Pakhtuns I contest the argument in the literature (Verkaaik, 
2007) that religious and ethnic boundaries coincide in Pakistan.
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Conclusion
Pakhtuns in Malakand categorize and identify each other in a contested manner. They 
draw boundary and maintain it through a meaning system that  involves interpretations 
of cultural features and performance. Through such processes they  signify the intra 
ethnic aspects of identification. Moreover, they further relate these intra ethnic aspects 
of identity to inter ethnic that primarily involve a discourse on who is Pakhtun? 
Pakhtunness in this way is entailing contestation in local context and near consensus in 
non local context. The pragmatic and dynamic processes indicate the multilayered 
Pakhtun identity. Pakhtun in Malakand debate and reflect on their Pakistani and Muslim 
identities. They do so in relation to State’s consistent pressure for integration in the 
national whole and in the current focus of relationship  between Islam and Pakhtun 
identity. Thus for Pakhtuns various aspects of Pakhtunness manifest  intra ethnic, inter 
ethnic, national and religious identification that also involve contestation and consensus. 
Therefore, the multiple senses of belonging for Pakhtuns are crucial aspects of their 
existence on which they reflect in the process of identification. 
 This study is about the intra ethnic, inter ethnic process of identification, 
contextual and contested identities reflected in segmentary ethnicity. It is an enquiry 
into these processes in time of social and economic flux. It also illustrates the interplay 
between ethnicity and religion and the manifestation of this interplay in the process of 
identification. In this study I have argued that Pakhtun identity  need to be problematized 
to enquire into its various aspects that undergo a change. I have taken Pakhtuns’ 
perspective of their identity  in order to explicate its problematized character. In doing so 
I will set the debate about the Pakhtunness that will contribute to exiting literature that 
has been less reflective on such problematization and to suggest future researches 
avenues related to ethnic identification among Pakhtuns. 
 The theoretical position undertaken by this work is close to social 
constructionists, focusing on how people in Malakand socially construct their 
differences and thus draw boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Moreover, the foremost 
focus of the project is the generative process and the flux that characterize the 
complexity of Pakhtun social existence and their identity. In this way the study is 
contemporary  in its focus on the dynamism and complexity of society as against the 
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structural functionalist view of ‘static’,‘homogeneous’ and ‘isolated’ cultures and 
societies (cf. Eeriness, 2002: 10). It is through such nuanced understanding of ethnicity, 
boundaries, groupness embedded in the process of identification that this study shapes 
its analysis and seek to contribute to the literature. 
 The diligent inquiry  of identification processes in Pakistan reveals that the 
concept of boundary is relevant to delineate internal stratification among Pakhtuns and 
explicate the simultaneous process of ethnic identification among various groups in 
Pakistan. Internal identification process discloses that Pakhtuns in Malakand categorize 
each other into Khanan and Ghariban and thus draw a boundary  that differentiates. 
However, such identification and categorization process is set in a local context that is 
characterized by contestation, informed by previous stratification schemes and 
influenced by  incessant social and economic change. Boundary making is also evident 
from the identification by Pakhtuns vis-a-vis other ethnic groups, such as Punjabis or 
Mohajirs etc. Such identification is embedded in the national (non local) context which 
is characterized by consensus among Pakhtuns in choosing more inclusive features of 
Pakhtun identity  (such as language) in apparently  symbolic and, at times, in 
essentialized manner. It  is here that the ‘groupness’ (cf. Brubaker, 2004) among 
Pakhtuns in political sense is more visible.  
 Moreover, this study equally significantly explains the importance of the internal 
content (‘cultural stuff’) which Barth (1969a) initially ignored. Through the discussion 
of social stratification, behavioral patterns and reinterpretation of cultural features I 
denoted that the internal content has its own significance. Thus the dialectics of internal 
stratification (contestations) and the ethnic groupness (consensus) highlight the mutual 
influence and significance of the ‘cultural stuff’ and the boundary simultaneously.     
 The thesis contributes to the broader literature on ethnicity  and identity  by  
adding to the debate about the segmentary and contextual ethnicity, identity  processes 
and shifting emphasis from cultural content to boundary. The discussion in the thesis on 
the Pakistaniat and Muslimness of Pakhtun provides insights for the researchers 
working on the relationship of ethnicity  and religion in Pakistan. Such discussion also 
provides different perspective (Pakhtun perspective) on the current Islamic unrest in the 
region and thus is a valuable addition to the multitude of literature produced in post 9/11 
context. 
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 In this study I have argued that Pakhtuns in Malakand construct  Pakhtunesss in 
certain contexts by emphasizing one or other marker or aspects of Pakhtunness 
(ascribed or achieved). In such a way they  contest over the choice of ascribed or 
performed aspect in local context but develop a consensus on more inclusive markers 
such as language to identify  a Pakhtun in non local context. Therefore, unlike Ahmed 
(1980) who described lineage or Barth (1969b) who emphasized values (such as 
autonomy, egality, etc) as defining markers I argue that defining markers depend on the 
choice Pakhtun make in different contexts. Ironically, local context may be 
characterized by contested Pakhtunness but the non local context may manifest 
concurrence on Pakhtunness. 
 The ontological question of who is Pakhtun is implied in the statement that 
Pakhtun identity is based in an elaborated repertoire or ‘tool kit’ that includes diverse 
features that are contextually  associated with Pakhtunness. Therefore, the reality of 
Pakhtunness is socially  and contextually  constructed through a reference to diverse 
features. Moreover, such process of construction is partly informed by the ascription of 
Pakhtuns by non Pakhtuns such as Punjabis, Mohajirs etc through numerous 
stereotypes. In this stereotypical image Pakhtuns are vividly seen as ‘them’, which in 
turn influences Pakhtun sense of belonging to Pakistan. 
 The position and identity  of the author is an important aspect of this study. 
Where my Pakhtun credentials were instigating elements in undertaking this study, the 
inherent sensitivities were pivotal in the analysis and reporting about the Pakhtun 
perspective from the Pakhtuns of Malakand. The utmost effort to gain access to 
informants and information at such testing times would have been difficult for non 
Pakhtun researcher, particularly  when the issue of access is the major cause of 
unavailability of new perspectives on the people and the region (Banerjee, 2000). 
However, the researcher was also an outsider to the society under investigation and such 
position had its own consequences. The information shared was under the pressure of 
circumstances and situation. Most importantly the expectations and sensitivities of the 
informants put restraints on the researcher in time of enormous uncertainty and 
ambivalence.  
 In this study I have not postulated a model that would be taken in holistic 
manner to interpret Pakhtun everywhere, for I am aware that  the variation in Pakhtun 
form and existence would render any such attempt short of reductionism and 
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synchodicism as Ahmed (1976: 8-) found in the study of Barth. However, the case study 
I undertake represent hybridity of Tribal and Settled Areas if not Nang and Qalang (cf. 
Ahmed, 1976: 73-83; 1980) and the variation in Pakhtun form. Also I postulated the 
findings of this study will have relevancy for the situation in Settled Areas where 
hierarchical stratification are more established and decades of existence under 
centralized States may have produced more significant identity issues. Moreover, the 
findings of the study  may still be useful to Tribal Areas where stratification may not be 
a significant fact of life but the encroaching State has disturbed the locus of authority 
and power. These areas manifest the flux that is also characteristic of Malakand. The 
findings of this study  may help in elaborating the flux in Tribal region in relation to 
Pakhtun identity.  
  
Intra ethnic and inter ethnic processes 
This thesis signifies the role of intra ethnic aspects of Pakhtun identification which are 
often discussed as internal stratification short of meaningful identification process. 
These intra ethnic aspects of identification are enacted by social actors in time of flux. 
They  are meaningful in local contexts where the people engaging with socio economic 
changes and deal with the hybridity  of the administrative and political system. 
Malakand being one such place which is at the margin of Tribal and Settled Areas and 
has hybrid administrative and political systems of Tribal and Settled Areas. People in 
Malakand relate intra and inter ethnic aspects in a dynamic process that has mutual 
consequences. Although, further study is needed to elaborate on the precise relationship 
between these different aspects of identification, this thesis sets the debate that suggest 
the significant of these aspects. In this way it contributes to the understanding of 
Pakhtun identity, the flux that affect such identity and the political and administrative 
system in relation with identity.    
 The broader literature on ethnicity recognizes the segmentary nature of ethnicity 
(Jenkins, 2008a; 42-43) but reflect less on the processes at these segmentary levels and 
the consequent collectivities produced through such processes. I have illustrated these 
processes and the entailing contestation and consensus. I have also explicated how these 
processes are transcendent as they  cut cross the segmentary  levels. The way Khanan 
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and Ghariban configured within the larger ethnic group in oppositional manner on the 
bases of lineage and landowning, the way they stressed ascribed and performed aspects 
of Pakhtunness to include and exclude in broader ethnic identity in local context, the 
way they contested and consented in different contexts on the definition of Pakhtun, 
refer to the striking presence of intra ethnic and inter ethnic processes and the 
relationship these different aspects have.
 The thesis signifies that besides the external boundary maintenance on which a 
huge anthropological literature stresses in post Barth (1969b) proposition. It is in line 
with some literature currently referring to cultural stuff that  has regained some of its 
weight. By focusing on intra ethnic processes, manipulation of cultural features in local 
context and the processes that involve contestation and consensus I have signified the 
importance of cultural content of ethnic groups. Implied in these discussions is the 
argument that social actors in Malakand have reconstructed the external boundary vis a 
vis other ethnic groups by revisiting the debate of who is Pakhtun? It  is the 
contextualization of this debate that generated contestation and consensus. Moreover, 
such contestation and consensus is related to internal process of categorization in local 
context. Therefore, a dynamic process in which Khanan and Ghariban involve in 
categorizing each other internally  and contextually contest each other’s Pakhtunness by 
emphasizing its different aspects.      
 Higher degree of immigration, development of Batkhela market and related 
economic changes, the inflow of remittances from abroad, the emergence of Awami-
khel movement and Bhutto’s ascend to power and finally successive political 
administrative reforms (since 1970) have generated changes that have influenced 
collective identification in Malakand. These changes have signified intra ethnic 
processes or internal processes largely  ignored by  the literature. Focusing on these 
internal processes, I have argued that Pakhtuns in Malakand categorize each other 
internally and maintain categorical boundary. The two most prominent categories of 
Khanan and Ghariban emerge from such processes. These two categories are related to 
each other through reciprocated identification of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
 Previously reported (Barth, 1959b; 1981; Lindholm, 1982) social stratification, 
where people were divided in a range of hierarchical status categories is diminishing. 
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The hierarchal structure of categories is successively transforming in a dynamic way 
into an organization where continuity  with the past is established by drawing from 
previous categorical arrangement. However, the transformed categories of Khanan and 
Ghariban keep a mutually antagonistic relationship (overtly or covertly) despite losing 
previous patron-client character. 
 This work elaborated the evolving nature of Khanan and Ghariban categories 
and did not pursue to determine the exact  nature of these categories. Perhaps it is too 
early to establish it for it is difficult to predict the direction of this evolution. However, 
what is illustrated here is the diminishing hierarchical statuses and patron client 
relationships that were too obvious in the literature produced on the area and its people. 
This is the reason I insist that the hierarchical stratification discussed by  the literature 
are not enough to grasp  the complexity of social relations and the impact of this 
complexity on the identity issues. Focusing on the these categories in relation with 
identification process I have integrated my  findings at intra ethnic level with other 
levels of identification to support the central argument that there are multilayered 
identification processes that need to be studied. Moreover, I leave it to future 
researchers to look into the character of these categories and their relationship with 
historical processes and memories, accumulated experiences of the members of these 
categories and their setting in changing social milieu. 
 By focusing on collective identification and the reworking of hierarchies into 
more oppositional categorization between Khanan and Ghariban I have avoided what 
Ahmed (1976) has criticized Barth’s for i.e Methodological individualism. I have not 
observed a khan leading a faction in fight with another khan leading another faction and 
clients making a choice to support one or the other patron, rather I have indicated social 
tension between social collectivities engaged in the process of categorization and 
identification. 
 The categorical boundaries between Khanan and Ghariban in Malakand are 
rigorously maintained by a meaning system that is informed by social conduct. The 
meaning system and the social conduct is reflected through typified behavioral patterns. 
Nevertheless, these meanings emanating from these behavioral patterns generated 
contest when interpreted differently. Therefore, Khanan through their pride in heroic 
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past and tribal identity demonstrate ‘ego’ and ‘self pride’ and Ghariban through their 
own self aggrandizement vis a vis Khan in business demonstrate ‘self accomplishment’. 
These behavioral patters are interpreted in the meaning of ‘Nasha’ (arrogance) and 
‘Thanklessness’, ‘betrayal’ in social interaction. Some cultural features and institutions 
such as Melmastiya, honor, Gham Khadi, etc, reflect the above behavioral traits and the 
contestations in the associated meanings. Through the performance of these cultural 
features the extent to which these features satisfy the core cultural values (cf. Edward, 
1990) can be determined. 
 The boundary  that demarcates Khanan from Ghariban is also interpreted in 
contestation. Therefore, the boundary  for Ghariban means ‘usurpation’, ‘arrogance’, etc 
and the image of Khan becomes a ‘usurper’, ‘condescending’ unlike earlier suggested 
(Barth, 1981, Lindholm, 1982) ideal person embodying ‘bravery’ and ‘strength’. The 
status of khan is therefore, less desirable. Ghariban for Khanan are devoid of Pakhtun 
ancestry and Pakhtun values. Ghariban and Khanan see their statuses primarily but not 
exclusively  performed and ascribed. The boundary between Kisanyan (peasants) and the 
Khanan is currently salient despite kisanyan stepping into the landowners role  that was 
zealously reserved by Khanan for themselves. Kisanyan narrative like other Ghariban is 
of accomplishment and pride and not of remorse and malediction (cf. Barth, 1981). The 
redrawing of hierarchies in Malakand is not consciously  pursued but the contested 
interpretation of the boundary  in itself indicate hierarchies are discredited and dissolved. 
Moreover, the tacit consent and submission to values and social system built on them as 
demonstrated by Barth (1981) and Lindholm (1982) is non discernible in Malakand. In 
fact, by discrediting the behavior of the Khanan, Ghariban did not aspire to take their 
position and status.
 Awami-khel, an indigenous organization, questioned the political status of a 
tribal Agency  and related the issues of recognition, inequality and dishonor with 
identification. Awami-khel, although entirely ignored by the literature on the region, 
indicates the significance of internal processes for change. I have illustrated the 
ideology and struggle of the Awami-khel to reflect on how local forces can demand 
reforms in Tribal Areas and how those demands are embedded in local issues of social 
stratification and identification. This can be tied up with the debate of change being 
imposed by encapsulating system (c.f Ahmed, 1980) or change being internally  desired 
(as I have shown here). Future research may  focus on the issue of indigenous endeavor 
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against the prevailing political and social dispensation in Tribal Areas and explore the 
relationship  between State’s interests and local demands for reforms. An extensive 
debate about the reforms in Tribal Areas is currently  addressing the paradox to whether 
reform the political and administrative system in the region. The debate is the part of 
enormous interest in the region in the context of unrest in Tribal Areas.
 Pakhtuns in Malakand not just socially  categorize, contest boundary meanings 
(chapter 4) but also evolve a discourse on ethnic identity. Such discourse has greater 
repercussions as it involves varying degree of emphasis on different aspects of 
Pakhtunness such as ascribed and achieved to include and exclude. The ascribed aspect 
of Pakhtunness allude to patrilineal descent established through the memory of 
genealogies, landownership related to the position in the genealogy and the right to 
belong by birth. Literature on Pakhtun identity clearly  emphasize on the importance of 
ascribed aspect of Pakhtun. The performing aspect or achieved aspect is in the Pakhtun 
code of Pakhtunwali or Pakhto. Its significance is also highlighted by the literature. 
These two aspects are variously stressed in different contexts by the Pakhtun in 
Malakand. Khanan and Ghariban categories stress different markers or attributes of 
identity  and indulge in contest over the definition of Pakhtun as they do on the meaning 
of categorical boundaries. This contest is shaped by multiple contexts in which the locus 
of discourse is the definition of Pakhtun. Contexts are situational i.e local, national and 
historical. Local contexts are defined by the social categorization, contested categorical 
boundaries meaning and historical experience. Therefore, the contest on who is Pakhtun 
is highly  significant. When the situation is defined by  national context the discourse 
loses some of its contested form. Historical context draws from both local and national 
contexts and guides the discourse through historical claims deeply entrenched in the 
past experiences. Through such processes the inter ethnic and intra ethnic aspects of 
Pakhtun identity are related. Moreover, the contested and contextualized Pakhtunness as 
posited here would be an important  addition to the literature that so far has not 
problematized Pakhtun identity. 
 I put history  in perspective when I explored the struggle and rhetoric of Awami-
khel when they related tribal organization and the establishment of the political system 
with the arrival of British in the region. I have also shown how consistently  the system 
was locally categorized to be deviation from the norm and how such deviation happened 
in colonial context. This refers to some of the criticism Ahmed extended against Barth’s 
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study of Swat. I agree to an extent that Barth and Lindholm were insensitive to the 
popular discontent towards such deviation. Why could not they grasp the popular 
reference to norms of Pakhtun and the exploitation of Khanan at the cost of deviation 
from norms. Malakand being an extension of Swat society under autonomous 
administrative system designed by British, also highlights the debate about Nang and 
Qalang categories and their relationship with maintaining Pakhtun identity  (cf. Ahmed, 
1976; Barth, 1959b; Barth 1981; Edwards, 1998). However, Malakand case suggest 
blurring of such distinction and uniqueness of its character. It is here that the recent 
work on Pakhtun comes handy to explain that the features of Pakhtunwali are not static 
and that its features can be interpreted, manipulated and negotiated (Banerjee, 2000; 
Bartlotti, 2000). 
 The Ghariban insistence on values and norms of Pakhtun culture despite the fact 
that they have lost most of the organizational characteristics of Pakhtun society i.e trace 
of common descent, segmentary  tribal opposition vis a vis Khanan who have retained 
some of these features refer to their attempt to establish the egalitarian values and norms 
outside the tribal setup. My arguments in this thesis does not suggest that Ghariban 
wished to destroy the tribal setup, in fact they attempted to emulate it  at times, Awami-
khel symbolic reference to Ghariban as a single khel (clan), but suggest the dynamism 
of tribal setup as pointed out by Anderson (1983). 
Religion, ethnicity and Pakistani identity 
A useful approach towards the problem of national integration in Pakistan would be to 
take the perspective of the ethnic groups having the history of ethno nationalist 
sentiments. This could be useful alternative to the exhausted State centered approaches 
to Pakistani nationalism. I have attempted to explain the issue of national integration 
and national identity through Pakhtun perspective and their processes of identification. I 
suggest that Pakistani identity is part of Pakhtun identification and it is through the 
studying of Pakhtun identity that we can comprehend the problem of national 
integration in Pakistan. Although mine is not first  attempt to see Pakhtuns developing 
sense of belonging to Pakistan (see Ahmed,1977:16;1984 and Edwards, 1996:227-230). 
However, I have related such sense of belonging to other senses of belonging i.e intra 
and inter ethnic and religious. My study  is different from various other studies on ethnic 
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groups in Pakistan which primarily enquire into ethno nationalist sentiments and 
articulation of such sentiments in Political movements. These studies look into the 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies and then debate the effectiveness of the nation 
making process in Pakistan. I contribute to the wider literature by  combining State 
centered and ethnic centered approaches by giving Pakhtuns’ perspective; but shaping 
of such perspective in response to State’s nation making efforts. I have also probed the 
interplay  of ethnicity and religion in such identification process. Although literature on 
Pakhtuns has reported that Muslimness is central to Pakhtun identity  I discuss such 
Muslimness in relation to State’s nation making. I therefore contribute to literature on 
the interplay between ethnicity and religion in Pakistan. In these discussion I take up a 
most important aspect of current debates about the relationship  of Islam with 
Pakhtunwali in the context of religious radicalism.     
 Pakhtunness retains primary significance for Pakhtuns in Malakand, despite 
internal contest on the definition of Pakhtun. However, that does not make identification 
an exclusive domain of ethnic identity, rather in a pragmatic way  Pakhtuns relate their 
ethnic and national (Pakistani) identities, which generates multiple senses of belonging. 
Through successive integration in the State of Pakistan and attachment to 
personification of the region that is located within the boundaries of Pakistan, Pakhtuns 
facilitate their belonging to Pakistan. Moreover, they discursively demonstrate their 
relation with a multi ethnic Islamic Pakistan. The Islamic aspect of Pakistani identity is 
neither contested nor seen as primary to belong to the State. Conspicuously Pakhtun 
cannot accommodate the idea of belonging to nation that recognizes Islamic or 
Muslimness of Pakistanis and frustrates ethnic as sense of belonging. For them 
Pakistaniat is necessarily in the ethnic diversity and Muslimness. 
 Pakistan is a nation in making, and the dilemma for Pakhtuns is to balance their 
own ethnic pride with that of Pakistani identity. To have a national identity that 
accommodates ethnic expressions is at the center of the Pakhtun paradox of belonging 
to Pakistan. Reiterating Pakhtun identity brings Pakhtuns in direct clash with those 
(ruling elites) who are inclined to define Pakistan as only an Islamic nation carved out 
of the Muslims of South Asia. Their intimacy  with Pakhtun culture and identity require 
them to adjust with the national identity  that has yet to be agreed upon. Elite emphasis 
on non ethnic Islamic identity would maximize the dilemma for Pakhtuns, for it would 
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exasperate the paradox and force them to make a hard choice between their pride in 
ethnic affiliation and assimilation in nation predicated on Islam alone. 
 Islam continues to be a significant aspect of Pakhtun identity. Not only religion 
is understood in a peculiar way as an institution concerned with performance of certain 
rituals and duties but Sharia is also interpreted in local context to be an alternative to 
inefficient political system. Pakhtuns in Malakand have been receptive to reformists 
message of reforms in the performance of rituals but unreceptive to their sectarian 
rhetoric and political ideology. Although local discourse rarely involves contestation 
over religious text or interpretation of the text, Taliban style Sharia and  methods are 
contested. Therefore, the process of internalizing any sectarian or ideological (Jihadi) 
globalism into ethnic identity is indiscernible. The militant religious elements (such as 
Taliban) are perceived exclusive to ‘us’ category, despite the constructed concomitance 
and inclusivity of Pakhtuns and Islamic militants and the consequent stereotyping in 
Pakistan. However, I have posited that people’s responses and sensitivities are informed 
by current presentation of Pakhtuns in media and political unrest in the region. 
 Moreover, Pakistani nationalism predicated on Islam has been less an 
assimilating factor for Pakhtuns as they insist on their ethnic identity. The exiting 
literature and evidence from the field suggest that global Islamism and the ideological 
Jihad has been more the product of State strategy and has less reflection in local 
expression and discourse of religion in Malakand. However, such an understanding in 
Malakand is informed by the current political situation. The relationship of Pakhtun 
culture and the radical tendencies is also complex. Currently a discourse is revisiting the 
relationship  between Islam and Pakhtunwali (cultural code). Such discourse looks for 
convergence and divergence between the two and polarize the elite among Pakhtuns. 
The discourse indicate two counter narratives of the relationship  between Islam and 
Pakhtunwali that sharpens the disjunctions and discontinuities. The discourse itself 
alludes to the processes of identification among Pakhtuns as an ongoing struggle and 
not a transformation through the dominance of any single constituent element of 
identity such as, Islam or Pakhtunwali.
 Despite sectarian contestation in Pakistan, sectarian boundaries do not  coincide 
with ethnic boundaries. Although, Pakhtuns differentiate between the Muslimness of 
Pakhtuns and the Muslimness of Punjabis or Sindhis, such boundaries are non sectarian. 
They  perceive others to be poor Muslims because they do not practice religion the way 
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they  do. Moreover, they would hardly identify  themselves as Deobandis or Barelvis but 
would most certainly and vividly identify  themselves as Sunni Muslims and express 
their unequivocal sense of belonging to Muslim Ummah. On these grounds I contest the 




List of informants with their Pseudonyms and other details
Interviewee Details Place Dates
Fareed Khan A leading Khan of Batkhela, who also 
owns considerable land and property. He 
is one of those earliest  Khanan in 
business. He and his siblings are 
generally  respected for their success in 
business and political influence. 
Batkhela 26 Oct 2008
11 April 2008 
S e v e r a l 
i n f o r m a l 
discussions. 
Saif ullah A leading member of Kisanyan 
movement. Still active and owns land in 
Batkhela now.
Batkhela 1 0 A p r i l 
2008
28 Oct 2008
Hamid A leading businessman in Batkhela who’s 
family migrated generations ago. 
Batkhela 1 2 A p r i l 
2008
Arshid A leading businessman in Batkhela 
market. His family has greater political 
influence in Batkhela. His family  is 
considered by khanan to belong to lower 
caste category. 





Former government employe and a well 
known khan. 
Batkhela 10 April 
2008
Abu Zar A leading political figure who claims 
Syed caste but often cited by  Khanan in 
Batkhela and Thana to have changed his 
caste from mullah to Syed. His family 
runs a very successful business in 
Batkhela.
Batkhela 19 April 
2008
Raheem An immigrant and businessman of 
Batkhela who has been a public figure. 
Batkhela Did not 
interview
Maulana A high ranking TNSM leader who is also 
an immigrant in Batkhela. He is educated 
in a number of madrasas and associate 
himself with Panjpiri sect. 
Batkhela 12 April 
2008
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Interviewee Details Place Dates
Yousaf Khan A young khan from Batkhela who is a 
government servant and the grandson of 
Fareed khan 




An important  Awami-khel office bearer. 
He is an immigrant and former 
government servant. 
Batkhela 26 Oct 2008
Aurangzeb 
Khan
Khan of Batkhela who runs business, 
practice law and owns land. He 
participated in processions against 
Muhammad Khan the leader of Awami-





An elderly khan of Batkhela. Currently, 
retired from government service. 
Batkhela 27 Oct 2008
7 April 2008
Abdali Khan A leading khan, trader and businessman, 
who also patronizes and participate 
literary activities in Batkhela. 
Batkhela 27 Oct 2008
Inayat ullah 
Khan
The son of Fareed khan and a leading 
businessman. 




A practicing doctor and an immigrant. Batkhela 28 Oct 2008
Irfan Nazim An immigrant who traces his family 
migration from the British time. He is 
currently a representative of a political 
party  and holds public office in local 
government. 
Batkhela 28 Oct 2008
Asad Nazim A renown immigrant who has successful 
business, represent a political party and 
hold public office in local government. 
Batkhela 26 Oct 2008
Arbaz Khan A leading khan of Batkhela who owns 
land and is associated with agriculture. 
His family is associated with politics for 
generations.  
Batkhela 26 Oct 2008
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Nadeem A representative of private company 
visits Batkhela often and mostly  stays 
with Fareed khan’s family. He does not 
belong to Malakand. 
Batkhela 2008
Khatir A literary figure from an immigrant 
family. His family is associated with 
business. 
Batkhela 04 April 
2008
Hafeez ullah One of the most successful businessman, 
who migrated to Batkhela in 1950s. His 
family members are included by Inayat 
ullah Khan in friendship circles.  
Batkhela 5 April 2008
Kamran Asif School teacher in Malakand. Member of 
Thana Adabi Tolena (Thana literary 
gathering/association. 
Thana 1 3 A p r i l 
2008
Fida Anwar Poet and member of Thana Adabi Tolena. Thana 1 3 A p r i l 
2008
Jameel Jamat Islami activist from Ghariban. 
Runs a small business. 




A khan of Batkhela who was previously a 
J i r g a m e m b e r. H o w e v e r , s i n c e 
performing Hajj has devote to teach 
Quran to children. 
Batkhela 8 April 2008
Qaid Khan A well known khan of Thana who is local 
government representative and political 
worker of a leading political party. 
Thana 1 4 A p r i l 
2008
Khalid Khan A w e l l k n o w n k h a n o f T h a n a . 
Agriculturalist and lawyer by profession. 
Thana D e c e m b e r 
2007
MAL A literary  Association in Batkhela. One of 
its gathering was used as focus group in 
this research work. 
Batkhela 6 April 2008
Thana Adabi 
Tolena
Literary  Association of Thana. One of its 
gathering was used as focus group in this 
research work. 
Thana 1 3 A p r i l 
2008
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Administrative officers stationed in 








Various faculty members of Department 
of Political Science, University of 
Peshawar, Peshawar. 





Faculty member of University  of 
Peshawar




Ex faculty  member of University  of 
Peshawar. 




A respected man in Batkhela who teaches 
Quran to children and also serves a 
teacher in a school.
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